NOTE: We have heard that the landlord is planning to appeal this case, so watch for an update
This tribunal hearing involved a tenant, Mr. Desjardins, who had kept a dog and cat in his apartment since 2011 despite a no-pets clause in his lease, prompting his third landlord (unlike the first two, who had tolerated the animals) to seek termination of the lease once he refused a formal notice to remove them. In response, the tenant applied to have the clause annulled as contrary to the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms or, alternatively, as abusive under the Civil Code, supported by an intervention from the Montreal SPCA and medical evidence from his physician, psychiatrist, and occupational therapist attesting to the therapeutic value of his pets for his anxiety, depression, and PTSD.
The Tribunal confirmed its jurisdiction over the dispute, annulled the no-pets clause on the basis that it infringed the tenant’s rights to liberty and privacy under sections 1 and 5 of the Quebec Charter without justification under section 9.1 (the landlord’s stated goal of simply “maintaining control” was not a legitimate and important objective, particularly since no harm had ever been caused), alternatively found the clause abusive and unreasonable under article 1901 C.C.Q. given the credible evidence of therapeutic benefit and absence of nuisance, and dismissed the landlord’s application to terminate the lease for lack of proven serious prejudice.
The decision is notable for extending the existing line of “pet therapy” cases (such as Coopérative de l’Ébène, D.C. v. Berthierville, Bilodeau v Chabot, and Berniqué) into an explicit Quebec Charter analysis rather than resting solely on unreasonableness under the Civil Code, drawing on the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of “liberty” and “privacy” in Godbout v. Longueuil and R. v. Morgentaler to characterize the choice to share one’s home with a pet as a fundamentally personal act deserving Charter protection. The Tribunal also leaned on animal welfare legislation and academic commentary (notably Jean Turgeon at para 131) to support treating pets as more than mere property when interpreting tenants’ rights, and it accepted relatively general and sparse medical notes—paralleling the low evidentiary bar set in D.C. v. Berthierville—as sufficient when combined with the tenant’s credible testimony, despite the landlord’s argument that such notes could “apply to everyone.”
Perhaps most striking are the Tribunal’s policy remarks framing residential leases as “fertile ground for the development of contracts of adhesion” given tenants’ relative powerlessness in a scarce housing market, and its explicit positioning of the ruling as contributing to the “harmonious evolution of housing law in Quebec.” Finally, the landlord’s own candid admission that he had “nothing against” animals and sought only to preserve control proved fatal to his case on both the Charter proportionality analysis and the termination application, undermining the traditional “lease is the law between the parties” approach reflected in prior case law like Franco v. Beaumier and Triple A Real Estate Broker Inc. v. Duquette, and signaling that blanket no-pets clauses may now face significant difficulty being enforced in Quebec absent actual proof of nuisance or damage.
