R. c. Leclerc, Simard, Parent, 2024 QCPC (Cour du Québec), No. 200-01-251910-224

The three accused — Élizabeth Leclerc, Antoine Simard, and Édouard Parent — operated Expédition Mi-Loup inc., a sled dog tourism and mushing enterprise on Île d’Orléans, Québec. The enterprise ran from at least 2008 until April 2022, when it was shut down following a media report and a police investigation triggered by an eviction call at the premises.

At its peak, the kennel housed approximately 200 dogs. Simard was the owner and operator responsible for all kennel decisions, staffing, food procurement, and the management of the dog population. Leclerc, his partner, handled administration, reservations, and employee payroll. Parent was a handyman responsible for the snowmobile section and the repair shop, and was rarely present in the kennel itself.

Multiple former employees testified for the prosecution, describing a consistent pattern of abuse and neglect spanning years. Dogs were killed by hanging (a rope tied to a barn rafter with the dog projected downward, with executioners pulling on the hind legs if death was not immediate), by a homemade gas chamber built by Simard using his welding knowledge of argon (a domestic chest freezer connected to a gas canister, with dogs placed inside for approximately two minutes), and in some instances by being run over with a snowmobile. Puppies — estimated at between 500 and 1,500 over the period — were killed by placing them in a bucket connected to a snowmobile exhaust (CO2 gassing), by neck-breaking, or by being placed alive in the chest freezer. Simard maintained an elimination list targeting old, sick, or aesthetically undesirable dogs, and was transparent about it with staff. Dogs on the list were killed at night, out of sight of clients. One witness estimated over 1,000 animals eliminated between 2016 and 2022 alone.

No veterinarian ever attended the kennel during the period covered by the charges; veterinary care was entirely absent. Sick and injured dogs were treated by guides using super glue for wounds, horse-dose vermifuge for parasites, and human medication when nothing else was available. Two female dogs died of untreated wounds during this period. Dogs were fed once daily on abattoir scraps — bones, fat, gristle, and occasional meat — sometimes rotten in summer. There was no water in winter; dogs were expected to eat snow. Shelter consisted of plastic barrel kennels placed directly on the ground with no air circulation, and with exposed nail and screw points on the interior.

Dogs were forced to run up to six times daily, including pregnant females and dogs that had recently given birth. Simard managed the kennel through physical violence, kicking and hitting dogs that misbehaved; witnesses described dogs cowering when he entered. An unregulated rubber-band castration program was introduced around 2016, performed in a non-sterile environment. No sterilization of females was ever carried out.

Leclerc was acquitted on all counts; the court found that although she held an administrative role and had some awareness of conditions, the evidence was insufficient to establish the required mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, and she exercised no direct control over the animals.

Parent was acquitted on Count 3 via a directed verdict but convicted on Counts 1 and 2 based on evidence of his direct participation in the killing and transport of dogs, his manipulation of the argon canisters, and his statements to witnesses that firearms were more efficient than hanging.

Simard was convicted on all three counts. The court rejected his testimony entirely, finding it evasive and implausible, and held that his self-created overpopulation — resulting directly from his refusal to sterilize females — could not constitute a legitimate excuse for the mass killing of animals. The court further held that where other means of population control were available and accessible, any suffering imposed was without necessity.

Sentencing was pending at the time of this judgment.

R. v. Berg, 2017 ONCJ 163

The accused was convicted in absentia of animal cruelty offences under the Ontario SPCA Act for failing to provide adequate food, water, veterinary care, and general welfare for two snakes. During the execution of a warrant, an Ontario SPCA agent discovered one snake dead and heavily infested with maggots, while a second boa constrictor was found alive but lethargic, dehydrated, and without access to food or water. The surviving snake was seized and placed in the care of the OSPCA. The accused later admitted ownership of the snakes and acknowledged that they had stopped eating, but had not sought veterinary treatment.

Although the accused did not attend trial or sentencing, evidence showed that he became visibly distressed when informed of the potential penalties associated with the charges. The court noted, however, that it was unclear whether this reaction reflected genuine remorse or concern about the prospect of conviction.

In determining an appropriate sentence, the court emphasized several evidentiary limitations. There was insufficient evidence regarding the snakes’ age, expected lifespan, specific temperature requirements, and the reasons why the accused failed to obtain veterinary care. The court therefore declined to rely on these factors when assessing sentence and focused instead on the proven failures to provide food, water, and necessary care.

