R v Scott, 2024 ONCA 608

This is an appellate review of a case in which two men, Jeremy Pike and David Scott, were detained after their digital devices were searched upon entry to Canada. When the searches uncovered child pornography, the officers arrested them for the Customs Act offence of importing those illegal goods, then contacted the Peel Regional Police, who charged Pike and Scott with the Criminal Code offences of possessing and importing child pornography Concerns were raised about whether one of Canada’s border laws, section 99(1)(a) of the Customs Act which allows border officers to search travellers’ digital devices without any objective grounds, violates section 8 of the Charter (unreasonable search and seizure). The two men whose devices were searched under this law, and who were consequentially charged with possessing and importing child pornography, challenged the constitutionality of the law.

Pike is a former teacher. Before the charges, he was already a registered sexual offender who had been sentenced to 14 years in prison and stripped of his teacher’s licence for sexually interfering with eight young boys and making and possessing child pornography depicting that abuse; upon release, he left Canada and spent seven months visiting several developing countries, specifically some known destinations for travellers intending to sexually exploit children. Agency Border Services officers searched all 11 working devices belonging to Pike and found child pornography on one of the devices, arrested Pike for violating the Customs Act, and contacted Peel Regional Police, who found over 1,600 images depicting the sexual abuse and exploitation of children on two of Pike’s device (para. 18-19).

Scott is a 77-year-old retired business executive who had returned to Canada after spending six months at his vacation home in Belize. Border services officers searched his luggage and found 13 digital devices and after obtaining Scott’s passwords, officers then searched his three cell phones, one of the two tablets, and some USB keys. They found a folder that contained written child pornography 55 minutes into the search, then nineteen minutes later, after finding child pornography images, Scott was arrested for violating the Customs Act. The Agency contacted Peel Regional Police, who found approximately 3,000 text, image, and video files depicting the sexual abuse and exploitation of children on Scott’s digital devices (para. 20-21).

Neither Pike nor Scott were advised of their rights to counsel, and in Scott’s case that he was detained or the reasons for his detention, until well into the search and after illegal material had been located. The trial judge ruled that the s. 99(1) of the Custom’s Act was unconstitutional, and that the Agency had breached Pike’s and Scott’s s. 8 Charter right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as breaching their s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel and Mr. Scott’s s. 10(a) Charter right to be informed promptly of the reasons for his detention. He excluded from evidence the child pornography files from Pike’s devices and acquitted him of those charges; however, he admitted the files from Scott’s devices, convicted him of importing child pornography (R. v. Scott, 2022 ONSC 5823), and sentenced him to 23 months’ house arrest. The Crown was appealing Pike’s acquittal and seeking leave to appeal the sentence the trial judge imposed on
Scott, while Scott was appealing his conviction. (paras. 22-24).

Issues on appeal were whether:
1. The Customs Act’s authorization of searches of digital devices violates the Charter;
2. The Agency violated Mr. Pike’s and Mr. Scott’s right to counsel;
3. The evidence found on their digital devices is admissible; and
4. The trial judge erred by imposing a conditional sentence on Mr. Scott.

The Court relied on Friesen and Sharpe to extensively explain the harms and wrongs caused by possession and distribution of child sexual abuse material, in that it contributes to normalization, cognitive distortions and minimization of the damage such material causes, from paragraphs 144 through 156.

The Court found that, in Scott’s case, the trial judge erred in principle by failing to consider the many children that he had victimized and erroneously minimizing his moral blameworthiness; the trial judge had reasoned that most of Scott’s material did not depict real children. Scott told police in a statement that the defence agreed was admissible at sentencing that he collected material for three decades, and the psychologist who assessed him reported that he was a persistent user of child pornography since his teenager years, which increased his moral blameworthiness by showing that his actions were prolonged and repeated, thereby undercutting the trial judge’s conclusion that Scott had “previously good character” (para. 187). In addition, Scott’s “virtual and story material depicted or described especially harmful and wrongful activities, such as aggressive sexual activity, bondage, bestiality, and torture, which perpetuates messages that attack children’s very humanity and equality” (para. 189). The Court went on to conclude:

