R v Daly [1996] O.J. No. 5292

The accused was charged with neglect under the Criminal Code after his dog died at approximately nine or ten years old. The dog had lived outdoors and was in poor physical condition, with an ungroomed coat. However, he was also elderly and suffered from megacolon, a medical condition that affected his ability to obtain proper nutrition.

The Ontario Court of Justice acquitted the accused after determining that the Crown had failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the dog’s death resulted from neglect or abuse. The judge found that his deterioration could have been caused by his advanced age and medical condition. The judge also concluded that keeping a dog outdoors was not inherently abusive and that poor grooming alone was insufficient to establish criminal neglect.

This case highlights the need to prove criminal neglect beyond a reasonable doubt may require more than relying solely on an animal’s poor physical condition, and that considering an animal’s medical history can be determining. In addition, the judge emphasized that keeping a dog outdoors does not automatically constitute cruelty.

R. v. Dominic., 2009 BCPC 145

The accused was charged under section 445(a) of the Criminal Code with wilfully and without lawful excuse killing a dog kept for a lawful purpose. On May 28, 2007, he was heavily intoxicated when he stomped twice on a small dog belonging to a woman he had been drinking with, then picked him up and threw him to the ground, killing him. The accused did have a criminal history that was not specified in the judgment.

A neighbour witnessed the incident and contacted the police. The accused claimed that he had consumed significant amounts of alcohol and could not remember attacking the dog. Defence counsel argued that his intoxication prevented him from forming the criminal intent necessary for a conviction.

The British Columbia Provincial Court found the accused guilty of wilfully killing the dog under section 445(a). The court accepted that the accused had been heavily intoxicated but rejected the claim that he was so impaired that he could not control his actions ‘akin to automatism” (para. 76(c)) and noted that he had demonstrated an ability to make various decisions that evening despite his intoxication. The judge concluded that the accused was in a state of advanced intoxication, rather than extreme intoxication comparable to automatism.

Since section 445(a) was classified as a general intent offence, advanced intoxication could not serve as a defence. The court also determined that the dog’s death was a natural consequence of the accused’s voluntary actions. This case establishes that wilfully killing a dog under section 445(a) of the Criminal Code is a general intent offence in such that advanced intoxication cannot excuse criminal responsibility.

R. v. Ebrahimi., [2023] O.J. No. 2752

The offender pleaded guilty to animal cruelty for wilfully permitting his cat to experience unnecessary pain and suffering. The cat suffered serious injuries over approximately two to three weeks, but the offender attempted to treat him himself rather than seeking veterinary care, claiming that he could not afford veterinary treatment because of his severe addiction to cocaine and opioids. The cat’s injuries were so serious that he eventually had to be euthanized.

The offender also pleaded guilty to several unrelated property offences, including fraud, theft, and breaches of court orders. He had a limited criminal record (one past DUI conviction) and struggled with substance abuse of illicit drugs.

The Ontario Court of Justice sentenced the offender to a global sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment, followed by two years of probation, taking into account his pretrial custody and other offences. For the animal cruelty offence specifically, the judge determined that a four-month custodial sentence was appropriate, crediting three months for time already served and ordering an additional 30 days in jail.

The judge emphasized that the offender had allowed his cat to suffer unnecessarily for several weeks despite having the option of surrendering him to the SPCA. The court also imposed a seven-year prohibition order preventing him from owning, caring for, controlling, or living with animals. The judge considered his limited criminal history and relatively low risk of reoffending when determining the length of the prohibition and determined that the seven-year prohibition order demonstrates the importance of preventing future animal suffering, even if the offender is considered to have a relatively low risk of reoffending.

Henry v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONACRB 48

On May 23, 2023, complaints of animal abuse were made against the appellant by his neighbours, who provided an Animal Welfare Services (AWS) Inspector with video evidence showing him repeatedly striking his five dogs with his hands, fists, and a flashlight—once in front of a child (paras 20–21). After reviewing the videos, an AWS consulting veterinarian identified clear signs of physical and psychological distress and recommended removing the dogs from Henry’s care to alleviate their suffering.

A signed Veterinarian’s Certificate was subsequently provided on May 30, 2023, supporting their removal (para 20).Four adult dogs and a puppy were removed from the appellant’s care on May 31, 2023, by an AWS Inspector acting under a warrant pursuant to s. 31 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13 (the “PAWS Act”). The appellant was issued a Notice of Removal (NOR) (paras 1–2).

