This is a Crown appeal from an acquittal where the accused was charged with committing an assault with a weapon by using her dog. She admitted to inciting her dog, a pit bull, to attack the dog owned by the complainant. The accused also ordered her dog to attack the complainant, which the dog did, jumping at the complainant and biting her hand, breaking the skin on the thumb and first finger.
While the accused had pleaded guilty to two other counts of common assault, she was acquitted on the count of assault with weapon on the basis of the trial judge’s assessment that Parliament did not intend for animate objects, such as a dog, to be included in the definition of a weapon. The trial judge commented that this was the first occasion as far as they and counsel were aware that a Court has been faced with the question as to whether or not a dog, used in the manner it was by the accused: as a weapon. They concluded that “if Parliament had intended animate objects such as a dog be included in the definition of the word “weapon”, it would have said so in, and I repeat, clear and unambiguous terms, and having failed to do so, I cannot read into the definition of the word “weapon” the animate object of a dog” (para. 2.
The Crown appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in their interpretation of “weapon” and “anything” to exclude animate things like dogs. The sole question before the Appeal Court was whether or not a dog was a weapon as defined in section 2 of the Criminal Code.
The Appeal Court noted that ” the legislative history suggests that in 1985, when the present definition was enacted by virtue of s. 2(8) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1985, S.C. 1985, c.-19, Parliament intended to enlarge the scope of the definition” (para. 9), and went to quote the new definition at the time, stating that “the present definition is no longer confined to anything designed to be used as a weapon or anything used or intended to be used as a weapon” para. 10). Ultimately, the Appeal Court found that when Parliament used the term “anything” in the relevant provision, that word was meant to include animate and inanimate bodies. With this finding in mind, dogs can be used and intended to be as a weapon. Because the accused admitted to commanding the dog to attack the victim, the elements that constitute assault with a weapon are made out.
The acquittal was set aside and a conviction entered, and the matter was remitted to the Supreme Court of the Yukon Territory for sentencing. The relevance of this case is that animals can be understood to be used as weapons in certain circumstances.
https://canlii.ca/t/gbtrv