“I do not agree with the trial judge’s apparent conclusion that Mr. Scott’s characterization of his
actions as mere fantasies and claim that he did not “like” images depicting real children were mitigating. Rather, Mr.
Scott’s self-description of his actions reflected his distorted, myth-based thinking, minimized his possession of real
child images as a psychological crime, and overlooked the real children who he severely wronged and harmed.
Because he used images depicting children’s victimization to fuel those fantasies, they were an instrument of harm
to the real depicted children, and they increased the risks of inciting and facilitating the type of abuse of children
that Parliament sought to prevent by amending the Criminal Code to criminalize possession of child pornography.”(para. 191)

The court held that the Custom’s Act section was unconstitutional, however that did not entitle Pike and Scott to acquittals on the serious crimes against children with which they were charged. It allowed the Crown’s appeal from Pike’s acquittal, admitted the evidence that officers found on his digital devices, and ordered a new trial; for Scott, it also dismissed Scott’s appeal from conviction, granted the Crown leave to appeal the sentence the trial judge imposed on Scott but dismissed that appeal, to ensure that Scott served the rest of his house arrest sentence (paras. 195-196).

 

R v Jackson, 2024 BCPC 17

The accused made an application for the return of 12 firearms seized by the RCMP when he was charged with uttering a threat to injure an animal. He argued that the RCMP did not extend the detention order and that the guns were no longer needed for any proceeding. He also said keeping them caused hardship because he relies on them for sustenance hunting that is culturally essential to his Indigenous community.

The Crown position was that the application should be dismissed for two reasons (para.17):

a) Since proceedings were instituted, an application under 490(7) cannot proceed without Mr. Jackson first establishing under s. 490(8) that he would suffer hardship if his application was not allowed to proceed now. He has failed to do so; and

b) Even if Mr. Jackson establishes hardship, he has failed to meet the onus under 490(7) to establish that the seized items are not required for the proceedings.

The Court accepted that the applicant did suffer hardship, but held that he did not prove the firearms would not be required for trial (e.g., to show means, ownership, forensic classification). Since proceedings were already instituted, it was determined that the continued detention of the firearms was lawful.

The application was dismissed.

Kennedy v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2024 ONACRB 15872 93

Appellant Mark Kennedy contested the removal of his bulldog, Junior, by Provincial Animal Welfare Services (PAWS) investigators after a neighbour complained that the appellant had physically and emotionally abused Junior. A Senior Investigator for PAWS reviewed video showing the appellant yelling at, striking, pushing and kicking the dog. An AWS veterinarian, Dr. Robertson, reviewed the video, concluded the conduct was abusive and signed a veterinary certificate advising removal.

At issue was whether Junior was in distress on May 2, 2024 and whether removal was necessary to relieve that distress; and also whether the conditions leading to removal had been addressed so that Junior could be safely returned to the appellant.

Animal Care Review Board accepted the evidence of the investigator and the veterinarian, and found that Junior was in distress from physical and psychological abuse on the date in question and that his removal was necessary and lawful. In his testimony, the veterinarian stated that “when caregivers are physical abusers, there is inherently an element of psychological distress as compared to a single act of physical abuse by a random stranger whom the dog does not know; Dogs are dependent on their owners for the basic needs of life and physical abuse at the hands of an owner who they need to continue to interact with, causes psychological distress; Dogs who have been abused by their owners are conflicted by their need to be taken care of and their reluctance to interact with their abuser.” (para. 20 (h-j)).

The Board found the conditions causing removal had not been addressed and determined that the appellant’s expressions of remorse and willingness to take courses were not persuasive because he had not taken concrete remedial steps. The Board accepted expert evidence that returning Junior would likely cause the dog to experience further psychological harm (para. 29). One notable aspect of this decision is that the judge weighed both the physical and psychological harm suffered by Junior. Psychological distress of animals is frequently not considered by the courts, despite being included in the PAWS Act under the definition of distress.

MW v Nova Scotia Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA), 2024 NSAWAB1

MW appealed the Nova Scotia SPCA’s seizure of his dog, Daisy, who was removed from his home on January 5, 2024 under the Animal Protection Act. The allegations of abuse were widespread and significant, with some of it caught on video uploaded to YouTube which were the source of the complaints. At the time Daisy was retrieved, the SPCA was also looking for a cat Mookie, also owned by the appellant, who was seen being squeezed by the appellant, but Mookie was never found.

The majority of the board found that despite credible video evidence of some improper handling and an unsafe environment during the “chainsaw incident”, but overall the evidence did not establish that Daisy’s health, safety or well‑being had been impaired to the statutory threshold.

