R. v. Cook, 1910 CarswellPEI 19

Annie Cook was convicted for the unlawful and wilful killing of Peter G. Ross’ dog. The magistrates imposed a $1 fine (approximately $35.53 in 2026), awarded Ross $20 ($233) in damages for the loss of his dog, and ordered Cook to pay $4 ($142.12) in costs. Cook challenged the conviction, arguing that the magistrates did not have the authority under s. 537 of the Criminal Code to award damages to the dog’s owner.

The reviewing court agreed that the magistrates did not have such authority. Section 537 allowed them to impose the criminal penalty for killing a dog, but it did not give them the power to award compensation for the owners loss. The court held that Rosss claim for the $20 loss was a civil matter and rejected an attempt to treat the $1 fine and $20 damages as a single $21 criminal penalty because the magistrates had specifically imposed only a $1 fine.

Rather than quashing the entire conviction, however, the court exercised its power under s. 1124 of the Criminal Code to correct the error. It ordered that the portion of the conviction awarding $20 in damages be removed, while leaving the $1 fine in place.

Despite being a dated case, it is still relevant as it distinguishes between criminal punishment and civil compensation. The case equally demonstrates that a court cannot impose a remedy that is outside of its jurisdiction and that a reviewing court may correct an unauthorized conviction without having to overturn the decision as a whole.

R v C (L.A), 2001 CarswellOnt 4870

This case did not determine the accused’s guilt or innocence for the animal cruelty offences. Instead, it concerned a Charter application regarding whether certain evidence could be admitted at trial.

The accused was a 17-year-old charged with wilfully killing a dog and causing unnecessary pain by kicking and burning the dog, contrary to ss. 445(a) and 446(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. Police initially arrested her for an unrelated break and enter offence. During that investigation, officers discovered her diary, which allegedly contained entries describing the dog’s death, and later questioned her about the incident during a videotaped interview.

Regarding the accused’s personal circumstances, she was a young person with no indication in the decision of a significant prior criminal history. The court found that the diary was lawfully obtained during a search incident to the accused’s arrest and was therefore admissible. However, the statements she made about the dog during the videotaped interview were excluded.

Although the police had acted in good faith and had not coerced her, they failed to re-caution her about her right to counsel when the questioning shifted from the unrelated break and enter offence to the separate and more serious animal cruelty allegations. This breached her rights under s. 10(b) of the Charter and the protections afforded to young persons under the Young Offenders Act.

This case emphasizes the heightened procedural protections afforded to young people during police questioning. In particular, when questioning changes significantly to a new and unrelated offence, police must ensure that the young person understands their rights and potential consequences that may result.

Desjardins v. Amilis Inc., 2026 QCTAL 8220

NOTE: We have heard that the landlord is planning to appeal this case, so watch for an update

This tribunal hearing involved a tenant, Mr. Desjardins, who had kept a dog and cat in his apartment since 2011 despite a no-pets clause in his lease, prompting his third landlord (unlike the first two, who had tolerated the animals) to seek termination of the lease once he refused a formal notice to remove them. In response, the tenant applied to have the clause annulled as contrary to the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms or, alternatively, as abusive under the Civil Code, supported by an intervention from the Montreal SPCA and medical evidence from his physician, psychiatrist, and occupational therapist attesting to the therapeutic value of his pets for his anxiety, depression, and PTSD.

The Tribunal confirmed its jurisdiction over the dispute, annulled the no-pets clause on the basis that it infringed the tenant’s rights to liberty and privacy under sections 1 and 5 of the Quebec Charter without justification under section 9.1 (the landlord’s stated goal of simply “maintaining control” was not a legitimate and important objective, particularly since no harm had ever been caused), alternatively found the clause abusive and unreasonable under article 1901 C.C.Q. given the credible evidence of therapeutic benefit and absence of nuisance, and dismissed the landlord’s application to terminate the lease for lack of proven serious prejudice.

The decision is notable for extending the existing line of “pet therapy” cases (such as Coopérative de l’Ébène, D.C. v. Berthierville, Bilodeau v Chabot, and Berniqué) into an explicit Quebec Charter analysis rather than resting solely on unreasonableness under the Civil Code, drawing on the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of “liberty” and “privacy” in Godbout v. Longueuil and R. v. Morgentaler to characterize the choice to share one’s home with a pet as a fundamentally personal act deserving Charter protection. The Tribunal also leaned on animal welfare legislation and academic commentary (notably Jean Turgeon at para 131) to support treating pets as more than mere property when interpreting tenants’ rights, and it accepted relatively general and sparse medical notes—paralleling the low evidentiary bar set in D.C. v. Berthierville—as sufficient when combined with the tenant’s credible testimony, despite the landlord’s argument that such notes could “apply to everyone.”

