Henry v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONACRB 48

On May 23, 2023, complaints of animal abuse were made against the appellant by his neighbours, who provided an Animal Welfare Services (AWS) Inspector with video evidence showing him repeatedly striking his five dogs with his hands, fists, and a flashlight—once in front of a child (paras 20–21). After reviewing the videos, an AWS consulting veterinarian identified clear signs of physical and psychological distress and recommended removing the dogs from Henry’s care to alleviate their suffering.

A signed Veterinarian’s Certificate was subsequently provided on May 30, 2023, supporting their removal (para 20).Four adult dogs and a puppy were removed from the appellant’s care on May 31, 2023, by an AWS Inspector acting under a warrant pursuant to s. 31 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13 (the “PAWS Act”). The appellant was issued a Notice of Removal (NOR) (paras 1–2).

On June 4, 2023, the appellant was served with a Notice of Decision to Keep an Animal in the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector’s Care (DTK). On June 5, 2023, he appealed the NOR to the Animal Care Review Board (ACRB), requesting the return of his five dogs, but did not appeal the DTK (paras 3–4). He argued that his actions were legitimate training methods and challenged the reliability and context of the videos (paras 12, 24–25, 33).

The ACRB dismissed the appellant’s appeal, finding that the dogs were experiencing physical and psychological distress. The Board determined that their removal was lawful and necessary to alleviate their distress and refused to order their return (paras 31–32, 45–46). The ACRB noted that because the appellant neither appealed the DTK nor applied for the dogs’ return under s. 38(4) of the PAWS Act, it lacked jurisdiction to order their return on those grounds. Nevertheless, the Board found that even if such an application had been made, the dogs should not be returned because the appellant failed to provide evidence that the conditions causing their distress ben remedied (paras 35, 44).

The decision highlights that animal distress under the PAWS Act includes psychological suffering (paras 18–19). The dogs’ fearful behaviours, including cowering, fleeing, and hypervigilance, supported the finding of distress (paras 21, 27–28). Additionally, veterinary evidence indicated that the dogs could continue experiencing psychological distress if returned to Henry, even if the physical abuse stopped (paras 37–38, 43).

R. v. Elder, 2019 CarswellAlta 3000

The offender was brought before the Alberta Provincial Court for sentencing on five charges arising from three separate incidents. The most serious offence involved animal cruelty against his pit bull named Kato. In February 2016, the 23-year-old offender was observed kicking Kato twice and then, five weeks later he severely beat the dog on two occasions with a power drill. He also faced charges for an unprovoked assault on his roommate, two breaches of recognizance and failing to appear for sentencing.

The beatings caused significant injuries including a skull fracture, fractured teeth, facial injuries, bruising, and soft-tissue injuries. The veterinarian concluded that the skull fracture would have caused significant pain for at least six to eight weeks and that Kato’s injuries appeared to be part of a pattern of chronic physical abuse.

The Court considered the offender’s history of mental-health difficulties, anger and impulse-control problems, substance abuse and a disadvantaged childhood. There was a possible FASD diagnosis which had not been confirmed. He also had a significant criminal record, including previous convictions for assaults and uttering threats. At the same time, the judge noted the offender had also demonstrated prosocial behaviours, like the ability to work (para. 90). The judge also considered that the offender had developed a plan for counselling, addiction treatment, and psychiatric care after his release.

Justice McLeod imposed a total sentence of 10 months and 10 days in jail, which included 8½ months for the animal-cruelty offence, 45 days for the assault, and 10 days for failing to appear, with the other breach sentences running concurrently. The offender received 228 days of credit for pre-trial custody, leaving 82 days (approximately 2 months and 22 days) to serve. The Court also imposed a lifetime prohibition on possessing, owning, or having custody or control of animals, as well as a 10-year weapons prohibition.

Throughout the decision, the judge consistently characterizes the relationship between an owner and a domestic animal as involving a form of trust or duty because animals are vulnerable to the people responsible for their care (paras. 63 & 101). Additionally, the judge also noted that Canadian courts had not yet established a precise sentencing range for animal cruelty offences, meaning the sentence had to be individualized while considering comparable cases (para. 106).

R. v. L.M.F., 2003 ABPC 174

Three young offenders, L.F., J.D. and M.D., were involved in a series of offences committed over nine days in January 2003 near Bonnyville, Alberta. The offences included careless use of a firearm, property damage exceeding $30,000 and the killing of three horses and wounding of another.

The offences caused significant economic and psychological harm to the victims and community. L.F. was found to be the primary instigator and leader, while J.D. and M.D. were considered followers, although all three were found to have significant responsibility. All three offenders were 17 years old and had no prior criminal record.

