R. v. Jackson, 2025 ONSC 1677

This is an application for a stay of proceedings pursuant to sections 11(B) regarding unreasonable delay of proceedings and 24(1) of the Charter.

Steven Jackson was charged with eight counts on an indictment, including assault, assault with a weapon, mischief, criminal harassment, uttering a threat to cause death, and uttering threats to kill an animal. The allegations involved persistent intimate partner violence against his wife of 31 years.

Jackson made the application for a stay on the ground that the unreasonably delay in his trial for 33 months infringes on his s.11(b) Charter rights, which was three months and 14 days over the ceiling set in R. v. Jordan2016 SCC 27, and is presumptively unreasonable.

The Court reviewed the decision in Jordan, where the Supreme Court of Canada set out a new framework which introduced presumptive ceilings for a timely trial. In the Ontario Court of Justice, the presumptive ceiling is 18 months, and in the Superior Court of Justice the presumptive ceiling is 30 months. Anything beyond the specified ceilings is presumptively unreasonable and the onus lies with the Crown to rebut this presumption by referring to exceptional circumstances (para. 21). It also reviewed the procedural history, beginning in July 2022, including the Applicant’s arrest due to the contents of his affidavit included in the Supplementary Application Record filed on June 25, 2024, for this matter. His affidavit included a video of his wife in which she can be seen nude, as well as a still image taken from that video, which her counsel indicated was taken without consent (para. 14-15). It was this incident where the Court found that the Crown had failed to establish that the delay caused by the voyeurism charge constituted an exceptional circumstance: While the voyeurism charge was unexpected, the police and Crown’s handling of the arrest and investigation was not unforeseeable (para. 40-45).

The Court acknowledged that this was a difficult conclusion considering the circumstances of this case given that the charges of intimate partner violence facing Jackson are serious and disturbing. The decision quoted from R. v. Vrbanic, 2025 ONCA 151, at para.63:

“One might be tempted to reason that this is “close enough.”  However, as I have already noted, in Jordan, at para. 56, the majority made clear that the presumptive ceiling “is not an aspirational target.  Rather, it is the point at which delay becomes presumptively unreasonable.”  The hard ceilings in Jordan give practical effect to this principle.  A “close enough” approach would foster the uncertainty and culture of complacency rejected by Jordan.” (para. 49)

The Application was granted and the charges were stayed.

R. v. Grant, 2025 ONSC 4991

This is the sentencing case of an offender who shot and killed a police service dog, Bingo, in the context of escaping capture for killing someone involved in a domestic dispute with his daughter. It is significant for the sentence that was levied on the charge for killing Bingo at four years imprisonment and the Victim Impact Statements that lament the loss of Bingo which indicate that in addition to being a service animal, Bingo was also a treasured family member.

On July 24, 2023, Kenneth Grant attended his daughter’s apartment armed with a loaded firearm after learning that her former partner, Sophonias Haile, was refusing to leave. During the confrontation, Grant fired four shots at Mr. Haile, killing him. The following day, when police came to arrest him, Grant fired at Detective Constable Goulah and later at Sergeant Smith. During this encounter, Mr. Grant deliberately shot and killed Bingo, who was assisting the officers in locating him. Grant fled the scene but was apprehended later that day.

Grant pleaded guilty to manslaughter, discharging a firearm with intent to prevent arrest, reckless discharge of a firearm, killing a service animal, and possession of a loaded firearm. Sgt. Smith submitted a Victim Impact Statement to the Court that stated “My family is without Bingo”, and his wife submitted a Statement on behalf of the Smith family that indicated how “the family has not just faced the loss of Bingo but as the Victim Impact Statement sets out: “we not only grieve the violence that took place that day, but we also continue to mourn our profound and personal reality: the brutal and senseless loss of Bingo, as well as the very real fact that my husband almost didn’t make it home to our family that night.””(para. 16-17)

The Court accepted a joint submission by counsel and imposed a global sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment. The Court applied the principle of proportionality to ensure each sentence reflected the seriousness of the individual offences and the principle of totality to ensure the overall sentence was not unduly long or harsh. Individual sentences included 10 years for manslaughter, nine years concurrently for the firearms offences, and four years consecutively for the killing of Bingo. The court found that the killing of a service animal was an aggravating factor and emphasized that the offence represented a deliberate and callous killing (para. 41, 53).

