Kirby v R, 2024 NBCA 32

Statute: Criminal Code,
Section: s 221 Criminal negligence causing bodily harms.
Province or Territory: New Brunswick,
Offence: Neglect, Other,
Animal: Dog,
Type of Distress: Accused appealed verdict on four counts of criminal negligence for failing to control his dogs
Sentence: Appeal dismissed; conviction upheld
Legal Issue: Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Ownership/Care/Control,

 

The accused, Michael Kirby, appealed his convictions for four counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm, all arising from separate dog attacks involving his animals. That case summary is available here.

He argued that his trial took too long in violation of his Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time (s. 11(b)), and that the guilty verdicts were inconsistent because he was acquitted of breaching his bail condition about controlling his dogs.

The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments. It found that most of the delay was caused by Kirby or his lawyers, so the overall timeline did not exceed the Jordan limit. It also explained that the offences required different mental elements: criminal negligence is judged by an objective standard, while breaching bail requires proof that the accused acted knowingly or recklessly. Because these standards differ, the verdicts were not contradictory. The Court further found no error in how the trial judge assessed the evidence from the Tim Hortons incident.

The appeal was dismissed and all convictions were upheld.

 

https://canlii.ca/t/k30cl
R. v. Kirby-2

R. v. Kirby 2022 NBJ No. 356

Statute: Criminal Code,
Section: s. 221, Criminal negligence causing bodily harms; 145(3) Failure to comply with an undertaking
Province or Territory: New Brunswick,
Offence: Neglect, Other,
Animal: Dog,
Type of Distress: Failure to properly confine or control dogs
Sentence: Accused found guilty on four counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm under s.221; not guilty on the failure-to-comply
Legal Issue: Procedure (Charges), Maim/Wound/Injure, Ownership/Care/Control,

This case concerns multiple dog attacks in Saint John, NB, between June and December 2018. Michael Kirby, the defendant, owned several large dogs that, on repeated occasions, were off leash in public or inadequately secured and attacked pedestrians, causing puncture wounds and other injuries. Despite prior complaints, an SPCA warning about leashing, and two earlier incidents demonstrating risk, Kirby minimized the behaviour as “herding” or “play” and failed to implement effective precautions (leashing, muzzling, confinement, or other controls).

The Court found that, by continuing to walk the dogs off-leash and later leaving them unsupervised in public and at home with inadequate containment, Kirby displayed a wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others and committed a marked and substantial departure from the conduct of a reasonable person. He was therefore found guilty on four counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm (Criminal Code, s. 221).

On a separate charge for breaching an undertaking (s. 145(3)), the Court entered an acquittal, holding the Crown had not proven the requisite subjective mens rea under R v Zora.

R. v. Kirby

Benoit v Langille, 2022 NSSC 374

Statute: Other,
Section: s. 3(c), s. 6–7, Intimate Images and Cyber-Protection Act (NS)
Province or Territory: Nova Scotia,
Offence: Other,
Animal: Dog, n/a,
Type of Distress: Cyber-bullying: threats/intimidation related to applicant's past (adjudicated) history of animal abuses
Sentence: Take-down order of Facebook group; prohibition on further communications; no damages awarded as no evidence provided.
Legal Issue: Provincial case (Procedure),

Self-represented applicant Gail Ruth Benoit sought a cyber-protection order under the Intimate Images and Cyber-Protection Act against the Facebook group “Stop Gail Benoit From Ever Dealing With Dogs” and its administrator, Elizabeth Langille.

Ms. Benoit had previously been found guilty in Court proceedings concerning the mistreatment of animals, specifically dogs, and their sale, and her appeals were later dismissed and convictions upheld for breaches of the Animal Cruelty Act and assaulting a peace officer (para. 6): the history can be found here.

The Facebook group in question contained numerous posts targeting Ms. Benoit, including threats of violence, intimidation, and ongoing surveillance, which she included in her submissions to the Court. She argued that these posts amounted to cyber-bullying under the statute.