Perhaps most striking are the Tribunal’s policy remarks framing residential leases as “fertile ground for the development of contracts of adhesion” given tenants’ relative powerlessness in a scarce housing market, and its explicit positioning of the ruling as contributing to the “harmonious evolution of housing law in Quebec.” Finally, the landlord’s own candid admission that he had “nothing against” animals and sought only to preserve control proved fatal to his case on both the Charter proportionality analysis and the termination application, undermining the traditional “lease is the law between the parties” approach reflected in prior case law like Franco v. Beaumier and Triple A Real Estate Broker Inc. v. Duquette, and signaling that blanket no-pets clauses may now face significant difficulty being enforced in Quebec absent actual proof of nuisance or damage.

R. v. C. (R.), 2010 ONCJ 447

R.C. was a youth who, together with a co-accused, committed a series of residential break and enters. While the thefts themselves were serious, the case was particularly notable because of the senseless destruction inside the homes. The offenders vandalized multiple residences by spreading paint, leaving feces on floors, destroying personal belongings, and ransacking entire houses. They also microwaved and killed a nine-year-old child’s pet gecko and covered a family dog in paint. The judge described the damage as “mind-blowing” and emphasized that there was no apparent motive beyond amusement while intoxicated (para 2).

The offender had a significant youth criminal record and was already subject to multiple probation orders when these offences were committed. A psychological assessment diagnosed him with conduct disorder, ADHD (hyperactive-impulsive type), substance abuse disorder, and antisocial personality traits. Although he came from a relatively stable home with a supportive mother and step-father, he had a long history of defying authority, skipping school, associating with negative peers, and abusing drugs and alcohol. The clinical assessment also noted that there existed indication that the biological father of R.C exhibited similar antisocial & criminal behaviours, which presents as another strong factor to explain the accused’s conduct. He admitted that he and his co-accused committed the break-ins because they considered themselves “professionals” and, after becoming drunk, decided to “have fun and trash the homes” (para 7). While in custody, however, he showed meaningful improvement by participating in counselling, Alcoholics Anonymous, educational programs, and life skills training, and he expressed genuine remorse for his actions.

The court imposed a custodial sentence, finding that further incarceration was necessary despite the offender’s recent progress. The judge accepted that youth sentencing principles required the least restrictive sentence capable of promoting rehabilitation and reintegration, but concluded that the gravity of the offences, the offender’s criminal history, repeated failures on probation, and ongoing need for structure justified additional custody. The court agreed with the Crown that these offences were far more serious than a typical residential break and enter because of the malicious destruction and cruelty inflicted on the family’s pets.

This case is particularly relevant because it demonstrates how animal cruelty can significantly aggravate an already serious property offence. The judge repeatedly emphasized that the deliberate killing of a child’s pet and the abuse of the family dog elevated the offending well beyond ordinary break and enters. The victim impact statements also highlighted the lasting emotional harm caused, particularly to the children, who lost their sense of security and were traumatized by the death of the pet gecko. Although the court acknowledged the offender’s mental health diagnoses, substance abuse issues, and encouraging rehabilitation while in custody, it stressed that accountability remained necessary given the shocking and senseless nature of the offences and the profound impact on the victims.

R c. S. (L.-P.), 2003 CarswellQue 780

This case involved a 13-year-old adolescent charged with arson (s. 434 C.cr.) after deliberately setting fire to a wooden shed on December 17, 2002, resulting in the death of the shed tenant’s dog (a doberman/German shepherd hybrid) whose body was found in the debris, as well as a separate charge of having intentionally killed an animal or caused it to suffer pain, suffering, or injury without necessity (ss. 445, 446(1)(a) C.cr.).

The accused admitted responsibility for the fire but denied having intentionally harmed or killed the dog, claiming he did not know the dog was inside and had unsuccessfully tried to free it by pulling on its chain once he heard it. The Crown’s theory was that the accused had either struck or killed the dog with an iron bar before dragging it into the shed and setting the fire to conceal his act, or had lured the dog into the shed and fastened its chain to the ground with metal hooks before igniting the fire; this theory rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, since no witness saw the act and no physical evidence (such as a weapon, drag marks, or forced entry) was found.