After credit for 771 days of pre-sentence custody (calculated at 1.5:1), the remaining sentence was 10 years and 10 months. The Court also imposed a section 109 weapons prohibition for ten years, a DNA order and a forfeiture order

R v KT, 2025 ONCJ 234

This is a sentencing decision which at the outset is determined as complex by the Court.

The offender, KT, is a 35-year-old man with no prior criminal record who pleaded guilty to an array of sexual offences, including criminal harassment and indecent communication against adult female co-workers, child luring, making sexually explicit material available to children, possession of child pornography, voyeurism, and exposure to persons under the age of 16. KT was diagnosed with pedophilic disorder (non-exclusive), cyclothymic disorder, ADHD, and substance use disorders in remission (para. 71, 74). Assessments placed his intellectual functioning in the low average to borderline range (para 81-83). The court found him to be an “untreated, indiscriminate sex offender” who posed a high risk of re-offending if left untreated (para. 2).

The police discovered a total of 3,651 videos and 2,257 images that depicted child pornography on KT’s devices with male and female victims aged between six months and 17 years old, with images that included depictions of bestiality (para. 30-31). The court also noted as aggravating the use of his workplace to target victims, the exploitation of minors, and the lack of remorse (para. 97-98); the size and nature of the child pornography collection is treated by the court as an extremely aggravating factor (para. 164-165).

The total sentence was calculated 7 years and 6 months in custody after applying the principle of totality and accounting for pre-sentence custody credit (paras 248-249, 293-294). Lifetime orders were imposed under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) and section 161 of the Criminal Code, including restrictions on contact with minors, internet use, and proximity to victims (paras 313-317), and DNA and a firearms prohibition order for 10 years were issued (para. 311-312).

R. v. King, 2024 NWTTC 2

This case involves an action by the Crown to review representative sample of child pornography or Child Sex Assault Material (“CSAM”). The accused had pleaded guilty to charges of having possessed child pornography, which included forensic analysis of Mr. King’s devices revealed 1,731 unique images and 140 unique videos of accessible CSAM, with an additional 512 unique images and two videos of CSAM were inaccessible on the device (para. 6 noting paras. 13-20 of Agreed Statement of Facts (ASF)). Among those recovered materials were human and animated CSAM images of children engaged in sexual activities with animals.

The Court noted that Parliament, the courts, Crown and victim advocates indicate that the replaying of CSAM revictimizes their victims, and where a description is contained in the ASF, as was done in this case, there is nothing left to imagine; and that, if at any point this court believed it was appropriate to view this CSAM, the court would be compelled to seek the victims’ views on the issue of the court viewing their sexual degradation as per the Victims Bill of Rights (para. 12-13).

In this case, the Court rules that the only possible outcomes would be the court becoming so enraged that its ability to impartially determine a sentence is reasonably subject to doubt. It is notable that the court acknowledges the degree of horror present in the material as so significant that it could prejudice judicial proceedings, a principle that may have weight going forward.

 

 

Richards v. Richards, 2024 ONSC 2488

This is a trial to change the initial order of joint custody issued by Justice McSweeney on January 26, 2018. The issues in dispute are decision-making responsibility, parenting time, police enforcement of the parenting time order, ongoing child support, retroactive child support, life insurance to secure child support and whether spousal support should be terminated.

After the initial order was issued, investigations by Dufferin Child and Family Services (DCFS)commenced due to a number of allegations made by Ms. Richards that her ex-husband’s parenting time was fraught with abuse and neglect, which resulted in a number of temporary orders. Among the allegations was the accusation that Mr. Richards routinely engaged in substance use (alcohol and drugs) and animal abuse in front the children, with one example being that he killed a sleeping raccoon in the attic with a knife in front of them, which Mr. Richards minimized as protecting his family. Based on these allegations but prior to the conclusion of the investigation, Mr. Richards parenting time was restricted to weekly, with supervision.

Later investigations through the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL) later found no conclusive evidence of abuse or neglect and restored Mr. Richard’s parenting time. Ms. Richards continued to prevent the children from seeing him based on her children’s wishes, and action was brought before the Court to review the original custody Order.