On June 4, 2023, the appellant was served with a Notice of Decision to Keep an Animal in the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector’s Care (DTK). On June 5, 2023, he appealed the NOR to the Animal Care Review Board (ACRB), requesting the return of his five dogs, but did not appeal the DTK (paras 3–4). He argued that his actions were legitimate training methods and challenged the reliability and context of the videos (paras 12, 24–25, 33).

The ACRB dismissed the appellant’s appeal, finding that the dogs were experiencing physical and psychological distress. The Board determined that their removal was lawful and necessary to alleviate their distress and refused to order their return (paras 31–32, 45–46). The ACRB noted that because the appellant neither appealed the DTK nor applied for the dogs’ return under s. 38(4) of the PAWS Act, it lacked jurisdiction to order their return on those grounds. Nevertheless, the Board found that even if such an application had been made, the dogs should not be returned because the appellant failed to provide evidence that the conditions causing their distress ben remedied (paras 35, 44).

The decision highlights that animal distress under the PAWS Act includes psychological suffering (paras 18–19). The dogs’ fearful behaviours, including cowering, fleeing, and hypervigilance, supported the finding of distress (paras 21, 27–28). Additionally, veterinary evidence indicated that the dogs could continue experiencing psychological distress if returned to Henry, even if the physical abuse stopped (paras 37–38, 43).

R. v. Elder, 2019 CarswellAlta 3000

The offender was brought before the Alberta Provincial Court for sentencing on five charges arising from three separate incidents. The most serious offence involved animal cruelty against his pit bull named Kato. In February 2016, the 23-year-old offender was observed kicking Kato twice and then, five weeks later he severely beat the dog on two occasions with a power drill. He also faced charges for an unprovoked assault on his roommate, two breaches of recognizance and failing to appear for sentencing.

The beatings caused significant injuries including a skull fracture, fractured teeth, facial injuries, bruising, and soft-tissue injuries. The veterinarian concluded that the skull fracture would have caused significant pain for at least six to eight weeks and that Kato’s injuries appeared to be part of a pattern of chronic physical abuse.

The Court considered the offender’s history of mental-health difficulties, anger and impulse-control problems, substance abuse and a disadvantaged childhood. There was a possible FASD diagnosis which had not been confirmed. He also had a significant criminal record, including previous convictions for assaults and uttering threats. At the same time, the judge noted the offender had also demonstrated prosocial behaviours, like the ability to work (para. 90). The judge also considered that the offender had developed a plan for counselling, addiction treatment, and psychiatric care after his release.

Justice McLeod imposed a total sentence of 10 months and 10 days in jail, which included 8½ months for the animal-cruelty offence, 45 days for the assault, and 10 days for failing to appear, with the other breach sentences running concurrently. The offender received 228 days of credit for pre-trial custody, leaving 82 days (approximately 2 months and 22 days) to serve. The Court also imposed a lifetime prohibition on possessing, owning, or having custody or control of animals, as well as a 10-year weapons prohibition.

Throughout the decision, the judge consistently characterizes the relationship between an owner and a domestic animal as involving a form of trust or duty because animals are vulnerable to the people responsible for their care (paras. 63 & 101). Additionally, the judge also noted that Canadian courts had not yet established a precise sentencing range for animal cruelty offences, meaning the sentence had to be individualized while considering comparable cases (para. 106).

R. v. L.M.F., 2003 ABPC 174

Three young offenders, L.F., J.D. and M.D., were involved in a series of offences committed over nine days in January 2003 near Bonnyville, Alberta. The offences included careless use of a firearm, property damage exceeding $30,000 and the killing of three horses and wounding of another.

The offences caused significant economic and psychological harm to the victims and community. L.F. was found to be the primary instigator and leader, while J.D. and M.D. were considered followers, although all three were found to have significant responsibility. All three offenders were 17 years old and had no prior criminal record.

The Court sentenced the accused under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA). The judge recognized that youth sentencing emphasizes rehabilitation and reintegration and requires custody to be used only where appropriate alternatives are insufficient. However, the judge found that the extreme seriousness and violence of the offences, their continuation over nine days, and the significant harm caused meant that non-custodial sentences would not adequately hold the accused accountable.