The Court sentenced the accused under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA). The judge recognized that youth sentencing emphasizes rehabilitation and reintegration and requires custody to be used only where appropriate alternatives are insufficient. However, the judge found that the extreme seriousness and violence of the offences, their continuation over nine days, and the significant harm caused meant that non-custodial sentences would not adequately hold the accused accountable.

L.F. received 30 days in secure custody followed by 15 days of community supervision, while J.D. and M.D. each received 20 days in secure custody followed by 10 days of community supervision. All three were placed on 18 months of probation and ordered to pay compensation for the damage: $20,535.28 for L.F., $6,378.19 for J.D., and $5,143.39 for M.D. Each was also prohibited from possessing firearms and other specified weapons for two years.

This case demonstrates that youth offenders can receive custodial sentences under the YCJA when the offences are exceptionally serious, even in the absence of a previous criminal record. The judge described the killing of the horses as “vile, cruel and despicable” (para 17) and emphasized that the offences were not a single spontaneous incident but a nine-day course of conduct, giving the accused numerous opportunities to stop.

 

R. v. Fusell, 1920 CarswellSask 16

Mrs. Fred F. Fusell was charged under s. 537 of the Criminal Code for unlawfully shooting and killing a neighbour’s dog, valued at $25. She was tried on October 16, 1919, with adjournment until October 20, 1919, when the justice announced his conclusion and made a minute: “I find the accused guilty and fine her $5.00 and costs, and I award damages of $15.00 for loss of the dog” (para. 2).

The accused admitted to shooting the dog but explained that it had been chasing and biting pigs belonging to her husband. There was no indication in the decision of any prior criminal record or other relevant history.

The judge found that the evidence supported the accused’s explanation that she shot the dog to protect the pigs and that this provided a legal justification under s. 541 of the Criminal Code. The court found that the magistrate at trial had “overlooked sec. 541, that nothing shall be an offence under any of the foregoing provisions of this Part unless it is done without legal justification or excuse, and without colour of right. In some cases it would be a harsh measure to shoot a dog chasing pigs, but as the evidence disclosed that one pig died from a dog bite and others had their ears chewed by a dog, it can safely be stated that there was at least “colour of right” (para. 20). The original charge also failed to expressly allege that the killing was “wilful”.

The court quashed the conviction with costs awarded against the informant.

KPS (Litigation Guardian) v National Service Dogs, 2024 HRTO 548

The respondent, National Service Dogs, removed the applicant’s service dog “Sammy” from her home on March 28, 2022. The applicant claimed this removal was discriminatory on the basis of disability under the Human Rights Code (sections 1, 9, 11, and 17) and was detrimental to her severe Autism Spectrum Disorder (“ASD”).

The respondent claimed Sammy was removed due to the health problems that had developed since his placement with the applicant in September 2018. The applicant’s family had also failed to accommodate the respondent’s concerns of the dog’s health and did not exercise him enough. Sammy had gained significant weight and associated health concerns.

The Tribunal dismissed the application because withdrawal of the animal was justified, remarking at paragraph 71: “While I recognize the challenges of families with children living with ASD, accepting a service animal includes a commitment to care and support these animals to excel in their work.” The tribunal adjudicator also referred to Sammy as ‘he’ throughout the decision.

R. v. Cretney, 1987 CarswellBC 1729, 1 W.C.B. (2d) 373.

The appellant had been convicted of wilfully failing to provide adequate food and care for 19 horses, several of which were severely malnourished, with one dying from starvation and another having to be euthanized. On appeal, he argued that the Crown had not proven “wilfulness” because he had purchased and provided hay for the horses.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that although the trial judge had not specifically discussed wilfulness in his reasons, there was no evidence that he had misunderstood or failed to consider this requirement.

The case affirms that wilfulness is an essential element of the offence which can include recklessly failing to act when a person knows their omission can cause a harmful result, and does not necessarily require an “evil intention” (para 6).

R. v. Corliss, 1957 CarswellOnt 157, 120 C.C.C. 341

The accused had shot and killed a dog that was on his property where his cattle were kept. He said the dog was bothering his cattle and then turned and threatened him. He was convicted of unlawfully killing the dog.

The court quashed the conviction. First, the original charge did not say that the accused had “wilfully” killed the dog, which was a required element of the offence. The court held that this could not be fixed after the conviction. Second, the court found that even if the charge had been properly written, the accused should still be acquitted because he had a legal justification for shooting the dog and honestly believed he was protecting himself and his cattle.

This case demonstrates the importance that every essential element of a criminal offence must be included in the charge. It also illustrates how the common defence of legal justification can be used when charged with killing or injuring an animal, where that animal is posing a threat to person or livestock wellbeing, particularly where the person has an honest belief that the action is legally justified.

