R. v. Jackson, 2025 ONSC 1677

This is an application for a stay of proceedings pursuant to sections 11(B) regarding unreasonable delay of proceedings and 24(1) of the Charter.

Steven Jackson was charged with eight counts on an indictment, including assault, assault with a weapon, mischief, criminal harassment, uttering a threat to cause death, and uttering threats to kill an animal. The allegations involved persistent intimate partner violence against his wife of 31 years.

Jackson made the application for a stay on the ground that the unreasonably delay in his trial for 33 months infringes on his s.11(b) Charter rights, which was three months and 14 days over the ceiling set in R. v. Jordan2016 SCC 27, and is presumptively unreasonable.

The Court reviewed the decision in Jordan, where the Supreme Court of Canada set out a new framework which introduced presumptive ceilings for a timely trial. In the Ontario Court of Justice, the presumptive ceiling is 18 months, and in the Superior Court of Justice the presumptive ceiling is 30 months. Anything beyond the specified ceilings is presumptively unreasonable and the onus lies with the Crown to rebut this presumption by referring to exceptional circumstances (para. 21). It also reviewed the procedural history, beginning in July 2022, including the Applicant’s arrest due to the contents of his affidavit included in the Supplementary Application Record filed on June 25, 2024, for this matter. His affidavit included a video of his wife in which she can be seen nude, as well as a still image taken from that video, which her counsel indicated was taken without consent (para. 14-15). It was this incident where the Court found that the Crown had failed to establish that the delay caused by the voyeurism charge constituted an exceptional circumstance: While the voyeurism charge was unexpected, the police and Crown’s handling of the arrest and investigation was not unforeseeable (para. 40-45).

The Court acknowledged that this was a difficult conclusion considering the circumstances of this case given that the charges of intimate partner violence facing Jackson are serious and disturbing. The decision quoted from R. v. Vrbanic, 2025 ONCA 151, at para.63:

“One might be tempted to reason that this is “close enough.”  However, as I have already noted, in Jordan, at para. 56, the majority made clear that the presumptive ceiling “is not an aspirational target.  Rather, it is the point at which delay becomes presumptively unreasonable.”  The hard ceilings in Jordan give practical effect to this principle.  A “close enough” approach would foster the uncertainty and culture of complacency rejected by Jordan.” (para. 49)

The Application was granted and the charges were stayed.

R. v. Grant, 2025 ONSC 4991

This is the sentencing case of an offender who shot and killed a police service dog, Bingo, in the context of escaping capture for killing someone involved in a domestic dispute with his daughter. It is significant for the sentence that was levied on the charge for killing Bingo at four years imprisonment and the Victim Impact Statements that lament the loss of Bingo which indicate that in addition to being a service animal, Bingo was also a treasured family member.

On July 24, 2023, Kenneth Grant attended his daughter’s apartment armed with a loaded firearm after learning that her former partner, Sophonias Haile, was refusing to leave. During the confrontation, Grant fired four shots at Mr. Haile, killing him. The following day, when police came to arrest him, Grant fired at Detective Constable Goulah and later at Sergeant Smith. During this encounter, Mr. Grant deliberately shot and killed Bingo, who was assisting the officers in locating him. Grant fled the scene but was apprehended later that day.

Grant pleaded guilty to manslaughter, discharging a firearm with intent to prevent arrest, reckless discharge of a firearm, killing a service animal, and possession of a loaded firearm. Sgt. Smith submitted a Victim Impact Statement to the Court that stated “My family is without Bingo”, and his wife submitted a Statement on behalf of the Smith family that indicated how “the family has not just faced the loss of Bingo but as the Victim Impact Statement sets out: “we not only grieve the violence that took place that day, but we also continue to mourn our profound and personal reality: the brutal and senseless loss of Bingo, as well as the very real fact that my husband almost didn’t make it home to our family that night.””(para. 16-17)

The Court accepted a joint submission by counsel and imposed a global sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment. The Court applied the principle of proportionality to ensure each sentence reflected the seriousness of the individual offences and the principle of totality to ensure the overall sentence was not unduly long or harsh. Individual sentences included 10 years for manslaughter, nine years concurrently for the firearms offences, and four years consecutively for the killing of Bingo. The court found that the killing of a service animal was an aggravating factor and emphasized that the offence represented a deliberate and callous killing (para. 41, 53).