Applying the credibility framework from R. v. W.(D.) and the standard for circumstantial evidence from R. v. Cooper, the court found the accused’s version of events plausible and consistent with the physical evidence (the fire’s point of origin, the location of the debris he admitted throwing, the location of the dog’s body, and an independent witness’s account of the accused playing alone in the yard without hearing the dog). The court held that while it was probable the accused had killed or trapped the dog, this was not the only reasonable inference available on the evidence, given key gaps such as the absence of proof of the cause of death, no weapon found, no evidence of forced entry, and no proof the dog had been beaten or dragged into the shed.

The court found the accused guilty of intentionally causing a fire (arson, s. 434 C.cr.) but acquitted him of both animal cruelty charges — intentionally killing an animal (s. 445(a) C.cr.) and causing an animal to suffer unnecessarily (s. 446(1)(a) C.cr.) — on the basis that the Crown had not proven guilt on those counts beyond a reasonable doubt.

This case is a useful illustration of the application of the R. v. W.(D.) credibility test and the R. v. Cooper circumstantial evidence standard in the animal cruelty context, showing that even where circumstances make an accused’s guilt “probable,” this is legally insufficient — the Crown must eliminate other reasonable inferences to secure a conviction. The decision is also notable for the split verdict: the accused was convicted of the underlying property offence (arson) while being acquitted of the animal cruelty charges arising from the same set of facts, illustrating how a young accused’s confession and consistent narrative on one charge can still leave reasonable doubt on a related but factually distinct charge, particularly where physical/forensic evidence linking the accused to the animal’s death is absent.

Abed (Re), (2025) ORBD No 1634

On August 27, 2021, Haitham Abed engaged in a violent episode at his residence in London, Ontario. During the incident, he struck a police service dog with wooden balusters, causing soft tissue damage to the animal’s left shoulder and forearm and a cut to the gumline (para. 9). He also assaulted a police officer and damaged property. Mr. Abed was subsequently found not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder and diagnosed with schizophrenia. On January 22, 2025, the Ontario Review Board (ORB) ordered a conditional discharge.

Following a hospital request for an early review of his conditional discharge disposition, the Board reconvened on July 3, 2025 at Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences pursuant to s. 672.81(2) of the Criminal Code to determine whether he could be safely granted an absolute discharge. Based on the updated hospital report, the offender had continued to live successfully in the community since his last annual hearing in January 2025, was engaged in employment and has maintained his independent apartment and had contact with the Forensic Outpatient Service (FOS) not less than once every two weeks dictated by the Ontario Review Board Disposition (para. 15). Further evidence from the hospital doctor overseeing the offender’s care provided that the offender remained stable and understood that without medication, he will become psychotic and that it was the opinion of the treatment team that his violent risk factors had been mitigated (paras. 16 to 17).

This evidence as well as the offender’s continued medication compliance, mental stability, insight into illness, community reintegration, and family support led to the ORB granting him absolute discharge on August 1, 2025.

R v Abernethy, 2025 BCPC 201

The 68-year-old accused was the owner of a 14-year-old Shitzu, Sarah. Sarah was found in severe conditions of dehydration and emaciation, with a ruptured eye, leg wound infection and maggot infestation. She was taken to the vet by a family friend of the accused, where she was euthanized.

The accused was charged for neglecting to attend to Sarah’s health condition; the Crown sought a 90-day jail sentence followed by a 12-month probation order, requiring him to attend counselling, and a lifetime animal prohibition order under s. 24(3). The accused denied the alleged offence of neglect by claiming his own mental and financial conditions prevented him from properly attending to Sarah’s needs and protested against the animal prohibition order, arguing that he had always been an animal lover and lacked the mens rea to cause any suffering to his pet (para. 6). However, because provincial offences are strict liability offences, the lack of mens rea is not a defence.

Determining that the accused’s moral culpability was low due to his mental state at the time of the offence but still relying on the principle of denunciation and deterrence, the Court determined that appropriate sentencing was a $5000 fine, a two-year probation, and lifetime animal prohibition order. The Court noted that the accused had not expressed insight into his actions and continued “to feel he has been unjustly interfered with by the authorities and maintains his beliefs about animals being allowed to die “naturally” (para. 17). It also noted that the animal prohibition order would be most useful as a deterrent because the accused’s “need to care for animals is so compelling he has taken to keeping bees while under bail conditions which prevent him from owning pets” (para. 40). Any yet, the accused also demonstrated a “a history of neglecting important things that required his attention”: when Sarah’s sister Susie passed away, the ground was too frozen to dig a grave so the accused kept her body in his house for months until his former wife prompted him to dispose of it, therefore that would be reasonable grounds to believe that if the accused were to obtain another animal, “he may again become blind to its needs” (para. 41).