R. v. Chailler, 2013 CarswellAlta 3145

The offender pleaded guilty to six offences committed on December 4, 2012, in Edmonton, Alberta, including two break and enters, mischief causing property damage, animal cruelty, and failing to comply with a youth sentence. The most serious offence involved the intentional killing of his mother’s family dog. The Court found that the offender killed the dog in an attempt to impress a young woman who had rejected him, believing it would prove he was serious and should not be ignored. He also took photographs of the deceased dog afterward and sent them to others.

The Court considered several factors regarding the offender’s background and risk of future offending. Although he had a minor youth criminal record consisting of one mischief and one theft over $5,000.00, the offences occurred while he was on probation, which was considered aggravating. A pre-sentence report and FACS assessment raised concerns about his rehabilitation and public safety risk. These assessments noted statements made by the offender about violent thoughts toward others, including fantasies of raping and killing women, although he later claimed these statements were exaggerated.

The Court was particularly concerned by the offender’s lack of remorse and his failure to understand the seriousness of killing an animal. His mother expressed concerns that he dismissed his actions and showed little emotional response. The Court also considered evidence that he had previously harmed animals, including throwing a cat over a fence in anger and cutting open a squirrel to examine its insides.

The Court rejected the defence argument that the offences should be treated as one criminal “spree.” Instead, the judge found that the property offences and breach of sentence were separate from the animal cruelty offence because of its different nature and motivation. The offender received nine months imprisonment for the break and enter and mischief offences, 30 days for breaching his youth sentence, and a consecutive 16-month custodial sentence for animal cruelty. The Court also imposed a lifetime ban on owning animals, a DNA order, and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The Court emphasized that animal cruelty offences are serious crimes requiring denunciation and deterrence. The judge described the killing of the dog as calculated and motivated by a desire to gain attention, demonstrating a “callous disregard” for the life of a family pet (para 25). The Court was particularly concerned that the offence was deliberate rather than impulsive and viewed his lack of empathy and previous animal cruelty as indicators of potential future risk. The Court noted that animal cruelty offenses are seen in a “more serious light” since such offenses can presage “more chilling possible adult behaviours” (para 26).

Overall, this case is significant since it acknowledges animal cruelty can reveal deeper behavioral issues which justify stronger sentences focused on deterrence and protection of the general public.

R. v. Cook, 1910 CarswellPEI 19

Annie Cook was convicted for the unlawful and wilful killing of Peter G. Ross’ dog. The magistrates imposed a $1 fine (approximately $35.53 in 2026), awarded Ross $20 ($233) in damages for the loss of his dog, and ordered Cook to pay $4 ($142.12) in costs. Cook challenged the conviction, arguing that the magistrates did not have the authority under s. 537 of the Criminal Code to award damages to the dog’s owner.

The reviewing court agreed that the magistrates did not have such authority. Section 537 allowed them to impose the criminal penalty for killing a dog, but it did not give them the power to award compensation for the owners loss. The court held that Rosss claim for the $20 loss was a civil matter and rejected an attempt to treat the $1 fine and $20 damages as a single $21 criminal penalty because the magistrates had specifically imposed only a $1 fine.

Rather than quashing the entire conviction, however, the court exercised its power under s. 1124 of the Criminal Code to correct the error. It ordered that the portion of the conviction awarding $20 in damages be removed, while leaving the $1 fine in place.

Despite being a dated case, it is still relevant as it distinguishes between criminal punishment and civil compensation. The case equally demonstrates that a court cannot impose a remedy that is outside of its jurisdiction and that a reviewing court may correct an unauthorized conviction without having to overturn the decision as a whole.

R v C (L.A), 2001 CarswellOnt 4870

This case did not determine the accused’s guilt or innocence for the animal cruelty offences. Instead, it concerned a Charter application regarding whether certain evidence could be admitted at trial.

The accused was a 17-year-old charged with wilfully killing a dog and causing unnecessary pain by kicking and burning the dog, contrary to ss. 445(a) and 446(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. Police initially arrested her for an unrelated break and enter offence. During that investigation, officers discovered her diary, which allegedly contained entries describing the dog’s death, and later questioned her about the incident during a videotaped interview.

Regarding the accused’s personal circumstances, she was a young person with no indication in the decision of a significant prior criminal history. The court found that the diary was lawfully obtained during a search incident to the accused’s arrest and was therefore admissible. However, the statements she made about the dog during the videotaped interview were excluded.

Although the police had acted in good faith and had not coerced her, they failed to re-caution her about her right to counsel when the questioning shifted from the unrelated break and enter offence to the separate and more serious animal cruelty allegations. This breached her rights under s. 10(b) of the Charter and the protections afforded to young persons under the Young Offenders Act.

This case emphasizes the heightened procedural protections afforded to young people during police questioning. In particular, when questioning changes significantly to a new and unrelated offence, police must ensure that the young person understands their rights and potential consequences that may result.