After credit for 771 days of pre-sentence custody (calculated at 1.5:1), the remaining sentence was 10 years and 10 months. The Court also imposed a section 109 weapons prohibition for ten years, a DNA order and a forfeiture order

R v KT, 2025 ONCJ 234

This is a sentencing decision which at the outset is determined as complex by the Court.

The offender, KT, is a 35-year-old man with no prior criminal record who pleaded guilty to an array of sexual offences, including criminal harassment and indecent communication against adult female co-workers, child luring, making sexually explicit material available to children, possession of child pornography, voyeurism, and exposure to persons under the age of 16. KT was diagnosed with pedophilic disorder (non-exclusive), cyclothymic disorder, ADHD, and substance use disorders in remission (para. 71, 74). Assessments placed his intellectual functioning in the low average to borderline range (para 81-83). The court found him to be an “untreated, indiscriminate sex offender” who posed a high risk of re-offending if left untreated (para. 2).

The police discovered a total of 3,651 videos and 2,257 images that depicted child pornography on KT’s devices with male and female victims aged between six months and 17 years old, with images that included depictions of bestiality (para. 30-31). The court also noted as aggravating the use of his workplace to target victims, the exploitation of minors, and the lack of remorse (para. 97-98); the size and nature of the child pornography collection is treated by the court as an extremely aggravating factor (para. 164-165).

The total sentence was calculated 7 years and 6 months in custody after applying the principle of totality and accounting for pre-sentence custody credit (paras 248-249, 293-294). Lifetime orders were imposed under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) and section 161 of the Criminal Code, including restrictions on contact with minors, internet use, and proximity to victims (paras 313-317), and DNA and a firearms prohibition order for 10 years were issued (para. 311-312).

R. v. King, 2024 NWTTC 2

This case involves an action by the Crown to review representative sample of child pornography or Child Sex Assault Material (“CSAM”). The accused had pleaded guilty to charges of having possessed child pornography, which included forensic analysis of Mr. King’s devices revealed 1,731 unique images and 140 unique videos of accessible CSAM, with an additional 512 unique images and two videos of CSAM were inaccessible on the device (para. 6 noting paras. 13-20 of Agreed Statement of Facts (ASF)). Among those recovered materials were human and animated CSAM images of children engaged in sexual activities with animals.

The Court noted that Parliament, the courts, Crown and victim advocates indicate that the replaying of CSAM revictimizes their victims, and where a description is contained in the ASF, as was done in this case, there is nothing left to imagine; and that, if at any point this court believed it was appropriate to view this CSAM, the court would be compelled to seek the victims’ views on the issue of the court viewing their sexual degradation as per the Victims Bill of Rights (para. 12-13).

In this case, the Court rules that the only possible outcomes would be the court becoming so enraged that its ability to impartially determine a sentence is reasonably subject to doubt. It is notable that the court acknowledges the degree of horror present in the material as so significant that it could prejudice judicial proceedings, a principle that may have weight going forward.

 

 

R v Scott, 2024 ONCA 608

This is an appellate review of a case in which two men, Jeremy Pike and David Scott, were detained after their digital devices were searched upon entry to Canada. When the searches uncovered child pornography, the officers arrested them for the Customs Act offence of importing those illegal goods, then contacted the Peel Regional Police, who charged Pike and Scott with the Criminal Code offences of possessing and importing child pornography Concerns were raised about whether one of Canada’s border laws, section 99(1)(a) of the Customs Act which allows border officers to search travellers’ digital devices without any objective grounds, violates section 8 of the Charter (unreasonable search and seizure). The two men whose devices were searched under this law, and who were consequentially charged with possessing and importing child pornography, challenged the constitutionality of the law.