Neither the DCFS nor the OCL found any evidence of abuse or neglect in Mr. Richards parenting. Some of the accusations raised by Ms. Richards caused concern, notably the drug use and the “raccoon incident”, which led the children to have an unfavourable impression of their father (para. 80). However, the Court determined that both parents contributed to parental alienation, and that those impacts combined with the toxic relationship between parents, substance misuse and “the interruption of the child–father bond cannot be discounted”, therefore it was in the children’s best interests to effectively address those issues (para. 98).

The original custody Order was replaced with one that accommodates a phased custody approach for Mr. Richards in order to rebuild the children’s trust in him (para. 100), with the addition of a parental coordinator and counselling orders for both parents and children.

Importance of Case: While the Court accepts that the killing of a raccoon occurred, it simply rules that as a “cause for concern” and sign of significant trust erosion, that must be remedied through the new phased custody plan. However, no more attention is drawn to it than to the accusations of drug use, and it does not appear to have been ruled a sign of child abuse or neglect, which indicates that family courts do not always acknowledge the statistical link between animal abuse and child abuse.

R v Scott, 2024 ONCA 608

This is an appellate review of a case in which two men, Jeremy Pike and David Scott, were detained after their digital devices were searched upon entry to Canada. When the searches uncovered child pornography, the officers arrested them for the Customs Act offence of importing those illegal goods, then contacted the Peel Regional Police, who charged Pike and Scott with the Criminal Code offences of possessing and importing child pornography Concerns were raised about whether one of Canada’s border laws, section 99(1)(a) of the Customs Act which allows border officers to search travellers’ digital devices without any objective grounds, violates section 8 of the Charter (unreasonable search and seizure). The two men whose devices were searched under this law, and who were consequentially charged with possessing and importing child pornography, challenged the constitutionality of the law.

Pike is a former teacher. Before the charges, he was already a registered sexual offender who had been sentenced to 14 years in prison and stripped of his teacher’s licence for sexually interfering with eight young boys and making and possessing child pornography depicting that abuse; upon release, he left Canada and spent seven months visiting several developing countries, specifically some known destinations for travellers intending to sexually exploit children. Agency Border Services officers searched all 11 working devices belonging to Pike and found child pornography on one of the devices, arrested Pike for violating the Customs Act, and contacted Peel Regional Police, who found over 1,600 images depicting the sexual abuse and exploitation of children on two of Pike’s device (para. 18-19).

Scott is a 77-year-old retired business executive who had returned to Canada after spending six months at his vacation home in Belize. Border services officers searched his luggage and found 13 digital devices and after obtaining Scott’s passwords, officers then searched his three cell phones, one of the two tablets, and some USB keys. They found a folder that contained written child pornography 55 minutes into the search, then nineteen minutes later, after finding child pornography images, Scott was arrested for violating the Customs Act. The Agency contacted Peel Regional Police, who found approximately 3,000 text, image, and video files depicting the sexual abuse and exploitation of children on Scott’s digital devices (para. 20-21).

Neither Pike nor Scott were advised of their rights to counsel, and in Scott’s case that he was detained or the reasons for his detention, until well into the search and after illegal material had been located. The trial judge ruled that the s. 99(1) of the Custom’s Act was unconstitutional, and that the Agency had breached Pike’s and Scott’s s. 8 Charter right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as breaching their s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel and Mr. Scott’s s. 10(a) Charter right to be informed promptly of the reasons for his detention. He excluded from evidence the child pornography files from Pike’s devices and acquitted him of those charges; however, he admitted the files from Scott’s devices, convicted him of importing child pornography (R. v. Scott, 2022 ONSC 5823), and sentenced him to 23 months’ house arrest. The Crown was appealing Pike’s acquittal and seeking leave to appeal the sentence the trial judge imposed on
Scott, while Scott was appealing his conviction. (paras. 22-24).

Issues on appeal were whether:
1. The Customs Act’s authorization of searches of digital devices violates the Charter;
2. The Agency violated Mr. Pike’s and Mr. Scott’s right to counsel;
3. The evidence found on their digital devices is admissible; and
4. The trial judge erred by imposing a conditional sentence on Mr. Scott.

