Niagara North Condominium Corp. No. 46 v Chassie, 1999 CanLII 15025 (ONSC)

Statute: Other,
Section: Condominium Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.26; Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19
Province or Territory: Ontario,
Offence: Other,
Animal: Cat,
Type of Distress: Condo corporation seeking an order to remove residents' 16-year-old cat
Sentence: Appeal dismissed
Legal Issue: Procedure, Provincial case,

The applicant, Niagara North Condominium Corporation No. 46 (NNCC), commenced an application in the Ontario Court (General Division) seeking an order directing the respondents, Raymond and Muriel Chassie, to remove their 16-year-old cat from their unit, claiming its presence violated the condominium’s Declaration and Rules, which prohibited all animals, except small, caged birds and fish.

The corporation relied on its authority under the Condominium Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.26, which permits the establishment and enforcement of rules. The court found enforcement unreasonable.

The Chassies’ position was that they had been disadvantaged at the time of purchase, as they were unaware of the cat prohibition and the possibility of enforcement. Further, the Board of Directors had also acquiesced to previous pets, including cats, which undermined the corporation’s claim and made strict enforcement unfair. Finally, removing the cat would further constitute discrimination against Mrs. Chassie due to her depression under the Ontario Human Rights Code, as the cat provided essential companionship and therapeutic support.

The Court found the pet prohibition unreasonable in modern society, where attitudes toward pets have evolved. The prohibition lacked flexibility to accommodate changing circumstances, such as the needs of elderly or disabled residents. The Court emphasized that the cat did not interfere with the use or enjoyment of other units (paras 83-94). It was also found that Mrs. Chassie suffered from a mental disorder (depression) within the meaning of the Human Rights Code. The cat was essential to her mental health and well-being, making them a support/therapy animal, therefore enforcing the no-pet rule would constitute discrimination against Mrs. Chassie based on her health condition or disability, contrary to the Code (paras 108-115).

The application was dismissed; no costs awarded.

https://canlii.ca/t/1wclb
1999 NNCC No 46 v Chaissie

R v T.B., 2008 ONCA 80

Statute: Criminal Code, Youth Criminal Justice Act,
Section: YCJA sections 110(1), 111(1), and 138(1)
Province or Territory: Ontario,
Offence: Dog fighting, Other,
Animal: Dog,
Type of Distress: Appeal on assault with weapon verdict, where accused was acquitted of causing unnecessary suffering to a dog used as a weapon
Sentence: Appeal dismissed
Legal Issue: Ownership/Care/Control,

In the original judgement, the accused was found guilty on multiple counts including assault with a weapon (the pit bull dog Tiger and a beer bottle), aggravated assault, and breaches of probation. The court found that T.B. had control over the dog, intentionally commanded it to attack two victims causing significant injuries, and threw a beer bottle at a police officer during his flight. While he was acquitted of animal cruelty due to reasonable doubt on intentionally causing “sufficient harm” to the dog, the court concluded the dog was used as a weapon, and T.B. was convicted as a principal to the assaults. You can read the initial case here.

An appeal was made based on the claim that trial judge placed undue emphasis on the appellant’s demeanour, which led to her undue assessment of the credibility of T.B.’s testimony.

The Ontario Court of Appeal found that the trial judge’s assessment towards T.B.’s demeanour played little role in her assessment of the credibility of T.B.’s testimony, therefore, dismissed the appeal.

 

 

https://canlii.ca/t/1vmf8
R. v. T.B 2008 ONCA 80

R v T.B., 2006 ONCJ 391

Statute: Criminal Code,
Section: sections 2, 267(a), 268(1), and 446(1) (a)
Province or Territory: Ontario,
Offence: Dog fighting, Other,
Animal: Dog,
Type of Distress: Unlawfully and willfully caused unnecessary suffering to a dog by using the animal as a weapon
Sentence: Not guilty
Legal Issue: Ownership/Care/Control, Suffering, Wilfulness,

The accused, T.B., attended a large party held by another teenage at his parents house in Brampton on June 29, 2002. Around ten to fifteen teenagers were invited; more showed up upon “hearing about it,” and a lot of them were consuming alcohol. Uninvited, T.B. came with a group of friends and brought with him his friend Andre Alleyne’s pit bull named “Tiger,” who he had a close relationship with. The presence of Tiger was not welcomed by the crowds at the party and the accused was told that his dog would have to leave.