Pike is a former teacher. Before the charges, he was already a registered sexual offender who had been sentenced to 14 years in prison and stripped of his teacher’s licence for sexually interfering with eight young boys and making and possessing child pornography depicting that abuse; upon release, he left Canada and spent seven months visiting several developing countries, specifically some known destinations for travellers intending to sexually exploit children. Agency Border Services officers searched all 11 working devices belonging to Pike and found child pornography on one of the devices, arrested Pike for violating the Customs Act, and contacted Peel Regional Police, who found over 1,600 images depicting the sexual abuse and exploitation of children on two of Pike’s device (para. 18-19).

Scott is a 77-year-old retired business executive who had returned to Canada after spending six months at his vacation home in Belize. Border services officers searched his luggage and found 13 digital devices and after obtaining Scott’s passwords, officers then searched his three cell phones, one of the two tablets, and some USB keys. They found a folder that contained written child pornography 55 minutes into the search, then nineteen minutes later, after finding child pornography images, Scott was arrested for violating the Customs Act. The Agency contacted Peel Regional Police, who found approximately 3,000 text, image, and video files depicting the sexual abuse and exploitation of children on Scott’s digital devices (para. 20-21).

Neither Pike nor Scott were advised of their rights to counsel, and in Scott’s case that he was detained or the reasons for his detention, until well into the search and after illegal material had been located. The trial judge ruled that the s. 99(1) of the Custom’s Act was unconstitutional, and that the Agency had breached Pike’s and Scott’s s. 8 Charter right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as breaching their s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel and Mr. Scott’s s. 10(a) Charter right to be informed promptly of the reasons for his detention. He excluded from evidence the child pornography files from Pike’s devices and acquitted him of those charges; however, he admitted the files from Scott’s devices, convicted him of importing child pornography (R. v. Scott, 2022 ONSC 5823), and sentenced him to 23 months’ house arrest. The Crown was appealing Pike’s acquittal and seeking leave to appeal the sentence the trial judge imposed on
Scott, while Scott was appealing his conviction. (paras. 22-24).

Issues on appeal were whether:
1. The Customs Act’s authorization of searches of digital devices violates the Charter;
2. The Agency violated Mr. Pike’s and Mr. Scott’s right to counsel;
3. The evidence found on their digital devices is admissible; and
4. The trial judge erred by imposing a conditional sentence on Mr. Scott.

The Court relied on Friesen and Sharpe to extensively explain the harms and wrongs caused by possession and distribution of child sexual abuse material, in that it contributes to normalization, cognitive distortions and minimization of the damage such material causes, from paragraphs 144 through 156.

The Court found that, in Scott’s case, the trial judge erred in principle by failing to consider the many children that he had victimized and erroneously minimizing his moral blameworthiness; the trial judge had reasoned that most of Scott’s material did not depict real children. Scott told police in a statement that the defence agreed was admissible at sentencing that he collected material for three decades, and the psychologist who assessed him reported that he was a persistent user of child pornography since his teenager years, which increased his moral blameworthiness by showing that his actions were prolonged and repeated, thereby undercutting the trial judge’s conclusion that Scott had “previously good character” (para. 187). In addition, Scott’s “virtual and story material depicted or described especially harmful and wrongful activities, such as aggressive sexual activity, bondage, bestiality, and torture, which perpetuates messages that attack children’s very humanity and equality” (para. 189). The Court went on to conclude:

“I do not agree with the trial judge’s apparent conclusion that Mr. Scott’s characterization of his
actions as mere fantasies and claim that he did not “like” images depicting real children were mitigating. Rather, Mr.
Scott’s self-description of his actions reflected his distorted, myth-based thinking, minimized his possession of real
child images as a psychological crime, and overlooked the real children who he severely wronged and harmed.
Because he used images depicting children’s victimization to fuel those fantasies, they were an instrument of harm
to the real depicted children, and they increased the risks of inciting and facilitating the type of abuse of children
that Parliament sought to prevent by amending the Criminal Code to criminalize possession of child pornography.”(para. 191)

The court held that the Custom’s Act section was unconstitutional, however that did not entitle Pike and Scott to acquittals on the serious crimes against children with which they were charged. It allowed the Crown’s appeal from Pike’s acquittal, admitted the evidence that officers found on his digital devices, and ordered a new trial; for Scott, it also dismissed Scott’s appeal from conviction, granted the Crown leave to appeal the sentence the trial judge imposed on Scott but dismissed that appeal, to ensure that Scott served the rest of his house arrest sentence (paras. 195-196).

 

R v Jackson, 2024 BCPC 17

The accused made an application for the return of 12 firearms seized by the RCMP when he was charged with uttering a threat to injure an animal. He argued that the RCMP did not extend the detention order and that the guns were no longer needed for any proceeding. He also said keeping them caused hardship because he relies on them for sustenance hunting that is culturally essential to his Indigenous community.

The Crown position was that the application should be dismissed for two reasons (para.17):

a) Since proceedings were instituted, an application under 490(7) cannot proceed without Mr. Jackson first establishing under s. 490(8) that he would suffer hardship if his application was not allowed to proceed now. He has failed to do so; and

b) Even if Mr. Jackson establishes hardship, he has failed to meet the onus under 490(7) to establish that the seized items are not required for the proceedings.

The Court accepted that the applicant did suffer hardship, but held that he did not prove the firearms would not be required for trial (e.g., to show means, ownership, forensic classification). Since proceedings were already instituted, it was determined that the continued detention of the firearms was lawful.

The application was dismissed.

Kirby v R, 2024 NBCA 32

 

The accused, Michael Kirby, appealed his convictions for four counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm, all arising from separate dog attacks involving his animals. That case summary is available here.

He argued that his trial took too long in violation of his Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time (s. 11(b)), and that the guilty verdicts were inconsistent because he was acquitted of breaching his bail condition about controlling his dogs.

The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments. It found that most of the delay was caused by Kirby or his lawyers, so the overall timeline did not exceed the Jordan limit. It also explained that the offences required different mental elements: criminal negligence is judged by an objective standard, while breaching bail requires proof that the accused acted knowingly or recklessly. Because these standards differ, the verdicts were not contradictory. The Court further found no error in how the trial judge assessed the evidence from the Tim Hortons incident.

The appeal was dismissed and all convictions were upheld.

 

R. v. Kirby 2022 NBJ No. 356

This case concerns multiple dog attacks in Saint John, NB, between June and December 2018. Michael Kirby, the defendant, owned several large dogs that, on repeated occasions, were off leash in public or inadequately secured and attacked pedestrians, causing puncture wounds and other injuries. Despite prior complaints, an SPCA warning about leashing, and two earlier incidents demonstrating risk, Kirby minimized the behaviour as “herding” or “play” and failed to implement effective precautions (leashing, muzzling, confinement, or other controls).

The Court found that, by continuing to walk the dogs off-leash and later leaving them unsupervised in public and at home with inadequate containment, Kirby displayed a wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others and committed a marked and substantial departure from the conduct of a reasonable person. He was therefore found guilty on four counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm (Criminal Code, s. 221).

On a separate charge for breaching an undertaking (s. 145(3)), the Court entered an acquittal, holding the Crown had not proven the requisite subjective mens rea under R v Zora.