The judge emphasized that allowing an animal’s condition to deteriorate to the point of death is “a grave matter” (para 13). However, the court also carefully considered mitigating factors, including the defendant’s lack of prior offences.

The court ordered the accused to pay $2,500 in restitution to compensate the OSPCA for the costs of caring for the surviving snake and prohibited him from owning snakes for five years. While the prosecution sought fines of $1,500 per count, the court imposed substantially lower fines, citing the evidentiary limitations, the absence of a prior record, and the principles set out in the 1989 Supreme Court decision, R v P (D.W).

The court also conditionally stayed the sentence on the third count because it arose from the same underlying conduct as the first two convictions, stating “in the event that the defendant is not successful in bringing an appeal from either conviction or sentence on the first two counts, then the conditional stay becomes permanent. Should the defendant bring a successful appeal in relation to counts 1 or 2, then the stay may be lifted” (para. 21).

R. v. Blackwell and Larson, 2017 BCPC 228

This case is part of the Chilliwack Cattle Sales investigation, which resulted in the BC SPCA recommending 20 criminal charges to the Crown. The initial case can be found here.

The accused were employees at a large dairy farm in British Columbia and were responsible for the care of cattle during night shifts. An undercover investigation using a hidden camera revealed repeated incidents of animal cruelty and neglect occurring between April and June 2014. The video evidence showed both accused directly engaging in violent conduct toward cows, including hitting, kicking, and using objects such as canes and equipment to strike animals. In addition, cattle were observed being subjected to distressing handling practices, including the use of tractors and chains to lift and move downed animals. The footage also showed Mr. Larson failing to intervene when other employees inflicted harm on animals under his supervision.

Both accused pleaded guilty to offences under the British Columbia Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, specifically causing or permitting cattle to be in distress and failing to protect animals from foreseeable harm. The Crown and defence proceeded by way of a joint submission on sentence, which the court accepted in accordance with the principles set out in R. v. Anthony-Cook. The court imposed a sentence of a $4,000 fine and 20 days of intermittent (weekend) jail for Mr. Larson, along with a one-year prohibition on owning or caring for large animals for remuneration. Mr. Blackwell received a $7,000 fine and a three-year prohibition on owning or caring for large animals for remuneration. Both accused also received probationary conditions and victim fine surcharges.

The judge emphasized deterrence at paragraph 11: “The actions of each of the accused…demonstrates what can only be described as gratuitous violence against the cattle. The sentence that is imposed must send out a message that this type of gratuitous violence against animals will not be tolerated in our society”.

The case highlights the court’s strong reliance on deterrence and denunciation in animal cruelty cases. It also demonstrates how courts treat both direct acts of cruelty and passive failure to intervene as equally serious forms of liability under animal welfare legislation, since Mr. Larson contributed both directly and passively to the distress of the cows through his actions/omissions.

R. v. Bulger, 1978 CarswellPEI 35

Three accused (Bennett Bulger, Bruce Mann, and Reginald Arsenault) were convicted by a jury of stealing a cow, contrary to s. 298(1.1) of the Criminal Code. The stolen cow belonged to a farmer in Prince Edward Island and had disappeared in August 1977.

At sentencing, the trial judge concluded that the cow had been alive when she was dragged approximately 8 miles and died along the way, describing the incident as an act of extreme cruelty. Based in part on this finding, Bulger received a sentence of three years’ imprisonment, while Mann and Arsenault each received sentences of two years less one day.

The Prince Edward Island Supreme Court, Appeal Division, allowed the offenders’ sentence appeals and reduced all three sentences. The Court found that there was no evidence to support the trial judge’s conclusion that the cow had been alive when dragged or that the accused had cruelly killed the animal. The accused had been convicted only of cattle theft, not animal cruelty, and the trial judge improperly relied on an unproven allegation of cruelty when imposing sentence. As a result, Bulger’s sentence was reduced from three years to two years’ imprisonment. Mann’s and Arsenault’s sentences were reduced from two years less one day to twelve months’ imprisonment each.

