Richards v. Richards, 2024 ONSC 2488

This is a trial to change the initial order of joint custody issued by Justice McSweeney on January 26, 2018. The issues in dispute are decision-making responsibility, parenting time, police enforcement of the parenting time order, ongoing child support, retroactive child support, life insurance to secure child support and whether spousal support should be terminated.

After the initial order was issued, investigations by Dufferin Child and Family Services (DCFS)commenced due to a number of allegations made by Ms. Richards that her ex-husband’s parenting time was fraught with abuse and neglect, which resulted in a number of temporary orders. Among the allegations was the accusation that Mr. Richards routinely engaged in substance use (alcohol and drugs) and animal abuse in front the children, with one example being that he killed a sleeping raccoon in the attic with a knife in front of them, which Mr. Richards minimized as protecting his family. Based on these allegations but prior to the conclusion of the investigation, Mr. Richards parenting time was restricted to weekly, with supervision.

Later investigations through the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL) later found no conclusive evidence of abuse or neglect and restored Mr. Richard’s parenting time. Ms. Richards continued to prevent the children from seeing him based on her children’s wishes, and action was brought before the Court to review the original custody Order.

Neither the DCFS nor the OCL found any evidence of abuse or neglect in Mr. Richards parenting. Some of the accusations raised by Ms. Richards caused concern, notably the drug use and the “raccoon incident”, which led the children to have an unfavourable impression of their father (para. 80). However, the Court determined that both parents contributed to parental alienation, and that those impacts combined with the toxic relationship between parents, substance misuse and “the interruption of the child–father bond cannot be discounted”, therefore it was in the children’s best interests to effectively address those issues (para. 98).

The original custody Order was replaced with one that accommodates a phased custody approach for Mr. Richards in order to rebuild the children’s trust in him (para. 100), with the addition of a parental coordinator and counselling orders for both parents and children.

Importance of Case: While the Court accepts that the killing of a raccoon occurred, it simply rules that as a “cause for concern” and sign of significant trust erosion, that must be remedied through the new phased custody plan. However, no more attention is drawn to it than to the accusations of drug use, and it does not appear to have been ruled a sign of child abuse or neglect, which indicates that family courts do not always acknowledge the statistical link between animal abuse and child abuse.

MG v JG, 2025 NBKB 115

This is a family law case where the mother MG was seeking sole parenting time and decision-making responsibility for her three children as well as a restraining order, citing the father’s (JG) history of violence, substance abuse, and neglect. In addition to physical abuse and threats of violence, including from JG and his mother who threatened to call 911 and report that the mother was “crazy” or even kill her if she tried to leave with the children (paras.50-51) along with claims he would have her beaten up or killed by his drug dealers and that he was connected with motorcycle gangs (para. 53), JG also engaged in coercive, controlling behaviour, encouraged his favoured child to imitate his behaviour toward MG (throwing food and taunting with insults), and animal abuse.

Animal abuse listed under facts included throwing MG’s cat to the floor and punishing the animal for bladder or bowel accidents by shoving their face into it, increasing the cat’s stress and frequency of such accidents to the point where MG had the animal euthanized to spare them further abuse (para. 61). JG applied the same treatment to the family dog acquired later, as well as abusive discipline such as beating with a chair and using a remote shock device on its highest setting should the animal have an accident in the house, despite not permitting MG to take the dog out to relieve themselves out of fear that MG may flirt with the neighbour; the few times she was permitted to take the dog outdoors, MG was instructed to keep her eyes down and look at the ground “to avoid flirtatious glancing” (paras. 62-63). The dog was given to MG’s mother to care for in order to protect them from further abuse.

In August 2024, Child Protection Services and the RCMP launched an investigation into allegations against JG of child sexual misconduct (para. 77) with the two older children, whom he took into the washroom and spent excessive time with the door locked behind him (paras.104-105). MG relayed to her therapist that she had walked in on JG in the bathtub with their oldest child on at least two occasions and in one incident found him fondling the child’s penis, “rubbing it with movements that went far beyond cleaning the child” (para. 116), which led to the therapist filing the disclosure that led to the joint investigation (para. 117).

The Court granted MG sole parenting time and decision-making responsibility, as well as a restraining order against JG to protect herself and the three children.

 

KLM v JRH, 2024 BCSC 640

This is a family law dispute wherein K.L.M. applied for numerous interim orders regarding protection orders against J.R.H., parenting responsibilities/arrangements, breaches of conduct, and child/spousal support. K.L.M. and J.R.H. are in a marriage-like relationship with two children; J. and C.

Evidence shows J.R.H. engaged in family violence between 2021 and 2023 through disputed forms of physically assaulting K.L.M. and using language that constituted emotional abuse. He had also told J.R.H. had also told K.L.M. that he had been charged with assault two previous times against women he was in relationships with, but that those charges were dropped. In 2008, J.R.H. was convicted of animal cruelty after he put a cat belonging to his previous girlfriend in a microwave (para. 25-26).