R. v. Hall, 2025 MBPC 34

The 41-year-old accused Gregory Hall was charged with possession of 427 images and 34 unique videos across a number of devices, including 5,163 files categorized as “investigative interest” on his Samsung device. These files contain mostly images of females aged between 8 to 12, with images and videos depicting bestiality as an aggravating feature. This material was part of a broader collection characterized by a “high degree of depravity”.

The accused denied any sexual interest in child and recollection of collecting the images and videos due to the memory loss caused by brain tumor and subsequent seizures starting in 2020. He submitted a letter from his oncologist stating that his type of tumor can cause him to “experience periods of short-memory loss.”

The sentencing judge firmly rejected the accused’s claim that his medical condition reduced his moral culpability or justified a non-custodial sentence. The court held there was “no evidence of any nexus between the accused’s medical condition and his offending” (para. 62). There was no evidence it impaired his understanding that his actions were wrong or harmful. The court emphasized that for CSAM offences, denunciation and deterrence are paramount. The horrific nature of the material, including bestiality, the large collection, the number of child victims, and the significant harm caused, demanded a penitentiary sentence to reflect societal condemnation.

R. c. Richer 2025 QCCQ 1315

The accused assaulted his intimate partner while intoxicated during an argument. He struck and pushed the victim, held her on the ground with his knee on her neck, and threw a chair in her direction. The victim suffered physical injuries and psychological consequences. After his arrest and release on conditions, the accused later breached those conditions by contacting the victim and violating his curfew. He ultimately pleaded guilty to assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, forcible confinement, and breaches of release conditions.

The Court noted numerous aggravating factors, including the severity of the assault, the impact on the victim, the accused’s intoxication at the time of the offence, repeated breaches of court orders, and his prior criminal history. In 2014, the accused was given a suspended sentence and probation with 125 hours of service for assault, uttering threats, forcible confinement, animal cruelty and possession of a weapon while prohibited from doing so, all in a context of domestic violence (para. 24). Mitigating factors included the accused’s guilty pleas; that he is an “asset to society” as a master mechanic and that the accused completed the follow-up offered by the Addiction Rehabilitation Centre regarding their problematic use of alcohol.

The Court sentenced the accused to 12 months’ imprisonment, finding that a custodial sentence was necessary to reflect the seriousness of the violence and to achieve denunciation and deterrence. This case made reference to the violence link between interpersonal violence and animal abuse, as the Court referred to the historical animal cruelty as part of the broader pattern of violent behaviour considered during sentencing.

The Animal Control Officer (CSRD) v Burger, 2025 BCPC 247

In June and October 2024, Luna, a female Mastiff-Rottweiler cross-type dog, escaped from her owners, Sandra and Colin Burger’s property on three occasions and attacked individuals, including two incidents that caused serious injuries requiring medical attention. On June 21, 2024, following complaints, Animal Control Officers visited the Burgers’ property. Mr. Burger acknowledged that the perimeter fence had holes allowing the dogs to escape and run at large occasionally. He demonstrated shock collars, but the officers observed the dogs’ behaviour was unaffected. Despite being cautioned about a potential future application to declare the dog dangerous, the Burgers did not implement effective measures to prevent further incidents.

Following these incidents, the Animal Control Officer of the Columbia Shuswap Regional District brought forward an application under s. 49(10) of the Community Charter seeking a declaration that Luna was a dangerous dog and an order for her destruction. Under s. 49(1)(a) of the Community Charter, a “dangerous dog” includes a dog that has killed or seriously injured a person.

The Burgers proposed a containment plan, including the construction and maintenance of the perimeter fences, protocols to prevent accidental escape, management of the ‘pack effect’ with their other two dogs, the retention of a dog trainer, restraint equipment and the financial resources to fund this plan (para 32).

The court relied on witness testimony, incident reports and expert evidence from notable animal behaviour and welfare scientist Dr. Rebecca Ledger, who assessed Luna’s behaviour as territorial and movement-triggered aggression, noting that Luna did not respond to her training (para 28). Additionally, Dr. Ledger testified to great skepticism about the Burgers’ containment plan, highlighting that it lacked expert guidance and failed to meet the detailed requirements she had outlined (paras 45-47). Dr. Ledger concluded that the risk to the public remained significant (para 33). The judge also observed that the Burgers minimized the seriousness of the incidents and the danger Luna presented to the community (para 54).

Based on the evidence, the court held that Luna is a dangerous dog and cannot be safely returned to the Burgers’ (para 58). She was ordered to be humanely euthanized by or under the supervision of a licensed veterinarian, and that this is to occur no sooner than 14 days after the making of this order (para 60).