After a series of squabbles between the invited guests and T. B.’s group, the dog attacked two people, Eddie Alessi and Marty Brown, under command of T.B. Tiger was hit over the head with a beer bottle “with full force” by Simon Keenan to make it release its grip on Eddie Alessi, and was kicked and punched by various individuals, including the victims, in self-defence. The dog was described as letting out a “little cry” when struck with the beer bottle and then ran away.

The defence argued that T.B. lacked “appropriate control or decision-making capacity” over the dog. to test whether T.B have the required control and intent for the dog attacks, the Court accepted evidence that T.B said “you want this? Bring it” before unleashing the dog, the evidence that he repeatedly yelled “get him” to incite the dog to attack, and that T.B. had a close, possessive relationship with the dog, referring to it as “my dog” during testimony. Together with the fact that Tiger was also responsive of all these commands, the Court found beyond reasonable doubt that T.B. did have de facto control of the dog, despite the dog belongs to his friend Andre Alleyne.

Following the precedent set in R. v McLeod, which held that the definition of “weapon” in s. 2 of the Criminal Code includes both animate and inanimate objects and the focus on the definition should be on the use or intended use of the object to cause injury or threat, the Court ruled that a dog can be a weapon. Altogether, the Court concluded T.B used the dog as a weapon with the request intent for assault.

Despite it has been proven T.B. had the intent to use Tiger as a weapon for assault, the judge acquitted him on the animal cruelty count. The decision is based on a reasonable doubt on the presence of mens rea and “unnecessary suffering.” The charge that T.B unlawfully did willfully cause unnecessary suffering to a dog required proof that he had objective foresight that his actions would lead to the dog being beaten. The court had a reasonable doubt that T.B., when unleashing and inciting the dog to attack, had required foreknowledge that people would have to beat the dog to fend it off. However, his intent was for the dog to attack others, not necessarily for the dog itself to be harmed in the process. In addition, the Crown led no specific evidence about the actual injury or suffering endured by the dog. There was no testimony from a veterinarian or the dog’s owner about any lasting harm, wounds, or the extent of the animal’s pain. The evidence showed the dog ceased its attacks when hit, cried out, but was then able to be led away from the scene. The court was left in a state of reasonable doubt as to whether the suffering inflicted met the legal threshold of being “unnecessary” and caused by the accused’s actions within the meaning of the Criminal Code.

The court concluded that while T. B.’s actions were reckless and criminal in their use of the dog as a weapon against people, the Crown failed to prove the specific elements of the animal cruelty charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The focus of his criminal liability was on his actions toward the human victims, not toward the dog. Consequently, T.B. was found not guilty on animal cruelty.

https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/bd2b11e5-fe63-46f7-b995-e821a73fbb05/?context=1505209
R. v. T.B 2003 - 2006 ONCJ 391

R v Mrozik, 2025 MBPC 54

Statute: Criminal Code,
Section: s163.1(4)
Province or Territory: Manitoba,
Offence: Other,
Animal: Unknown,
Type of Distress: Possession of videos and images with child sexual abuse, with additional 2247 images and 413 videos classified as images of "investigative interest" featuring bestiality and searches for zoo-sadism
Sentence: Two and a half years imprisonment; ancillary orders including DNA and 20-year SOIRA order; 10-year weapons prohibition
Legal Issue: Possession of animal sexual abuse exploitation material ("pornography"),

The accused, a 22-year-old man with no criminal record, pleaded guilty to possessing a significant collection of Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM). The material, found on his cell phone and a gaming device, included 187 unique images and 25 unique videos. The court described the collection as being at the “high end of any depravity scale,” depicting graphic sexual violence, exploitation, and degradation of infants and young children.