In the course of their relationship, K.L.M. also witnessed J.R.H. hitting, kicking, and beating his dog, and throwing her cat against a wall. While the Court determined that the 2008 animal cruelty conviction was not directly relevant to this matter, J.R.H.’s abuse towards the cat constitutes emotional abuse towards K.L.M., either by way of threats to her pet or intentional damage to her property. In addition, a review of the 63 pages of message application exchanges between the parties revealed patterns of “J.R.H. demanding that K.L.M. answer questions, badgering her, and refusing to accept her choice not to engage with him when he does so…He also blames her for a range of things including, most seriously, blaming her for any behavioural or other issues experienced by the children” (para. 31). And “at times, he “gaslights” her, blaming her for failing to ensure that he has information related to the children when he was actually provided with that information, or denying that he blamed her for anything when he clearly had done so… has repeatedly insulted and belittled K.L.M….accusing her of lying and of being incapable of handling important documentation” (para. 32). The Court stated that “All of this constitutes family violence” (para. 34) and accepts that it “has likely had a substantial effect on the children’s health and emotional well‑being” (para. 40).

Although he had violated the pre-existing conduct orders regarding communications on the messaging application, the Court determined that a protection order for K.L.M. would not be appropriate at this time because J.R.H. has not contacted her physically and enforcement for communication misconduct would be difficult to enforce (para. 51). Instead, the Court strengthened the terms of the conduct orders to limit messaging to strictly and exclusively parenting issues and only factual in nature; failure for J.R.H. to comply would mean that K.L.M. could reapply for a protection order.

K.L.M. sought an order pursuant to s. 230(2)(b)(ii) of the FLA that J.R.H. pay her a fine of $5,000 for his repeated breach of the conduct orders (para. 71), with J.R.H. indicating he would consent to a $500 fine. The Court noted his breaches of the conduct orders were repeated, flagrant, and intentional, and was satisfied that a fine was necessary to enforce and secure his compliance (para. 76) and ordered that a fine of $2500 be imposed on J.R.H. to be paid within 60 days, with the understanding that any future failure to comply with the amended conduct orders would be likely to result in additional and larger fines.

Franco v Franco, 2024 ONSC 6436

This is a motion regarding ownership of a ten-year-old Yorkshire Terrier named Meg, at dispute after a relationship breakdown between the two parties who were married. The wife is seeking a declaration that she owns Meg, and for an order requiring the husband to immediately return Meg to her. In the alternative, she seeks an order that she have possession of Meg until further agreement of the parties or court order or that on a temporary basis, the parties share possession of Meg on an alternating week basis, with the exchange to take place on Mondays in conjunction with the parenting schedule with their daughter. The husband is seeking the same relief for himself.

In submissions, the wife claimed that the husband had purchased Meg for her as a gift, while the husband claims that he had wanted a dog for a long time, and that he managed the negotiations with the breeder, chose Meg from the litter, and paid for her therefore, he owns Meg. He acknowledges that the wife loves the dog but claims that her love for Meg is not connected to ownership. They have a nine-year-old daughter who resides equally between the two parties, and it was decided after they separated that it was in the best interests of their daughter to spend as much time as possible with the dog, so they agreed to share possession of Meg on an alternate week basis so that she spent the weekends with their daughter. After an attempt at reconciliation, the parties separated again and resumed sharing care of Meg until October 2023, when Meg was left in the exclusive care of the wife while the husband travelled and then moved residences. The husband did not retrieve Meg until the end of October, and on November 20, 2023, he advised the wife that he would not be returning Meg to her, which the wife states was a unilateral decision and made without notice to her. The husband has had Meg exclusively since then.

While acknowledging that “there may be a temptation to determine what party would be best able to look after a household pet, given that people who have pets generally think of them as family members, the developed law is that a dog is to be treated as property” (para. 28), the Court followed the factors set out in Coates v Dickinson, including who purchased, raised and cared for the animal as well as what happened to the animal after the relationship changed (para. 31). Given that there was conflicting evidence regarding which party provided primary care for Meg, there was no explanation from the husband as to why he denied the wife any time with or access to the dog since November 2023, despite her numerous attempts to come to some agreement around time-sharing, which left the Court concerned that further conflict would arise between the parties that would not be in their daughter’s best interests if ownership was not determined. There was also evidence that the husband had been taking steps to undermine the wife’s claim to ownership, even with her submission of many documents attesting to it (paras. 40-44).

The Court determined that based on the evidence provided, Meg’s ownership belonged with the wife.

 

Peng v Houston, 2024 BCCRT 505

This is a civil dispute relating to custody of a dog named Peanut. The two parties were involved in a romantic relationship when they bought Peanut, and after they separated and the respondent moved out, the parties agreed to a time-sharing arrangement. The arrangement broke down after several months, and the applicant asserts that since late October 2022, the respondent has withheld Peanut from her.