Daisy was returned to MW at no cost as “the majority of the Board members found that the dog did not require ”immediate seizure” to preserve its life on January 5, 2024” (para. 130), and the seizure was improper under the purported section of the Act; the inspectors erred in going straight to removal rather than making attempts to work with MW by issuing warnings and compliance orders first (para. 132). The Board was unwilling to withhold Daisy’s return, primarily because there was no unquestionable evidence of physical or psychological abuse. After lengthy deliberation, the Board majority found that the seizure was not carried out appropriately under the Act, and was overturned.

One Board member had a final point overall dissent with the majority decision: “My primary dissent was to the creation of a dangerous environment with the use of the chain saw and axes. There was no clear evidence of the location of the animals during this video segment, and the Appellant’s erratic behavior appeared to be escalating; therefore, I feel the SPCA was justified in seizing the animals as it was in the pets’ best interest, with the knowledge that they had at the time” (para. 135).

Talis (Re), [2024] O.R.B.D. No. 1231

This case refers to a hearing convened under the Ontario Review Board to determine whether the accused, Kalis Talis, represented a significant threat to the safety of the public as defined in section 672.5401 of the Criminal Code and, if so, what was the necessary and appropriate disposition which was also the least onerous and least restrictive. The animal abuse Mr. Talis was charged with and found not criminally responsible for was the intentional injury and later killing of his mother’s dog as a direct result of delusions about the dog eating him and hallucinations of voices that he believed to be coming from the dog. Talis had a long history of mental illness and had been charged several times in the past but sentenced only to probation until the most recent incident.

The Board determined that Mr. Talis represented a significant threat to the safety of the public and that the appropriate disposition would be a detention order under the terms recommended by the mental health facility. The Board ruled that Mr. Talis suffers from a major mental illness and has displayed regular noncompliance with recommended medication as well as acute symptoms of his illness. He has displayed significant aggression both to animals and human beings who minimizes his actions and is noncompliant with treatment.

Mr. Talis was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR) with respect to charges of mischief – interfere with lawful use, enjoyment, operation of property; failure to comply with a release order x2; kill or injure animal; and fail to comply with a probation order all contrary to the Criminal Code.

Importance of Case: Despite the fact that Mr. Talis had never directly harmed a human being physically – only threatened to – the Board draws a clear link between those threats and violence towards animals as a clear precursor to escalation. This demonstrates two important principles. First, that the Board does not view violence towards animals and towards humans as the same and places more weight on harm towards humans. However, it did acknowledge the link between violent treatment of animals and violent treatment of humans in ruling that the killing of the dog was sufficient grounds to detain Mr. Talis at the hospital.

Kirby v R, 2024 NBCA 32

 

The accused, Michael Kirby, appealed his convictions for four counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm, all arising from separate dog attacks involving his animals. That case summary is available here.

He argued that his trial took too long in violation of his Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time (s. 11(b)), and that the guilty verdicts were inconsistent because he was acquitted of breaching his bail condition about controlling his dogs.

The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments. It found that most of the delay was caused by Kirby or his lawyers, so the overall timeline did not exceed the Jordan limit. It also explained that the offences required different mental elements: criminal negligence is judged by an objective standard, while breaching bail requires proof that the accused acted knowingly or recklessly. Because these standards differ, the verdicts were not contradictory. The Court further found no error in how the trial judge assessed the evidence from the Tim Hortons incident.

The appeal was dismissed and all convictions were upheld.

 

R. v. Kirby 2022 NBJ No. 356

This case concerns multiple dog attacks in Saint John, NB, between June and December 2018. Michael Kirby, the defendant, owned several large dogs that, on repeated occasions, were off leash in public or inadequately secured and attacked pedestrians, causing puncture wounds and other injuries. Despite prior complaints, an SPCA warning about leashing, and two earlier incidents demonstrating risk, Kirby minimized the behaviour as “herding” or “play” and failed to implement effective precautions (leashing, muzzling, confinement, or other controls).

The Court found that, by continuing to walk the dogs off-leash and later leaving them unsupervised in public and at home with inadequate containment, Kirby displayed a wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others and committed a marked and substantial departure from the conduct of a reasonable person. He was therefore found guilty on four counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm (Criminal Code, s. 221).

On a separate charge for breaching an undertaking (s. 145(3)), the Court entered an acquittal, holding the Crown had not proven the requisite subjective mens rea under R v Zora.