In addition, there were 2247 images and 413 videos classified as images of “investigative interest” on the accused’s device. These materials contain elements of bestiality, sadism and masochism, and hurtcore pornography, with videos showing animals that are bound, some are subject to anal penetration and physical violence. His browser history on the dark web reveals searches for zoo-sadism, directly linking his online searches to the pursuit of material depicting animal cruelty. He also specifically requested materials including zoo-sadism, bestiality and other forms of CSAM in online chat rooms. Telegram Messenger chats found on his cell phone was where he engaged in discussions with other users online about types of CSAM; he specifically requested zoosadism and hurtcore materials, including “shota” (sexual content involving young males), from other users and sent CSAM images to other users and received CSAM images from them, as well as instructed other users as to how they could access certain types of material, including “cub” materials, a reference to young and childlike subjects (paras. 32-33).

In reviewing the circumstances of the offender (paras. 49-56), it was revealed that he suffered a decline in his mental health during the pandemic, where he presented as depressed and exhibiting hopelessness, tried several medications and treatment protocols, and received a diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder, Social Anxiety Disorder and mild Autism Spectrum Disorder in 2022. He does not use drugs or alcohol and currently has no close friends but enjoyed talking to people online, and said he was “addicted” to gaming but not been able to engage in those activities due to his release conditions. The accused has never been in a romantic or sexual relationship and denies having a sexual attraction to children. He says that he learned about the Dark Web and the Deep Web from YouTube which led him to explore; he was depressed and suffering from anxiety, boredom and isolation due to the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns and he “stumbled on” the CSAM and animal abuse material. He says he felt “rebellious” by being on the Dark Web and Deep Web and went on the chats or message boards to “troll” people; that he was disgusted by what he saw and engaged with the goal of being disruptive and reporting others to Telegram Messenger. He admits he did exchange videos but that he felt obligated to do so. He takes full responsibility for his offending, and says his arrest was a “wake up call” as to how his mental health had deteriorated and he realized he needed intervention and treatment.

In the presentencing report, the doctor indicated that he felt that the accused’s rehabilitation needs, with his complicating mental health issues, could best be met in the community, and that incarceration would be harmful to his mental health, given his vulnerability and fragility (emotionally, physically and psychologically) (para. 61).

The Court stated that denunciation and deterrence were the paramount sentencing objectives of the sentence to be imposed on the accused for possessing child pornography, referring the Supreme Court guidance in Friesen that sentences for these offences need to reflect society’s condemnation of such conduct and the trauma they inflict on victims (paras. 66-67). It also acknowledged that the accused’s mental health challenges contributed to the circumstances that led to the offending, but do not reduce his moral blameworthiness: “His mental health challenges did not cause him to actually engage in CSAM offending” (paras. 96-98).

While it was considered mitigating that the accused had insight into his offending, was very youthful (19 years old) at the time of his arrest, and there were no alleged breaches to his strict bail conditions nor alleged reoffending of any type, it was found to be aggravating that the CSAM was found on two devices, including a cell phone that provided ready access, the material was at the high end of depravity, and the offending continued for more than a year (paras. 111-112). It was determined that a fit sentence, one in keeping with the principles of deterrence and denunciation at the forefront but has consideration for the mitigating and personal circumstances and factoring in some modest reduction of moral culpability due to his mental health challenges, two and a half years imprisonment was appropriate (para. 137)

The Court also considered the concerns that the accused’s family members and presentencing report doctor expressed about the mental health challenges that  may result in a custodial institution, to which the response was: “The public cannot be expected to receive the same message of denunciation and general deterrence that a jail sentence delivers, if jail, when it is required, is avoided by concerns as to how an offender may do in custody” (para. 138).

The accused was sentenced to two and a half years imprisonment, with ancillary orders including DNA and SOIRA orders (20 years), a mandatory 10-year weapons prohibition, and forfeit of his cell phone and gaming desktop computer tower.

