R v Libin, 2026 ABCJ

It was alleged that the accused had wilfully caused unnecessary pain, suffering or injury to his fiancee’s dog when he kicked the dog, slammed their head into the elevator door three times, then flicked their leash at their head, and flipped the animal in a way which caused them to tumble, during the course of a short elevator ride. The primary evidence before the Court was a 60 second elevator video, 45 seconds of which captured the incident.

The Court was satisfied that accused’s conduct was wilfull and possessed the necessary mens rea for the offence. The Court accepted that there was no injury to the dog based on other non-expert evidence provided by the animal welfare officer who attended the scene. The issue before the Court was whether accused’s actions caused the dog unnecessary pain or suffering.

In its analysis on the law, the Court began with a statement quoting Chen: “The Court of Appeal of this Province has noted recently that animals, including dogs, are sentient… beings, capable of feeling and experiencing sensations and emotions, including feeling pain and suffering” (p.5).

The Court held that proving beyond a reasonable that some pain or suffering beyond “the least physical discomfort” occurred is sufficient to then consider whether the pain or suffering was unnecessary. Case law supported the ability of the trier of fact to infer pain and suffering from the evidence. Despite accepting the accused’s point that there had been no expert testimony provided, the judge indicated “that does not mean that based upon what I can see and hear on the elevator video, using common sense and experience, I am not able to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the dog sustained pain and suffering” (p. 8).

While the Court did not find that the leash flick caused unnecessary pain and the dog’s tumble was actually caused by the accused, it was objectionably foreseeable that the kicking and slamming would cause the dog unnecessary pain or suffering. Based on the dog’s reactions, the pain or suffering went beyond “the least physical discomfort.” It determined that these actions were done intentionally to cause the dog pain, and they were unnecessary.

The Court found the accused guilty of the offence charged.

 

 

R v Mrozik, 2026 MBCA 46

The offender had pled guilty to possessing child pornography under s. 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code; some of those images and videos contained bestiality and zoosadism. At his sentencing hearing, his counsel had sought a conditional sentencing order (CSO), while the Crown sought 42 months’ imprisonment. Defence counsel had led evidence that the offender suffered from autism spectrum disorder (level 1) (ASD), social anxiety disorder, and major depressive disorder, and that incarceration would be harmful to his mental health.

The offender was sentenced to two and one half years’ imprisonment. A number of ancillary orders were also made pursuant to the Criminal Code (R. v. Mrozik, 2025 MBPC 54: summary available here). He has appealed his sentence to the Court of Appeal of Manitoba (MBCA).

The Court considered whether the sentencing judge erred in principle by (1) giving insufficient weight to his disorders, (2) overemphasizing the principles of denunciation and deterrence and underemphasizing the principle of restraint and mitigating factors, and (3) finding that a conditional sentence order (CSO) was inappropriate.

It was determined that sentencing judge did not err in finding that the offender’s moral blameworthiness was not reduced despite some nexus between his disorders and offending. They had conducted a holistic assessment, and it is not the role of the Court to re-weigh relevant sentencing factors unless the weight had been unreasonable (R v Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 at para 78).

The Court also found that the sentencing judge did not err in their weighing the principles of denunciation and deterrence in favour of imposing the sentence. The offender’s conditions could be managed in custody. Weighing denunciation and deterrence was required given the seriousness of the crime and the gravity of the circumstances of the CSAEM, and any mitigating factors (age, disorders, and potential for rehabilitation) were reflected in the reduced sentence of 30 months imprisonment.

Lastly, custodial sentences are the anticipated norm for sexual offences against children, including those involving CSAEM. The Court found that the sentencing judge weighed all the circumstances of the case and determined that a CSO would not adequately addresses the objectives of denunciation and deterrence.

In the Court’s view, the sentencing judge did not err in her approach did not impose a demonstrably unfit sentence. Leave to appeal the sentence was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

R v Abraham, 2025 ABKB 637

On appeal from the Alberta Court of Justice. The offender was convicted after trial of two counts of willfully causing unnecessary pain, suffering, or injury to his dog Simba, contrary to s. 445.1(1) of the Criminal Code.

At trial, it was found that on two occasions in 2023, the offender held Simba by the collar, beat Simba multiple times in the head, and kicked Simba in the hind quarters, causing the dog unnecessary pain and suffering. He was also found to have tied Simba to a post high enough that Simba’s front legs could not touch the ground for more than half an hour on both occasions and that these actions also amounted to unnecessary suffering. The offender was sentenced to 120 days incarceration and 24 months probation.

He appealed the sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge 1) failed to explain why a conditional discharge was unsuitable, 2) failed to recognize that a conditional sentencing order (CSO) achieves denunciation and deterence, 3) failed to uphold the parity principle, and 4) failed to consider immigration consequences.

The Alberta Court of King’s Bench found that the sentencing judge had given thorough reasons for why a custodial sentence was appropriate and that it was clear why the defence’s arguments for a conditional discharge were dismissed. The sentencing judge considered that a CSO would not meet the objectives of denunciation and deterrence given the offender’s lack of acknowledgement of wrongdoing and his rehabilitation plan.