While the Court acknowledged that some of the communications in the group were true as Ms. Benoit had been found guilty of causing harm to animals, “that truth is inextricably linked with encouragement of surveillance of Ms. Benoit in the community and of condoning violence toward her on an ongoing basis for the potential of future conflicts with the law” (para. 30). The Court was satisfied that the group’s activities amounted to recklessness creating a risk of harm to Ms. Benoit, and that the Facebook group “Stop Gail Benoit From Ever Dealing With Dogs” and its posts met the definition of cyber-bullying set out in the Cyber-Protection Act (paras. 31-32). It was determined that the respondent, Stop Gail Benoit, and its administrator, Elizabeth Langille, engaged in cyber-bullying.

It was ordered that that Ms. Langille is prohibited from contacting Ms. Benoit and from making any further communications that would be cyber-bullying via Facebook and specifically her group “Stop Gail Benoit From Ever Dealing With Dogs”, which was ordered taken down along with any communications via Facebook or otherwise that encouraged violence or threats of violence against Ms. Benoit in accordance with section 6 of the Act.

This case is relevant as it reflects the increasing use of social media to communicate and organize within communities.

https://canlii.ca/t/k992f
Benoit v Langille -Facebook Group Stop Gail Benoit 2022 NSSC 374

Niagara North Condominium Corp. No. 46 v Chassie, 1999 CanLII 15025 (ONSC)

Statute: Other,
Section: Condominium Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.26; Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19
Province or Territory: Ontario,
Offence: Other,
Animal: Cat,
Type of Distress: Condo corporation seeking an order to remove residents' 16-year-old cat
Sentence: Appeal dismissed
Legal Issue: Procedure, Provincial case,

The applicant, Niagara North Condominium Corporation No. 46 (NNCC), commenced an application in the Ontario Court (General Division) seeking an order directing the respondents, Raymond and Muriel Chassie, to remove their 16-year-old cat from their unit, claiming its presence violated the condominium’s Declaration and Rules, which prohibited all animals, except small, caged birds and fish.

The corporation relied on its authority under the Condominium Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.26, which permits the establishment and enforcement of rules. The court found enforcement unreasonable.

The Chassies’ position was that they had been disadvantaged at the time of purchase, as they were unaware of the cat prohibition and the possibility of enforcement. Further, the Board of Directors had also acquiesced to previous pets, including cats, which undermined the corporation’s claim and made strict enforcement unfair. Finally, removing the cat would further constitute discrimination against Mrs. Chassie due to her depression under the Ontario Human Rights Code, as the cat provided essential companionship and therapeutic support.

The Court found the pet prohibition unreasonable in modern society, where attitudes toward pets have evolved. The prohibition lacked flexibility to accommodate changing circumstances, such as the needs of elderly or disabled residents. The Court emphasized that the cat did not interfere with the use or enjoyment of other units (paras 83-94). It was also found that Mrs. Chassie suffered from a mental disorder (depression) within the meaning of the Human Rights Code. The cat was essential to her mental health and well-being, making them a support/therapy animal, therefore enforcing the no-pet rule would constitute discrimination against Mrs. Chassie based on her health condition or disability, contrary to the Code (paras 108-115).

The application was dismissed; no costs awarded.

https://canlii.ca/t/1wclb
1999 NNCC No 46 v Chaissie

R v T.B., 2008 ONCA 80

Statute: Criminal Code, Youth Criminal Justice Act,
Section: YCJA sections 110(1), 111(1), and 138(1)
Province or Territory: Ontario,
Offence: Dog fighting, Other,
Animal: Dog,
Type of Distress: Appeal on assault with weapon verdict, where accused was acquitted of causing unnecessary suffering to a dog used as a weapon
Sentence: Appeal dismissed
Legal Issue: Ownership/Care/Control,

In the original judgement, the accused was found guilty on multiple counts including assault with a weapon (the pit bull dog Tiger and a beer bottle), aggravated assault, and breaches of probation. The court found that T.B. had control over the dog, intentionally commanded it to attack two victims causing significant injuries, and threw a beer bottle at a police officer during his flight. While he was acquitted of animal cruelty due to reasonable doubt on intentionally causing “sufficient harm” to the dog, the court concluded the dog was used as a weapon, and T.B. was convicted as a principal to the assaults. You can read the initial case here.