There was no mention of an animal prohibition order, likely because there is no legal mechanism for it with charges relating to possession of child sexual abuse material.

https://canlii.ca/t/kfj4n
R v Mrozik 2025 MBPC 54

R v Marineland of Canada Inc., 2025 ONCJ, File No. 4521-999-23-1028-00

Statute: PAWS Act (ON),
Section: s. 30(1) – Failure to comply with an order
Province or Territory: Ontario,
Offence: Other,
Animal: Other,
Type of Distress: Failure to adequately care for three black bears and comply with related orders
Sentence: Appeal dismissed
Legal Issue: Provincial case (Adequate: (providing adequate care)), Provincial case (Disposition of animals), Provincial case (Due dilligence), Provincial case (Procedure), Provincial case (Sentencing),

This is an unreported decision where Marineland appeals its conviction under Ontario’s Provincial Animal Welfare Services (PAWS) Act on three charges for failing to comply with a 2021 order relating to the care and removal of three black bears kept at the facility, Slash, Toad and Lizzy, alleging that the trial justice had erred in denying their application for a stay of the charges which argued that it was an abuse of process.

The facility had been convicted in March 2024 based on an agreed statement of facts they had presented which they indicated would be sufficient “to make a finding of guilt”, but lawyer Scott Fenton stressed that Marineland was not making a guilty plea and the park maintained the ability to appeal.

Marineland argued that the prosecution was abusive, that the revocation of the order nullified the offences, and that the presiding Justice of the Peace had misapplied the test for abuse of process and stay of proceedings set out in R v Babos, 2014 SCC 16.

Regarding the argument that the province’s revocation negated the offences, the Justice observed:

[17] The Appellant further argued in their factum of December 29, 2023, and in the argument before me that the Ministry simply could have sent the Appellant a letter indicating that given the bears had been removed that compliance with the Order was no longer necessary. The legislation does not contemplate a letter being sent. They argue instead that the Ministry issued a formal Revocation saying that the Order had been complied with.

[18] I reject this argument. For this to be the case it would mean that the Revocation order
would effectively nullify what were valid grounds to prosecute Marineland. I find this would
result in an absurdity.

The Ontario Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the revocation did not erase Marineland’s prior non-compliance and that no abuse of process was established. The Justice confirmed that the Babos framework had been properly applied and emphasized that maintaining public confidence in the enforcement of animal welfare laws required that prosecutions proceed where valid orders had been breached.

R v Marineland of Canada Inc., 2025 ONCJ

R v Merasty, 2025 SKCA 109

Statute: Criminal Code,
Section: s 2: definition of bodily harm
Province or Territory: Saskatchewan,
Offence: Other,
Animal: n/a,
Type of Distress: Definition of bodily harm
Sentence: Appeal allowed: conviction for assault substituted with a conviction for assault causing bodily harm and remitted to trial judge for sentencing
Legal Issue: Procedure (Charges), Procedure (Error in principle), Sentencing,

Despite not being an animal abuse case, this appeal does contain a concise overview on what is required for proving an assault causing bodily harm charge and may be of use when prosecuting animal cruelty.

The offender had been brought before the trial judge on robbery charges, as well as common assault, assault causing bodily harm, and aggravated assault due to an altercation involving a bicycle once owned by the offender. He testified at trial that the bike was his and admitted to striking the victim but said he did not expect to knock them out and that he was only defending his property.

Police who attended the scene had found the victim unconscious, confused and dizzy, with a one-inch laceration on the top right side of his head, with photos taken at the hospital showing the victim’s face covered in dried blood and head wrapped in gauze. Defence counsel argued that the victim’s prior physical condition had not been established and it had not been proven that the injuries described by police witnesses were caused by the offender. The trial judge convicted the offender of common assault but not of the more serious offences of aggravated assault or assault causing bodily harm, stating that:

“I am mindful that the police found [the victim] to be unconscious when he was found on the ground. When he was observed at the hospital sometime later, he was conscious and pictures were taken of his condition. However, when it comes to whether this injury rises to the standard of bodily harm, I have no evidence as to how the injury suffered by [the victim] affected either his health or comfort beyond what is considered transient or trifling… without further evidence as to how his health or comfort was affected, I am unable to determine or infer whether the injury he suffered equated to bodily harm according to Section 2” (para. 8).