This case emphasizes that a sentencing judge cannot increase a sentence based on facts that were not proven at trial. The appeal court stressed that if the Crown wished to pursue allegations of animal cruelty, the accused should have been charged under the separate animal cruelty provisions of the Criminal Code, highlighting the distinction between the offence of cattle theft and the offence of causing unnecessary suffering to an animal.

The Court also highlighted the importance of considering an offender’s criminal record at paragraphs 9-10 when determining sentence since Bulger received a harsher sentence than his co-accused due to his past criminal history. His past convictions involve theft, breaking and entering, or attempted theft.

Pakzad v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2022 ONACRB 13

Mustafa Pakzad appealed a Statement of Account (SOA) issued by Animal Welfare Services (AWS) after 28 pit bull-type dogs were removed from his residence in December 2021. AWS had initially investigated the property following complaints about the dogs’ living conditions and found unsanitary conditions, including excessive feces, a strong ammonia smell, and several underweight dogs.

After Pakzad failed to comply with an order requiring veterinary examinations and improved sanitary conditions, AWS obtained a warrant, returned to the residence, and removed all 28 dogs, finding that they remained in distress. Following the seizure, AWS issued an SOA totaling $31,639.68 for veterinary care, boarding, and other animal care expenses. Pakzad did not challenge the removal of the dogs but appealed the amount of the costs assessed against him.

The Animal Care Review Board determined that the removal of the dogs and the veterinary treatment provided were justified and necessary to relieve the animals’ distress. However, the Board found that the boarding costs charged by AWS were excessive. While the veterinary expenses were upheld as reasonable, the Board reduced the daily boarding rate from $35 to $25 per dog and varied the SOA from $31,639.68 to $22,819.68. The Board also calculated the costs associated with Pakzad’s primary dog, Batch, separately and ordered that Batch could be returned if Pakzad paid $814.99 and complied with all outstanding animal welfare orders.

This case shows the Board’s willingness to reduce unreasonable animal welfare enforcement costs while still holding owners accountable. A notable aspect of the decision was the Board’s recognition of the strong bond between Pakzad and his dog, Batch, and the positive role the dog had played in helping him improve his life (para. 31). As a result, the Board allowed Pakzad an opportunity to regain custody of Batch despite being unable to pay the full SOA.

R. v. Adams, 2020 CarswellAlta 2755

Sean David Adams pleaded guilty under Alberta’s Animal Protection Act for causing distress to his two-year-old French bulldog, Gunther. The case proceeded directly to sentencing after Adams accepted responsibility for his actions, resulting in the cancellation of a scheduled two-day trial. Adams had no prior criminal record and Gunther had been living with a friend since the incident.

The Provincial Court of Alberta accepted a joint sentencing submission and imposed a fine of $7,500, plus a victim surcharge of $1,125, for a total penalty of $8,625. The court also ordered three years of probation and a three-year prohibition order restricting Adams from owning, possessing, or residing with animals, except for Gunther or another animal approved by police. Adams was also required to complete a pet care course and permit inspections of Gunther or any approved animal with reasonable notice by police. What is interesting is that the offender would be living in Ontario, and although the prohibition order was issued under Alberta legislation, the court ordered that he abide by it when in Ontario (paras. 18-20, 45, 56).

This case is importance because the court imposed a significant financial penalty despite Adams having no criminal record and pleading guilty. The decision also reflects a rehabilitative approach since it combines punishment with education and ongoing monitoring to promote responsible animal care.

R c JM, 2024 QCCQ 5715

The accused attended the victim’s residence, intoxicated, to remove his belongings after their relationship ended. He then violently assaulted the victim, confining her for several hours, destroying property after breaking into the residence, and threatening to kill the victim’s dog. Their 19-month-old child was present during this incident.

The accused was convicted of several offences, including assault causing bodily harm, assault with strangulation, sexual assault, forcible confinement, break and enter, mischief, and uttering threats, including threats to an animal. At sentencing, the court emphasized the seriousness of the violence, the abuse of trust in an intimate partner context, and the significant psychological harm to the victim. The court imposed a global sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of probation, with credit for time served.

This case demonstrates that threats against animals can be treated as part of a broader pattern of coercive control and intimate partner violence, as in the violence link, and that courts may consider such threats when assessing an offender’s conduct and determining an appropriate sentence.