The Court relied on Friesen and Sharpe to extensively explain the harms and wrongs caused by possession and distribution of child sexual abuse material, in that it contributes to normalization, cognitive distortions and minimization of the damage such material causes, from paragraphs 144 through 156.

The Court found that, in Scott’s case, the trial judge erred in principle by failing to consider the many children that he had victimized and erroneously minimizing his moral blameworthiness; the trial judge had reasoned that most of Scott’s material did not depict real children. Scott told police in a statement that the defence agreed was admissible at sentencing that he collected material for three decades, and the psychologist who assessed him reported that he was a persistent user of child pornography since his teenager years, which increased his moral blameworthiness by showing that his actions were prolonged and repeated, thereby undercutting the trial judge’s conclusion that Scott had “previously good character” (para. 187). In addition, Scott’s “virtual and story material depicted or described especially harmful and wrongful activities, such as aggressive sexual activity, bondage, bestiality, and torture, which perpetuates messages that attack children’s very humanity and equality” (para. 189). The Court went on to conclude:

“I do not agree with the trial judge’s apparent conclusion that Mr. Scott’s characterization of his
actions as mere fantasies and claim that he did not “like” images depicting real children were mitigating. Rather, Mr.
Scott’s self-description of his actions reflected his distorted, myth-based thinking, minimized his possession of real
child images as a psychological crime, and overlooked the real children who he severely wronged and harmed.
Because he used images depicting children’s victimization to fuel those fantasies, they were an instrument of harm
to the real depicted children, and they increased the risks of inciting and facilitating the type of abuse of children
that Parliament sought to prevent by amending the Criminal Code to criminalize possession of child pornography.”(para. 191)

The court held that the Custom’s Act section was unconstitutional, however that did not entitle Pike and Scott to acquittals on the serious crimes against children with which they were charged. It allowed the Crown’s appeal from Pike’s acquittal, admitted the evidence that officers found on his digital devices, and ordered a new trial; for Scott, it also dismissed Scott’s appeal from conviction, granted the Crown leave to appeal the sentence the trial judge imposed on Scott but dismissed that appeal, to ensure that Scott served the rest of his house arrest sentence (paras. 195-196).

 

R v Jackson, 2024 BCPC 17

The accused made an application for the return of 12 firearms seized by the RCMP when he was charged with uttering a threat to injure an animal. He argued that the RCMP did not extend the detention order and that the guns were no longer needed for any proceeding. He also said keeping them caused hardship because he relies on them for sustenance hunting that is culturally essential to his Indigenous community.

The Crown position was that the application should be dismissed for two reasons (para.17):

a) Since proceedings were instituted, an application under 490(7) cannot proceed without Mr. Jackson first establishing under s. 490(8) that he would suffer hardship if his application was not allowed to proceed now. He has failed to do so; and

b) Even if Mr. Jackson establishes hardship, he has failed to meet the onus under 490(7) to establish that the seized items are not required for the proceedings.

The Court accepted that the applicant did suffer hardship, but held that he did not prove the firearms would not be required for trial (e.g., to show means, ownership, forensic classification). Since proceedings were already instituted, it was determined that the continued detention of the firearms was lawful.

The application was dismissed.

Kennedy v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2024 ONACRB 15872 93

Appellant Mark Kennedy contested the removal of his bulldog, Junior, by Provincial Animal Welfare Services (PAWS) investigators after a neighbour complained that the appellant had physically and emotionally abused Junior. A Senior Investigator for PAWS reviewed video showing the appellant yelling at, striking, pushing and kicking the dog. An AWS veterinarian, Dr. Robertson, reviewed the video, concluded the conduct was abusive and signed a veterinary certificate advising removal.

At issue was whether Junior was in distress on May 2, 2024 and whether removal was necessary to relieve that distress; and also whether the conditions leading to removal had been addressed so that Junior could be safely returned to the appellant.