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the more serious offences, arguing that the trial judge erred in law by failing to find that the injuries sustained by the complainant met the legal definition of bodily harm. At issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in concluding that the offence of assault causing bodily harm had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court reviewed the definition of bodily harm under the Criminal Code and the evidence required to prove it, referring to case law which ranges from fainting to superficial bruising, lacerations and pulling of hair (para. 19). It concluded that the trial judge had accepted that the victim had been conscious prior to the assault and not after, and that the altercation produced a laceration with significant bleeding, which amounted to more than trifling injuries, and went on to explain:

[22]           Testimony from [the victim]’s treating physician was not required to establish that [the victim] had suffered bodily harm, because the evidence accepted by the Court proved that [the victim] was knocked out and left with a cut that caused significant bleeding. It does not take the testimony of a person with medical training to describe a bruise, a cut, or that someone was found unconscious. It does not take evidence from a medical expert, or even the complainant, to conclude that these injuries affected the health and comfort of [the victim] and were more than trifling in nature. Bodily harm can be inferred from the nature of the injuries sustained which, in this case, were proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence.

[23]           Simply put, expert evidence or medical evidence is not required before making a finding of bodily harm.

The Court found that the trial judge had erred in his application of the definition of bodily harm to the facts. The appeal was allowed, with the conviction for assault substituted for a conviction for assault causing bodily harm, and the matter was remitted to the trial judge for sentencing.

https://canlii.ca/t/kg9mz
R v Merasty 2025 SKCA 109

Josan v R, 2025 SKKB 108

Statute: Criminal Code,
Section: s 445.1(1)(a)
Province or Territory: Saskatchewan,
Offence: Abuse,
Animal: Dog,
Type of Distress: Beating a dog, caught on video; threatening statements made to person recording incident
Sentence: Appeal dismissed; suspended sentence of 12 months with probation conditions, 30 hours of community service, restitution of $1,994 to the Regina Humane Society, a $100 victim surcharge, and a two-year prohibition on possessing animals upheld
Legal Issue: Procedure (Error in principle),

In November 2024, the appellant/offender had pled guilty to wilfully causing unnecessary pain to a dog by hitting it contrary to s 445.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code in an incident that had been captured on video. He was issued a suspended sentence of 12 months with probation conditions, 30 hours of community service, restitution of $1,994 to the Regina Humane Society, a $100 victim surcharge, and a two-year prohibition on possessing animals.

The offender appealed in June 2025, arguing the sentence was excessive and that the sentencing judge had failed to comply with section 726 of the Criminal Code by not asking the offender if he had anything to say before sentencing (para.13-14). The respondent/Crown submitted that the sentence was reasonable and proportionate to the offence, given its seriousness and the need for deterrence and denunciation and acknowledged the procedural error under section 726 but argued it did not affect the sentence.

The judge undertakes a thorough review of the history of animal case law across Canada, referring to the Criminal Code amendments in 2008 and 2019, and quoting at length from cases such as Justice Fraser’s dissent in Reece v Edmonton, Alcorn, Chen and the recent Nichols case from Manitoba to demonstrate the seriousness of animal cruelty offences and the evolving consideration animals have in society. The judge also stated that

“Sentencing judges must consider both the harm done to the animal and to society’s revulsion against and condemnation of animal cruelty. The focus of the inquiry must begin with the gravity of the offence – the nature and extent of the pain, suffering, and injury caused to the animal as the victim of the offence. Courts have compared offences against domestic animals with offences against children, since both are vulnerable and rely upon people as their guardians for their care and protection” (para. 73)

They reiterated that “most convictions result in a prison sentence, suspended sentence with probation, or conditional sentence order. Incarceration is appropriate for serious cases of intentional harm, including for first time offenders” (para. 74) and that “aggravating factors include harming animals in the offender’s care, since this is a breach of trust, and harming pets of others to exert control or as retribution” (para. 75).