The applicant is asking for an order for “full custody” of Peanut in exchange for a buyout equivalent to the $875 the respondent paid toward Peanut’s purchase price. The respondent denies the applicant’s claims, stating that the applicant kept trying to unreasonably change the parties’ time-sharing arrangement, so they decided to keep Peanut until the parties had “a legal agreement in place”. Because the Family Law Act only applies to those who are legally married or in a relationship akin to marriage for at least two years, the Civil Tribunal had jurisdiction over this matter because they had been together for less than two years.

The issues at dispute were:

    a. Who owns Peanut? and
    b. If the parties jointly own Peanut, should sole ownership of Peanut be granted to one of the parties?

Although the tribunal acknowledged that the courts recognized the unique place pets occupy in peoples’ lives (para. 16), it affirmed that pets fall under personal property, making it question of who owns the pet rather than who should have “custody” of them. It also upheld the Family Law Act changes in early 2024, where the willingness and ability of each spouse to care for the pet’s basic needs, cruelty or threat of cruelty towards a pet, family violence, and other factors must be considered although the Act did not apply to this dispute, but because those changes reflect developments around the common law “best interests of the dog assessment” and courts that have increasingly considered animal welfare and the animal’s needs in considering ownership claims (para. 18).

After examining Peanut’s best interests and finding no evidence or allegations of animal cruelty or threat of cruelty by either party, the tribunal determined that Peanut was jointly owned. It also took into account who had paid and cared for Peanut, as well as the human-animal bond between the applicant’s adult daughter, and found that the respondent’s behaviour in withholding possession of Peanut of significant importance and indicates that they were unwilling or unable to consider whether their actions were in Peanut’s best interests, given the existing bonds between Peanut and the applicant’s family members (para. 28).

Weighing the evidence, the tribunal awarded ownership to the applicant and ordered that the respondent return Peanut to her within 30 days

Kinross v Bleau, 2024 ONSC 766

This is a family law case which involves animal cruelty. In the two motions before the Court, the Applicant (mother) is petitioning for child and spousal support and arrears, a modification of parenting time exchange, and costs, while the Respondent (father) is moving for dismissal of spousal support and arrears, modification of parenting regime, and costs.

Among the acrimonious history between the two parties is the mention of an OPP charge against the Respondent for animal cruelty toward the family dog based on allegations brought by the Applicant, which the Respondent alleges was her malicious attempt to cause him financial hardship through legal fees and portray him negatively and were contradicted by the longstanding veterinarian. While the Respondent claims the charges were dropped by the OPP, he also stated that that he pleaded guilty to an offence under the Provincial Offences Act in relation to those allegations (para. 9(o)). The Applicant had the dog euthanized.

The Respondent alleged in his submissions relating to parenting time that the Applicant has a history of violence toward him, where she has created a toxic environment over the past ten years as she was constantly trying to put him in harm’s way, financially, criminally, and physically (para. 8(a)).

The Court determined that interim spousal support would be awarded to the Applicant, due to her virtual lack of income, in the amount of $1077.00 per month but arrears were deferred to the trial judge with the exception of those for unpaid spousal payments in relation to a previous order made on September 1, 2023. With respect to the parenting schedule, the Court rejected the Applicant’s submissions regarding concerns over the Respondent’s parenting abilities (para. 46) and concluded that it would be in the best interests of the children that an Interim Order modifying the parenting regime to a one-week on/one-week off schedule be issued.

Children’s Aid Society of Algoma v CD, 2024 ONCJ 167

This case discusses the motion brought by the father of the child to have access to the child, after all parties had consented to a final order that found the child needed protection and a six-month order placing the child in the interim care of the Children’s Aid Society (CAS) as well as an extension of the statutory time frame of care was made. The father seeks information regarding the child’s birth weight and height as well as regularly occurring information/contact such as, yearly photographs, report cards, reasonable virtual/electronic/telephone access with notice, and the ability to provide correspondence from the father to the child.

This falls under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, (Schedule 1 to the Supporting Children, Youth and Families Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14), and is subject to subsections 87(7), 87(8) and 87(9) of the Act. All respondents, other than the father, are opposed to the motion.

In December 2022, the father was charged under the Criminal Code with sexual assault, assault causing bodily harm, uttering threats, compelling the commission of bestiality under s 160(2), forceable confinement in relation to the mother, and flight from a peace officer. In June 2023, he pled guilty to sexual assault, assault with intentional use of force, forcible confinement, assault with a weapon, and flight from a peace officer and was sentenced to a term of incarceration for just over seven years. Sentencing terms included that the father have no contact with the mother as well as the child.

The father has a history of sexual abuse offences against relatives, non-relatives, and his own children (twelve biological, and three step-children, all removed from his care), a history of neglect spanning the last thirty years, and has served and is currently serving lengthy prison sentences for these convictions. In addition, the child was removed from the mother’s care at birth due to signs of withdrawal displayed by the newborn.

The motion was dismissed, and there shall be a specific order that the father not have access to the child, nor entitled to obtain or receive information about the child.

This case was included here as an example of the intersections between criminal and child protection cases that involve a lengthy history of sexual abuse and neglect, and where compelling commission of bestiality was not included in the final guilty plea.