The sentencing judge also properly identified that the cases advanced by the defence in support of a CSO had significant distinguishing factors such as mental health issues and a guilty plea – all mitigating factors that had not been present in this case. The sentencing judge made no error in applying the parity principle.

Regarding immigration consequences, the Sentencing Judge did not address this is in their reasons but was aware that a custodial sentence of 120 days would delay the offender in taking his oath of citizenship. The Court found that delay to swear an oath was not an immigration consequence and that, even though a sentencing judge has discretion to consider immigration consequences, these considerations cannot skew or dominate the sentencing process in a way that leads to a separate scheme for criminal sentencing where deportation is at risk.

The appeal was dismissed, and the offender was ordered to surrender himself into custody at the Edmonton Remand Centre within six days.

 

Bigelow v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2024 ONACRB 115

This matter is an appeal of the decision made by Animal Welfare Services to remove a large breed dog named Stella from the appellant’s residence located in Sundridge, Ontario.

On September 26, 2024, Animal Welfare Services (AWS) executed a search warrant pursuant to s. 28(2) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019 (PAWS) and entered the residence after a complainant advised AWS that the appellant had left his dog unattended for over 24 hours in his apartment. The complainant had further advised that the appellant had frequently left his dog alone for long periods of time and that there were several other people who had witnessed him punch, kick and hit Stella (para. 9). Another complainant stepped forward after an AWS inspector’s initial visit in August to advise that they had several recordings of what they believed were instances of the appellant abusing Stella (para.11-12).

Following inspection, AWS removed Stella from the residence and served a Notice of Removal (NOR) under s. 31(1)(a) of the PAWS Act on the basis that a veterinarian advised that removal was necessary to relieve Stella’s distress, which was caused by “physical and psychological distress”.

The Chief Animal Welfare Inspector led evidence establishing that Stella was subjected to psychological and physical distress within the meaning of s. 1(1) of the Act. Witness evidence from neighbours and AWS inspectors established multiple instances of beating, verbal abuse, and privation, and a veterinarian testified that these actions would cause psychological and physical distress in Stella. The appellant did not lead any evidence to contradict the evidence of the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, and at times admitted to yelling at Stella, hitting Stella, and hitting her crate when Stella was in it.

The Animal Care Review Board found the issuance of the NOR was warranted and dismissed the appeal.

R v Diallo, 2026 ONCJ

The accused was charged with causing unnecessary pain, suffering or injury to his puppy, Luna, and with wilfully obstructing or resisting a peace officer. Neighbours had witnessed the accused lift and drop Luna onto a balcony floor three times, causing the dog to scream or yelp loud enough to wake them and “described as long, loud and disturbing” (p. 1, para. 20). They called the police, who attended the scene and discovered that the accused was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the incident. They removed two dogs from the accused’s care, Taft and Luna, causing the accused to resist arrest because he became upset that his dogs were being taken (p. 2, para 20-25).

Although there was no evidence of physical injury to Luna, the Ontario Court of Justice found that the nature of the treatment and the dog’s reported reactions established unnecessary pain or suffering, including psychological suffering. The Court rejected the accused’s evidence that he had carefully dropped Luna onto a dog bed and found him guilty of both charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

The case is notable for confirming that proof of physical injury is not required to establish unnecessary pain or suffering to an animal.

 

R v Haer, 2025 BCPC 309

The Township of Langley obtained and executed a warrant to seize Enzo, a dog alleged to have attacked a contractor working at the Haers’ property and subsequently applied for an order to destroy him. The Haers opposed the application and challenged the seizure under s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking Enzo’s return.

The judge rejected their arguments that the manner in which the warrant was executed was unreasonable, finding that the search began within the authorized timeframe, the number of attending officers did not exceed the warrant’s authorization, there was no evidence of a failure to knock and announce, and the use of a catch pole did not amount to excessive force.

However, the Court found that the warrant itself was invalid. The information relied upon to obtain the warrant did not provide sufficient grounds for a justice to be satisfied that the statutory preconditions under s. 49(5) of British Columbia’s Community Charter had been met. As a result, the warrant could not properly have been issued and the seizure of Enzo breached s. 8 of the Charter.

This case is particularly relevant to animal-control proceedings because it distinguishes between the reasonableness of how an animal is seized and the legality of the judicial authorization permitting the seizure in the first place.

 

R v Daly [1996] O.J. No. 5292

The accused was charged with neglect under the Criminal Code after his dog died at approximately nine or ten years old. The dog had lived outdoors and was in poor physical condition, with an ungroomed coat. However, he was also elderly and suffered from megacolon, a medical condition that affected his ability to obtain proper nutrition.

The Ontario Court of Justice acquitted the accused after determining that the Crown had failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the dog’s death resulted from neglect or abuse. The judge found that his deterioration could have been caused by his advanced age and medical condition. The judge also concluded that keeping a dog outdoors was not inherently abusive and that poor grooming alone was insufficient to establish criminal neglect.