The appeal was dismissed after the judge concluded that the sentence was not excessive, but appropriate given the circumstances, and that the error made by the sentencing judge relating to s 726 was not a miscarriage in justice but a harmless oversight, as the offender’s counsel had effectively communicated the offender’s remorse and personal circumstances to the Court.

https://canlii.ca/t/kdlfj
Josan v R 2025 SKKB 108

Hamer v. Jane Doe, 2024 ONCA 721

Statute: Other,
Section: Courts of Justice Act, s. 137.1
Province or Territory: Ontario,
Offence: Hoarding, Neglect,
Animal: Cat,
Type of Distress: Appeal on dismissal of defamation action involving accusations of potential hoarding and neglect of cats
Sentence: Appeal allowed; dismissal of defamation action set aside
Legal Issue: Provincial case (Procedure),

This is an appeal of the motion judge’s dismissal of the appellants defamation action; the reasons and summary are here: Hamer v Doe, 2023 ONSC 4837.

The appellant operates a Roo Roo Cat Rescue, a rehabilitation and adoption service. They began an action against the respondents for negative social media posts and associated comments that alleged or suggested that the appellants were mistreating cats under their care and that Hamer was a cat hoarder with mental health issues.

The appellants allege that the motion judge committed a legal error by misapplying the criteria under s. 137.1(a) and (b) of the CJA and treated the respondents motion as a motion for a summary judgement. The court held that the motion judge’s analysis did not adequately consider both legislative purposes underlying s. 137.1 of the CJA by focusing on the protection of free speech to the exclusion of the protection of one’s reputation through a court action. Furthermore, the court held that the motion judge erred when they dismissed the action against the respondents. This was compounded by dismissing the entire action. S. 137.1 states that the action may be dismissed against only the moving party, not other defendants who may be participating in a motion.

The respondents (Defendants in the original action) position was that that the statements were expressions on matters of public interest, protected by defences such as fair comment, justification, and responsible communication. They argued that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate substantial harm.

The Court determined that the motion judge had failed to properly assess the cumulative effect of the impugned statements and mischaracterized the potential harm caused by the defamation. The social media posts alleged that the plaintiffs were mentally unstable and mistreated animals. This led to an improper analysis of the defences and the harm caused (paras. 59-61). It found that the motion judge had improperly dismissed the appellants’ evidence of harm, including the rescue’s and individual’s reputation and psychological harm, by imposing an unduly high evidentiary burden (paras. 103-110). The defamatory statements, which devolved into personal attacks, were of low public interest value and outweighed by the harm to the appellants’ professional reputation: “the impugned expression was unnecessary to convey the animal welfare message… the respondents could have expressed their concerns about the appellants’ activities without resort to the extreme and defamatory language that was used in the impugned statements. There is a significant difference between, on the one hand, providing others with a descriptive account of the animal welfare concerns with the appellants’ activities, and on the other hand, calling Ms. Hamer a mentally unstable cat hoarder who harms or kills cats in the appellants’ care” (para. 121).

The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the dismissal of the action, including the motion judge’s costs award in favour of the respondents. The Court found the appellants were entirely successful on this appeal and would therefore be entitled to their costs of the appeal from the appellants in the all-inclusive agreed upon amount of $14,644.46

https://canlii.ca/t/k74nw
Hamer v Jane Doe 2024 ONCA 721 - appeal

Hamer v Doe, 2023 ONSC 4837

Statute: Other,
Section: Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O 1999, c. C.43, s. 37.1
Province or Territory: Ontario,
Offence: Hoarding, Neglect,
Animal: Cat,
Type of Distress: Defamation action involving accusations of potential hoarding and neglect of cats
Sentence: Motion granted; Plaintiff defamation action dismissed under anti-SLAPP legislation
Legal Issue: Suitable care,

This case concerns a anti-SLAPP motion regarding a defamation action involving the plaintiffs and defendants.

The plaintiffs are Dee-Anne Hamer and Roo Roo Cat Rescue, which Hamer owns and operates. Roo Roo provides cat rescue, rehabilitation, and adoption services. A motion was brought by the defendants, Susan Namedof and Nicole Algar, to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ defamation claim under Ontario’s anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) legislation, as the proceeding limits freedom of expression on matters of public interest under Section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O.1990, c. C.43.

The defamation claim arises from three posts made on Facebook and comments made under those posts. The posts included concern for the cats under care and raised suspicions of potential hoarding and neglect of cats. After initial legal action was commenced, the defendant deleted her profile, effectively removing the posts. More posts were made on a different platform, which the plaintiff again sought legal action against.