Côté c. R., 2023 QCCS 3239

The accused, Nicolas Côté, was charged with second-degree murder and indignity to a human body after killing and dismembering the victim. The case came before the Superior Court of Québec on an application for release pending trial (bail).

During the bail hearing, evidence was presented about the accused’ s past behaviour toward animals. Witnesses described how he worked at a poultry farm where he killed sick chicks and chickens, and that he sometimes did so in a violent manner, including throwing them against walls and filming the acts. The accused was also known to collect knives and had a strong interest in taxidermy.

The court denied bail and ordered the accused to remain detained. In reaching this decision, the judge considered several factors, including the extreme violence of the alleged crime, the strength of the evidence, and concerns about the accused’ s character and potential danger to the public. Evidence regarding the accused’ s treatment of animals was referenced as part of the broader assessment of his behaviour and state of mind.

The case demonstrates how evidence of violent behaviour toward animals may be used by courts to evaluate an accused’ s character, risk to the public, and dangerousness during bail proceedings, even when the accused is not charged with an animal-related offence.

 

Children’s Aid Society of the Niagara Region v. T.B., 2011 ONSC 3905

This decision involved a status review application concerning six children, ages 5 to 14, with significant special needs. The Society became involved with the family in 2000 because of lack of parental supervision, children’s behavioural problems, the parents’ convictions for animal cruelty and the filthy and unsafe housing conditions. The Society sought an order to make the three older children Crown wards with parental access and the three younger children Crown wards without access. The respondent parents wanted all children returned to their care

In September, 2007, the parents presented two severely emaciated shepherd-mix dogs to Lincoln County Humane Society, claiming they had found them as strays. Both dogs significantly underweight, dehydrated, severely malnourished, and unable to hold their own heads up. Animal Control Officer Todd Menard described this as “the worst case of animal starvation” he had ever seen (para. 134). The B.s were charged with cruelty to animals; Mr. M.B. was additionally charged with public mischief for lying about finding the dogs as strays (para. 135). On July 7, 2008, both parents pled guilty to two charges each of causing unnecessary suffering to their dogs (para. 136).

For the court’s analysis of the parents’ capability of giving sufficient care to their four children, it gave substantial weight to the animal cruelty evidence. The court drew parallels between how the parents treated the dogs and how they treated their children, claiming that the parents had limited knowledge of the needs of both of their children and pets, had failed to ensure those needs were met, and exhibited the willingness to deny the difficulty in providing necessary care to meet those needs (paras. 247-248).

In this case, the element of animal cruelty is substantively integrated into the court’s reasoning about ongoing protection concerns. The Court used it to demonstrate that the parents’ deficits in caregiving—particularly their failure to recognize needs, provide adequate care, and accept responsibility—were longstanding and deeply ingrained patterns, not temporary shortcomings. This directly supported the conclusion that the children remained in need of protection and that returning them to parental care was not in their best interests.

The Court ordered all six children to be made Crown wards, with access granted for the three older children and no access for the three younger children, basing on their analysis of the parent’s, M.B. and T.B.’s ability to care for them.

Butler v Whalen, 1984 Carswell Nfld 178

On January 25, 1982, the appellant willfully and without lawful excuse shot and killed the respondent’s dog while it was in the appellant’s yard. At trial, he was convicted under section 401(a) of the Criminal Code of Canada and fined $100, or, in default of payment within 30 days, to 30 days’ imprisonment. Section 401(a) makes it an offence to “wilfully and without lawful excuse” kill a dog “kept for a lawful purpose.”

The appellant appealed, arguing that:

  1. The respondent did not keep the dog for a lawful purpose;
  2. The respondent failed to tether the dog as required by the Dog Act, 1976, which permits anyone to destroy a dog found killing, maiming, or worrying humans or livestock; and
  3. He shot the dog believing it threatened his sheep.

The key legal question was whether the appellant’s belief constituted a lawful excuse. Section 386(2) of the Criminal Code provides that no one is guilty if they acted with “legal justification or excuse” and “colour of right.” Evidence showed that the dog was not barking and did not chase the sheep while in the appellant’s yard.

The appellate court held that while there are circumstances in which a dog may be lawfully killed if attacking domestic animals, the dog in this case was not doing so. Accordingly, the conviction under section 401(a) was upheld, but the appellant was granted an absolute discharge.