Benoit v Langille, 2022 NSSC 374

Self-represented applicant Gail Ruth Benoit sought a cyber-protection order under the Intimate Images and Cyber-Protection Act against the Facebook group “Stop Gail Benoit From Ever Dealing With Dogs” and its administrator, Elizabeth Langille.

Ms. Benoit had previously been found guilty in Court proceedings concerning the mistreatment of animals, specifically dogs, and their sale, and her appeals were later dismissed and convictions upheld for breaches of the Animal Cruelty Act and assaulting a peace officer (para. 6): the history can be found here.

The Facebook group in question contained numerous posts targeting Ms. Benoit, including threats of violence, intimidation, and ongoing surveillance, which she included in her submissions to the Court. She argued that these posts amounted to cyber-bullying under the statute.

While the Court acknowledged that some of the communications in the group were true as Ms. Benoit had been found guilty of causing harm to animals, “that truth is inextricably linked with encouragement of surveillance of Ms. Benoit in the community and of condoning violence toward her on an ongoing basis for the potential of future conflicts with the law” (para. 30). The Court was satisfied that the group’s activities amounted to recklessness creating a risk of harm to Ms. Benoit, and that the Facebook group “Stop Gail Benoit From Ever Dealing With Dogs” and its posts met the definition of cyber-bullying set out in the Cyber-Protection Act (paras. 31-32). It was determined that the respondent, Stop Gail Benoit, and its administrator, Elizabeth Langille, engaged in cyber-bullying.

It was ordered that that Ms. Langille is prohibited from contacting Ms. Benoit and from making any further communications that would be cyber-bullying via Facebook and specifically her group “Stop Gail Benoit From Ever Dealing With Dogs”, which was ordered taken down along with any communications via Facebook or otherwise that encouraged violence or threats of violence against Ms. Benoit in accordance with section 6 of the Act.

This case is relevant as it reflects the increasing use of social media to communicate and organize within communities.

Niagara North Condominium Corp. No. 46 v Chassie, 1999 CanLII 15025 (ONSC)

The applicant, Niagara North Condominium Corporation No. 46 (NNCC), commenced an application in the Ontario Court (General Division) seeking an order directing the respondents, Raymond and Muriel Chassie, to remove their 16-year-old cat from their unit, claiming its presence violated the condominium’s Declaration and Rules, which prohibited all animals, except small, caged birds and fish.

The corporation relied on its authority under the Condominium Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.26, which permits the establishment and enforcement of rules. The court found enforcement unreasonable.

The Chassies’ position was that they had been disadvantaged at the time of purchase, as they were unaware of the cat prohibition and the possibility of enforcement. Further, the Board of Directors had also acquiesced to previous pets, including cats, which undermined the corporation’s claim and made strict enforcement unfair. Finally, removing the cat would further constitute discrimination against Mrs. Chassie due to her depression under the Ontario Human Rights Code, as the cat provided essential companionship and therapeutic support.

The Court found the pet prohibition unreasonable in modern society, where attitudes toward pets have evolved. The prohibition lacked flexibility to accommodate changing circumstances, such as the needs of elderly or disabled residents. The Court emphasized that the cat did not interfere with the use or enjoyment of other units (paras 83-94). It was also found that Mrs. Chassie suffered from a mental disorder (depression) within the meaning of the Human Rights Code. The cat was essential to her mental health and well-being, making them a support/therapy animal, therefore enforcing the no-pet rule would constitute discrimination against Mrs. Chassie based on her health condition or disability, contrary to the Code (paras 108-115).

The application was dismissed; no costs awarded.

R v T.B., 2008 ONCA 80

In the original judgement, the accused was found guilty on multiple counts including assault with a weapon (the pit bull dog Tiger and a beer bottle), aggravated assault, and breaches of probation. The court found that T.B. had control over the dog, intentionally commanded it to attack two victims causing significant injuries, and threw a beer bottle at a police officer during his flight. While he was acquitted of animal cruelty due to reasonable doubt on intentionally causing “sufficient harm” to the dog, the court concluded the dog was used as a weapon, and T.B. was convicted as a principal to the assaults. You can read the initial case here.

An appeal was made based on the claim that trial judge placed undue emphasis on the appellant’s demeanour, which led to her undue assessment of the credibility of T.B.’s testimony.

The Ontario Court of Appeal found that the trial judge’s assessment towards T.B.’s demeanour played little role in her assessment of the credibility of T.B.’s testimony, therefore, dismissed the appeal.