Plaintiffs claimed that the posts were defamatory, harmed their reputation, and caused financial and emotional damage, and argued that the posts were not in the public interest. The defendants position was that they had valid defences of justification and fair comment, and contended that the harm alleged by the Plaintiffs was not sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting their expression.

The judge held that the posts are in the public interest because they relate to animal protection, welfare, and rescue. Also, that none of the claims had substantial merit. Ultimately, the judge held that the case is about the plaintiff wanting to silence the defendant and any criticism of their rescue operation and not real damage. Potential harm to the plaintiff is outweighed by the public interest in protecting expression.

The motion was granted and the Plaintiffs’ defamation action was dismissed (para 56).

https://canlii.ca/t/jzzhc
Hamer v Jane Doe 2023 ONSC 4837 - motion to dismiss

R. v. J.V., 2015 ONCJ 815

Statute: Criminal Code,
Section: ss 271, 159(1), 289, 21(1), 22(1), 151, and 265(1)
Province or Territory: Ontario,
Offence: Bestiality,
Animal: Dog,
Type of Distress: Prolonged sexual and physical abuse of children, including bestiality
Sentence: Both perpetrators found guilty on multiple counts
Legal Issue: Procedure (Charges), Encourage/Aid/Assist,

The judge began their decision remarks with “P.V. and J.V. were tried before me on 22 counts alleging the most despicable and odious physical and sexual abuse allegations imaginable”. They were the parents of the complainants, their two daughters KI.V and K.V who were aged 4 and 5 respectively when the abuse began, continuing for more than a decade. The abuse was only discovered and resulted in charges being laid after KI.V attempted suicide, on February 1, 2014, when she hung herself from a tree in the back of the family farm property with an electrical cord; after she awoke from a coma to learn that her sister, K.V., had told a hospital social worker that they had been abused by their parents, KI.V corroborated the story with a hospital worker (para. 4).

Charges included aiding and abetting sexual assault, physical assault, and sexual interference. The father J.V physically and sexually assaulted his two daughters, among other things, for around 12 years. Physical abuse included beatings, forced exercise, being hit with items, and being thrown into beehives. K.V described some of the physical abuse that took place included eating feces and their father encouraging their dog to bite them. The sexual assault of each complainant included intercourse, rape, and other activities, some of which they testified their mother P.V. was involved in. J.V. would often watch bestiality pornography as well, and encouraged both children to watch and forced KI.V to perform sex acts on him (para. 37). On more than one occasion, J.V forced KI.V to have intercourse with the family dogs (para. 39). K.V. would refuse to watch pornography which resulted in violent rape (para. 81).

Testimony from KI.V and K.V was the only available evidence. The judge ruled that KI.V’s testimony was credible, despite some inconsistencies in K.V’s testimony. The judge provided some interesting context regarding the influence of bestality in the crime, specifically at para 216, stating:

“None of the sexual activity KI.V. described defies belief, not even her account of her mother joining in after her father demanded it or the use of a dog after the inspiration of bestiality pornography. KI.V. said that she did not resist. She did what she was told by someone who asserted complete control over her. It is entirely believable that a victim that compliant under the control of a perverted parent could be made to endure the sexual indignity she described” (para. 216).

J.V was found guilty on 11 counts, including sexual assault, physical assault, and related offences, and acquitted on 4 counts due to insufficient evidence or legal issues, while the mother P.V was found guilty on 4 counts, including aiding and abetting sexual assaults and participating in one sexual assault and acquitted on other counts due to lack of evidence.

It is interesting to note that compelling the commission of bestiality (s. 160(2)) or bestiality in presence of or by child (s. 160(3)) were not listed among the charges laid, and only referenced in the conclusion where the judge finds the mother P.V. guilty of one count for having aided J.V. by placing a dog in the room with J.V. and KI.V., while KI.V. was being sexually assaulted by J.V., knowing or being wilfully blind that the dog would be used by J.V. in sexually violating KI.V (para. 322).

https://canlii.ca/t/gsbkw
R. v. J.V., 2015 ONCJ 815