An appeal was made based on the claim that trial judge placed undue emphasis on the appellant’s demeanour, which led to her undue assessment of the credibility of T.B.’s testimony.

The Ontario Court of Appeal found that the trial judge’s assessment towards T.B.’s demeanour played little role in her assessment of the credibility of T.B.’s testimony, therefore, dismissed the appeal.

 

 

https://canlii.ca/t/1vmf8
R. v. T.B 2008 ONCA 80

R v T.B., 2006 ONCJ 391

Statute: Criminal Code,
Section: sections 2, 267(a), 268(1), and 446(1) (a)
Province or Territory: Ontario,
Offence: Dog fighting, Other,
Animal: Dog,
Type of Distress: Unlawfully and willfully caused unnecessary suffering to a dog by using the animal as a weapon
Sentence: Not guilty
Legal Issue: Ownership/Care/Control, Suffering, Wilfulness,

The accused, T.B., attended a large party held by another teenage at his parents house in Brampton on June 29, 2002. Around ten to fifteen teenagers were invited; more showed up upon “hearing about it,” and a lot of them were consuming alcohol. Uninvited, T.B. came with a group of friends and brought with him his friend Andre Alleyne’s pit bull named “Tiger,” who he had a close relationship with. The presence of Tiger was not welcomed by the crowds at the party and the accused was told that his dog would have to leave.

After a series of squabbles between the invited guests and T. B.’s group, the dog attacked two people, Eddie Alessi and Marty Brown, under command of T.B. Tiger was hit over the head with a beer bottle “with full force” by Simon Keenan to make it release its grip on Eddie Alessi, and was kicked and punched by various individuals, including the victims, in self-defence. The dog was described as letting out a “little cry” when struck with the beer bottle and then ran away.

The defence argued that T.B. lacked “appropriate control or decision-making capacity” over the dog. to test whether T.B have the required control and intent for the dog attacks, the Court accepted evidence that T.B said “you want this? Bring it” before unleashing the dog, the evidence that he repeatedly yelled “get him” to incite the dog to attack, and that T.B. had a close, possessive relationship with the dog, referring to it as “my dog” during testimony. Together with the fact that Tiger was also responsive of all these commands, the Court found beyond reasonable doubt that T.B. did have de facto control of the dog, despite the dog belongs to his friend Andre Alleyne.

Following the precedent set in R. v McLeod, which held that the definition of “weapon” in s. 2 of the Criminal Code includes both animate and inanimate objects and the focus on the definition should be on the use or intended use of the object to cause injury or threat, the Court ruled that a dog can be a weapon. Altogether, the Court concluded T.B used the dog as a weapon with the request intent for assault.

Despite it has been proven T.B. had the intent to use Tiger as a weapon for assault, the judge acquitted him on the animal cruelty count. The decision is based on a reasonable doubt on the presence of mens rea and “unnecessary suffering.” The charge that T.B unlawfully did willfully cause unnecessary suffering to a dog required proof that he had objective foresight that his actions would lead to the dog being beaten. The court had a reasonable doubt that T.B., when unleashing and inciting the dog to attack, had required foreknowledge that people would have to beat the dog to fend it off. However, his intent was for the dog to attack others, not necessarily for the dog itself to be harmed in the process. In addition, the Crown led no specific evidence about the actual injury or suffering endured by the dog. There was no testimony from a veterinarian or the dog’s owner about any lasting harm, wounds, or the extent of the animal’s pain. The evidence showed the dog ceased its attacks when hit, cried out, but was then able to be led away from the scene. The court was left in a state of reasonable doubt as to whether the suffering inflicted met the legal threshold of being “unnecessary” and caused by the accused’s actions within the meaning of the Criminal Code.