L.F. received 30 days in secure custody followed by 15 days of community supervision, while J.D. and M.D. each received 20 days in secure custody followed by 10 days of community supervision. All three were placed on 18 months of probation and ordered to pay compensation for the damage: $20,535.28 for L.F., $6,378.19 for J.D., and $5,143.39 for M.D. Each was also prohibited from possessing firearms and other specified weapons for two years.

This case demonstrates that youth offenders can receive custodial sentences under the YCJA when the offences are exceptionally serious, even in the absence of a previous criminal record. The judge described the killing of the horses as “vile, cruel and despicable” (para 17) and emphasized that the offences were not a single spontaneous incident but a nine-day course of conduct, giving the accused numerous opportunities to stop.

 

R. v. Fusell, 1920 CarswellSask 16

Mrs. Fred F. Fusell was charged under s. 537 of the Criminal Code for unlawfully shooting and killing a neighbour’s dog, valued at $25. She was tried on October 16, 1919, with adjournment until October 20, 1919, when the justice announced his conclusion and made a minute: “I find the accused guilty and fine her $5.00 and costs, and I award damages of $15.00 for loss of the dog” (para. 2).

The accused admitted to shooting the dog but explained that it had been chasing and biting pigs belonging to her husband. There was no indication in the decision of any prior criminal record or other relevant history.

The judge found that the evidence supported the accused’s explanation that she shot the dog to protect the pigs and that this provided a legal justification under s. 541 of the Criminal Code. The court found that the magistrate at trial had “overlooked sec. 541, that nothing shall be an offence under any of the foregoing provisions of this Part unless it is done without legal justification or excuse, and without colour of right. In some cases it would be a harsh measure to shoot a dog chasing pigs, but as the evidence disclosed that one pig died from a dog bite and others had their ears chewed by a dog, it can safely be stated that there was at least “colour of right” (para. 20). The original charge also failed to expressly allege that the killing was “wilful”.

The court quashed the conviction with costs awarded against the informant.

KPS (Litigation Guardian) v National Service Dogs, 2024 HRTO 548

The respondent, National Service Dogs, removed the applicant’s service dog “Sammy” from her home on March 28, 2022. The applicant claimed this removal was discriminatory on the basis of disability under the Human Rights Code (sections 1, 9, 11, and 17) and was detrimental to her severe Autism Spectrum Disorder (“ASD”).

The respondent claimed Sammy was removed due to the health problems that had developed since his placement with the applicant in September 2018. The applicant’s family had also failed to accommodate the respondent’s concerns of the dog’s health and did not exercise him enough. Sammy had gained significant weight and associated health concerns.

The Tribunal dismissed the application because withdrawal of the animal was justified, remarking at paragraph 71: “While I recognize the challenges of families with children living with ASD, accepting a service animal includes a commitment to care and support these animals to excel in their work.” The tribunal adjudicator also referred to Sammy as ‘he’ throughout the decision.

R. v. Cretney, 1987 CarswellBC 1729, 1 W.C.B. (2d) 373.

The appellant had been convicted of wilfully failing to provide adequate food and care for 19 horses, several of which were severely malnourished, with one dying from starvation and another having to be euthanized. On appeal, he argued that the Crown had not proven “wilfulness” because he had purchased and provided hay for the horses.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that although the trial judge had not specifically discussed wilfulness in his reasons, there was no evidence that he had misunderstood or failed to consider this requirement.

The case affirms that wilfulness is an essential element of the offence which can include recklessly failing to act when a person knows their omission can cause a harmful result, and does not necessarily require an “evil intention” (para 6).

R. v. Corliss, 1957 CarswellOnt 157, 120 C.C.C. 341

The accused had shot and killed a dog that was on his property where his cattle were kept. He said the dog was bothering his cattle and then turned and threatened him. He was convicted of unlawfully killing the dog.

The court quashed the conviction. First, the original charge did not say that the accused had “wilfully” killed the dog, which was a required element of the offence. The court held that this could not be fixed after the conviction. Second, the court found that even if the charge had been properly written, the accused should still be acquitted because he had a legal justification for shooting the dog and honestly believed he was protecting himself and his cattle.

This case demonstrates the importance that every essential element of a criminal offence must be included in the charge. It also illustrates how the common defence of legal justification can be used when charged with killing or injuring an animal, where that animal is posing a threat to person or livestock wellbeing, particularly where the person has an honest belief that the action is legally justified.