Animal Care Review Board accepted the evidence of the investigator and the veterinarian, and found that Junior was in distress from physical and psychological abuse on the date in question and that his removal was necessary and lawful. In his testimony, the veterinarian stated that “when caregivers are physical abusers, there is inherently an element of psychological distress as compared to a single act of physical abuse by a random stranger whom the dog does not know; Dogs are dependent on their owners for the basic needs of life and physical abuse at the hands of an owner who they need to continue to interact with, causes psychological distress; Dogs who have been abused by their owners are conflicted by their need to be taken care of and their reluctance to interact with their abuser.” (para. 20 (h-j)).

The Board found the conditions causing removal had not been addressed and determined that the appellant’s expressions of remorse and willingness to take courses were not persuasive because he had not taken concrete remedial steps. The Board accepted expert evidence that returning Junior would likely cause the dog to experience further psychological harm (para. 29). One notable aspect of this decision is that the judge weighed both the physical and psychological harm suffered by Junior. Psychological distress of animals is frequently not considered by the courts, despite being included in the PAWS Act under the definition of distress.

MW v Nova Scotia Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA), 2024 NSAWAB1

MW appealed the Nova Scotia SPCA’s seizure of his dog, Daisy, who was removed from his home on January 5, 2024 under the Animal Protection Act. The allegations of abuse were widespread and significant, with some of it caught on video uploaded to YouTube which were the source of the complaints. At the time Daisy was retrieved, the SPCA was also looking for a cat Mookie, also owned by the appellant, who was seen being squeezed by the appellant, but Mookie was never found.

The majority of the board found that despite credible video evidence of some improper handling and an unsafe environment during the “chainsaw incident”, but overall the evidence did not establish that Daisy’s health, safety or well‑being had been impaired to the statutory threshold.

Daisy was returned to MW at no cost as “the majority of the Board members found that the dog did not require ”immediate seizure” to preserve its life on January 5, 2024” (para. 130), and the seizure was improper under the purported section of the Act; the inspectors erred in going straight to removal rather than making attempts to work with MW by issuing warnings and compliance orders first (para. 132). The Board was unwilling to withhold Daisy’s return, primarily because there was no unquestionable evidence of physical or psychological abuse. After lengthy deliberation, the Board majority found that the seizure was not carried out appropriately under the Act, and was overturned.

One Board member had a final point overall dissent with the majority decision: “My primary dissent was to the creation of a dangerous environment with the use of the chain saw and axes. There was no clear evidence of the location of the animals during this video segment, and the Appellant’s erratic behavior appeared to be escalating; therefore, I feel the SPCA was justified in seizing the animals as it was in the pets’ best interest, with the knowledge that they had at the time” (para. 135).

Talis (Re), [2024] O.R.B.D. No. 1231

This case refers to a hearing convened under the Ontario Review Board to determine whether the accused, Kalis Talis, represented a significant threat to the safety of the public as defined in section 672.5401 of the Criminal Code and, if so, what was the necessary and appropriate disposition which was also the least onerous and least restrictive. The animal abuse Mr. Talis was charged with and found not criminally responsible for was the intentional injury and later killing of his mother’s dog as a direct result of delusions about the dog eating him and hallucinations of voices that he believed to be coming from the dog. Talis had a long history of mental illness and had been charged several times in the past but sentenced only to probation until the most recent incident.

The Board determined that Mr. Talis represented a significant threat to the safety of the public and that the appropriate disposition would be a detention order under the terms recommended by the mental health facility. The Board ruled that Mr. Talis suffers from a major mental illness and has displayed regular noncompliance with recommended medication as well as acute symptoms of his illness. He has displayed significant aggression both to animals and human beings who minimizes his actions and is noncompliant with treatment.

Mr. Talis was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR) with respect to charges of mischief – interfere with lawful use, enjoyment, operation of property; failure to comply with a release order x2; kill or injure animal; and fail to comply with a probation order all contrary to the Criminal Code.

Importance of Case: Despite the fact that Mr. Talis had never directly harmed a human being physically – only threatened to – the Board draws a clear link between those threats and violence towards animals as a clear precursor to escalation. This demonstrates two important principles. First, that the Board does not view violence towards animals and towards humans as the same and places more weight on harm towards humans. However, it did acknowledge the link between violent treatment of animals and violent treatment of humans in ruling that the killing of the dog was sufficient grounds to detain Mr. Talis at the hospital.