This case highlights the need to prove criminal neglect beyond a reasonable doubt may require more than relying solely on an animal’s poor physical condition, and that considering an animal’s medical history can be determining. In addition, the judge emphasized that keeping a dog outdoors does not automatically constitute cruelty.

R. v. Dominic., 2009 BCPC 145

The accused was charged under section 445(a) of the Criminal Code with wilfully and without lawful excuse killing a dog kept for a lawful purpose. On May 28, 2007, he was heavily intoxicated when he stomped twice on a small dog belonging to a woman he had been drinking with, then picked him up and threw him to the ground, killing him. The accused did have a criminal history that was not specified in the judgment.

A neighbour witnessed the incident and contacted the police. The accused claimed that he had consumed significant amounts of alcohol and could not remember attacking the dog. Defence counsel argued that his intoxication prevented him from forming the criminal intent necessary for a conviction.

The British Columbia Provincial Court found the accused guilty of wilfully killing the dog under section 445(a). The court accepted that the accused had been heavily intoxicated but rejected the claim that he was so impaired that he could not control his actions ‘akin to automatism” (para. 76(c)) and noted that he had demonstrated an ability to make various decisions that evening despite his intoxication. The judge concluded that the accused was in a state of advanced intoxication, rather than extreme intoxication comparable to automatism.

Since section 445(a) was classified as a general intent offence, advanced intoxication could not serve as a defence. The court also determined that the dog’s death was a natural consequence of the accused’s voluntary actions. This case establishes that wilfully killing a dog under section 445(a) of the Criminal Code is a general intent offence in such that advanced intoxication cannot excuse criminal responsibility.

R. v. Ebrahimi., [2023] O.J. No. 2752

The offender pleaded guilty to animal cruelty for wilfully permitting his cat to experience unnecessary pain and suffering. The cat suffered serious injuries over approximately two to three weeks, but the offender attempted to treat him himself rather than seeking veterinary care, claiming that he could not afford veterinary treatment because of his severe addiction to cocaine and opioids. The cat’s injuries were so serious that he eventually had to be euthanized.

The offender also pleaded guilty to several unrelated property offences, including fraud, theft, and breaches of court orders. He had a limited criminal record (one past DUI conviction) and struggled with substance abuse of illicit drugs.

The Ontario Court of Justice sentenced the offender to a global sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment, followed by two years of probation, taking into account his pretrial custody and other offences. For the animal cruelty offence specifically, the judge determined that a four-month custodial sentence was appropriate, crediting three months for time already served and ordering an additional 30 days in jail.

The judge emphasized that the offender had allowed his cat to suffer unnecessarily for several weeks despite having the option of surrendering him to the SPCA. The court also imposed a seven-year prohibition order preventing him from owning, caring for, controlling, or living with animals. The judge considered his limited criminal history and relatively low risk of reoffending when determining the length of the prohibition and determined that the seven-year prohibition order demonstrates the importance of preventing future animal suffering, even if the offender is considered to have a relatively low risk of reoffending.

Henry v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONACRB 48

On May 23, 2023, complaints of animal abuse were made against the appellant by his neighbours, who provided an Animal Welfare Services (AWS) Inspector with video evidence showing him repeatedly striking his five dogs with his hands, fists, and a flashlight—once in front of a child (paras 20–21). After reviewing the videos, an AWS consulting veterinarian identified clear signs of physical and psychological distress and recommended removing the dogs from Henry’s care to alleviate their suffering.

A signed Veterinarian’s Certificate was subsequently provided on May 30, 2023, supporting their removal (para 20).Four adult dogs and a puppy were removed from the appellant’s care on May 31, 2023, by an AWS Inspector acting under a warrant pursuant to s. 31 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13 (the “PAWS Act”). The appellant was issued a Notice of Removal (NOR) (paras 1–2).

On June 4, 2023, the appellant was served with a Notice of Decision to Keep an Animal in the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector’s Care (DTK). On June 5, 2023, he appealed the NOR to the Animal Care Review Board (ACRB), requesting the return of his five dogs, but did not appeal the DTK (paras 3–4). He argued that his actions were legitimate training methods and challenged the reliability and context of the videos (paras 12, 24–25, 33).

The ACRB dismissed the appellant’s appeal, finding that the dogs were experiencing physical and psychological distress. The Board determined that their removal was lawful and necessary to alleviate their distress and refused to order their return (paras 31–32, 45–46). The ACRB noted that because the appellant neither appealed the DTK nor applied for the dogs’ return under s. 38(4) of the PAWS Act, it lacked jurisdiction to order their return on those grounds. Nevertheless, the Board found that even if such an application had been made, the dogs should not be returned because the appellant failed to provide evidence that the conditions causing their distress ben remedied (paras 35, 44).

The decision highlights that animal distress under the PAWS Act includes psychological suffering (paras 18–19). The dogs’ fearful behaviours, including cowering, fleeing, and hypervigilance, supported the finding of distress (paras 21, 27–28). Additionally, veterinary evidence indicated that the dogs could continue experiencing psychological distress if returned to Henry, even if the physical abuse stopped (paras 37–38, 43).