The court concluded that while T. B.’s actions were reckless and criminal in their use of the dog as a weapon against people, the Crown failed to prove the specific elements of the animal cruelty charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The focus of his criminal liability was on his actions toward the human victims, not toward the dog. Consequently, T.B. was found not guilty on animal cruelty.

https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/bd2b11e5-fe63-46f7-b995-e821a73fbb05/?context=1505209
R. v. T.B 2003 - 2006 ONCJ 391

R v Mrozik, 2025 MBPC 54

Statute: Criminal Code,
Section: s163.1(4)
Province or Territory: Manitoba,
Offence: Other,
Animal: Unknown,
Type of Distress: Possession of videos and images with child sexual abuse, with additional 2247 images and 413 videos classified as images of "investigative interest" featuring bestiality and searches for zoo-sadism
Sentence: Two and a half years imprisonment; ancillary orders including DNA and 20-year SOIRA order; 10-year weapons prohibition
Legal Issue: Possession of animal sexual abuse exploitation material ("pornography"),

The accused, a 22-year-old man with no criminal record, pleaded guilty to possessing a significant collection of Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM). The material, found on his cell phone and a gaming device, included 187 unique images and 25 unique videos. The court described the collection as being at the “high end of any depravity scale,” depicting graphic sexual violence, exploitation, and degradation of infants and young children.

In addition, there were 2247 images and 413 videos classified as images of “investigative interest” on the accused’s device. These materials contain elements of bestiality, sadism and masochism, and hurtcore pornography, with videos showing animals that are bound, some are subject to anal penetration and physical violence. His browser history on the dark web reveals searches for zoo-sadism, directly linking his online searches to the pursuit of material depicting animal cruelty. He also specifically requested materials including zoo-sadism, bestiality and other forms of CSAM in online chat rooms. Telegram Messenger chats found on his cell phone was where he engaged in discussions with other users online about types of CSAM; he specifically requested zoosadism and hurtcore materials, including “shota” (sexual content involving young males), from other users and sent CSAM images to other users and received CSAM images from them, as well as instructed other users as to how they could access certain types of material, including “cub” materials, a reference to young and childlike subjects (paras. 32-33).

In reviewing the circumstances of the offender (paras. 49-56), it was revealed that he suffered a decline in his mental health during the pandemic, where he presented as depressed and exhibiting hopelessness, tried several medications and treatment protocols, and received a diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder, Social Anxiety Disorder and mild Autism Spectrum Disorder in 2022. He does not use drugs or alcohol and currently has no close friends but enjoyed talking to people online, and said he was “addicted” to gaming but not been able to engage in those activities due to his release conditions. The accused has never been in a romantic or sexual relationship and denies having a sexual attraction to children. He says that he learned about the Dark Web and the Deep Web from YouTube which led him to explore; he was depressed and suffering from anxiety, boredom and isolation due to the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns and he “stumbled on” the CSAM and animal abuse material. He says he felt “rebellious” by being on the Dark Web and Deep Web and went on the chats or message boards to “troll” people; that he was disgusted by what he saw and engaged with the goal of being disruptive and reporting others to Telegram Messenger. He admits he did exchange videos but that he felt obligated to do so. He takes full responsibility for his offending, and says his arrest was a “wake up call” as to how his mental health had deteriorated and he realized he needed intervention and treatment.

In the presentencing report, the doctor indicated that he felt that the accused’s rehabilitation needs, with his complicating mental health issues, could best be met in the community, and that incarceration would be harmful to his mental health, given his vulnerability and fragility (emotionally, physically and psychologically) (para. 61).