R v T.B., 2008 ONCA 80

In the original judgement, the accused was found guilty on multiple counts including assault with a weapon (the pit bull dog Tiger and a beer bottle), aggravated assault, and breaches of probation. The court found that T.B. had control over the dog, intentionally commanded it to attack two victims causing significant injuries, and threw a beer bottle at a police officer during his flight. While he was acquitted of animal cruelty due to reasonable doubt on intentionally causing “sufficient harm” to the dog, the court concluded the dog was used as a weapon, and T.B. was convicted as a principal to the assaults. You can read the initial case here.

An appeal was made based on the claim that trial judge placed undue emphasis on the appellant’s demeanour, which led to her undue assessment of the credibility of T.B.’s testimony.

The Ontario Court of Appeal found that the trial judge’s assessment towards T.B.’s demeanour played little role in her assessment of the credibility of T.B.’s testimony, therefore, dismissed the appeal.

 

 

R v T.B., 2006 ONCJ 391

The accused, T.B., attended a large party held by another teenage at his parents house in Brampton on June 29, 2002. Around ten to fifteen teenagers were invited; more showed up upon “hearing about it,” and a lot of them were consuming alcohol. Uninvited, T.B. came with a group of friends and brought with him his friend Andre Alleyne’s pit bull named “Tiger,” who he had a close relationship with. The presence of Tiger was not welcomed by the crowds at the party and the accused was told that his dog would have to leave.

After a series of squabbles between the invited guests and T. B.’s group, the dog attacked two people, Eddie Alessi and Marty Brown, under command of T.B. Tiger was hit over the head with a beer bottle “with full force” by Simon Keenan to make it release its grip on Eddie Alessi, and was kicked and punched by various individuals, including the victims, in self-defence. The dog was described as letting out a “little cry” when struck with the beer bottle and then ran away.

The defence argued that T.B. lacked “appropriate control or decision-making capacity” over the dog. to test whether T.B have the required control and intent for the dog attacks, the Court accepted evidence that T.B said “you want this? Bring it” before unleashing the dog, the evidence that he repeatedly yelled “get him” to incite the dog to attack, and that T.B. had a close, possessive relationship with the dog, referring to it as “my dog” during testimony. Together with the fact that Tiger was also responsive of all these commands, the Court found beyond reasonable doubt that T.B. did have de facto control of the dog, despite the dog belongs to his friend Andre Alleyne.

Following the precedent set in R. v McLeod, which held that the definition of “weapon” in s. 2 of the Criminal Code includes both animate and inanimate objects and the focus on the definition should be on the use or intended use of the object to cause injury or threat, the Court ruled that a dog can be a weapon. Altogether, the Court concluded T.B used the dog as a weapon with the request intent for assault.

Despite it has been proven T.B. had the intent to use Tiger as a weapon for assault, the judge acquitted him on the animal cruelty count. The decision is based on a reasonable doubt on the presence of mens rea and “unnecessary suffering.” The charge that T.B unlawfully did willfully cause unnecessary suffering to a dog required proof that he had objective foresight that his actions would lead to the dog being beaten. The court had a reasonable doubt that T.B., when unleashing and inciting the dog to attack, had required foreknowledge that people would have to beat the dog to fend it off. However, his intent was for the dog to attack others, not necessarily for the dog itself to be harmed in the process. In addition, the Crown led no specific evidence about the actual injury or suffering endured by the dog. There was no testimony from a veterinarian or the dog’s owner about any lasting harm, wounds, or the extent of the animal’s pain. The evidence showed the dog ceased its attacks when hit, cried out, but was then able to be led away from the scene. The court was left in a state of reasonable doubt as to whether the suffering inflicted met the legal threshold of being “unnecessary” and caused by the accused’s actions within the meaning of the Criminal Code.

The court concluded that while T. B.’s actions were reckless and criminal in their use of the dog as a weapon against people, the Crown failed to prove the specific elements of the animal cruelty charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The focus of his criminal liability was on his actions toward the human victims, not toward the dog. Consequently, T.B. was found not guilty on animal cruelty.