The Court stated that denunciation and deterrence were the paramount sentencing objectives of the sentence to be imposed on the accused for possessing child pornography, referring the Supreme Court guidance in Friesen that sentences for these offences need to reflect society’s condemnation of such conduct and the trauma they inflict on victims (paras. 66-67). It also acknowledged that the accused’s mental health challenges contributed to the circumstances that led to the offending, but do not reduce his moral blameworthiness: “His mental health challenges did not cause him to actually engage in CSAM offending” (paras. 96-98).

While it was considered mitigating that the accused had insight into his offending, was very youthful (19 years old) at the time of his arrest, and there were no alleged breaches to his strict bail conditions nor alleged reoffending of any type, it was found to be aggravating that the CSAM was found on two devices, including a cell phone that provided ready access, the material was at the high end of depravity, and the offending continued for more than a year (paras. 111-112). It was determined that a fit sentence, one in keeping with the principles of deterrence and denunciation at the forefront but has consideration for the mitigating and personal circumstances and factoring in some modest reduction of moral culpability due to his mental health challenges, two and a half years imprisonment was appropriate (para. 137)

The Court also considered the concerns that the accused’s family members and presentencing report doctor expressed about the mental health challenges that  may result in a custodial institution, to which the response was: “The public cannot be expected to receive the same message of denunciation and general deterrence that a jail sentence delivers, if jail, when it is required, is avoided by concerns as to how an offender may do in custody” (para. 138).

The accused was sentenced to two and a half years imprisonment, with ancillary orders including DNA and SOIRA orders (20 years), a mandatory 10-year weapons prohibition, and forfeit of his cell phone and gaming desktop computer tower.

There was no mention of an animal prohibition order, likely because there is no legal mechanism for it with charges relating to possession of child sexual abuse material.

https://canlii.ca/t/kfj4n
R v Mrozik 2025 MBPC 54

R v Marineland of Canada Inc., 2025 ONCJ, File No. 4521-999-23-1028-00

Statute: PAWS Act (ON),
Section: s. 30(1) – Failure to comply with an order
Province or Territory: Ontario,
Offence: Other,
Animal: Other,
Type of Distress: Failure to adequately care for three black bears and comply with related orders
Sentence: Appeal dismissed
Legal Issue: Provincial case (Adequate: (providing adequate care)), Provincial case (Disposition of animals), Provincial case (Due dilligence), Provincial case (Procedure), Provincial case (Sentencing),

This is an unreported decision where Marineland appeals its conviction under Ontario’s Provincial Animal Welfare Services (PAWS) Act on three charges for failing to comply with a 2021 order relating to the care and removal of three black bears kept at the facility, Slash, Toad and Lizzy, alleging that the trial justice had erred in denying their application for a stay of the charges which argued that it was an abuse of process.

The facility had been convicted in March 2024 based on an agreed statement of facts they had presented which they indicated would be sufficient “to make a finding of guilt”, but lawyer Scott Fenton stressed that Marineland was not making a guilty plea and the park maintained the ability to appeal.

Marineland argued that the prosecution was abusive, that the revocation of the order nullified the offences, and that the presiding Justice of the Peace had misapplied the test for abuse of process and stay of proceedings set out in R v Babos, 2014 SCC 16.

Regarding the argument that the province’s revocation negated the offences, the Justice observed:

[17] The Appellant further argued in their factum of December 29, 2023, and in the argument before me that the Ministry simply could have sent the Appellant a letter indicating that given the bears had been removed that compliance with the Order was no longer necessary. The legislation does not contemplate a letter being sent. They argue instead that the Ministry issued a formal Revocation saying that the Order had been complied with.

[18] I reject this argument. For this to be the case it would mean that the Revocation order
would effectively nullify what were valid grounds to prosecute Marineland. I find this would
result in an absurdity.

The Ontario Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the revocation did not erase Marineland’s prior non-compliance and that no abuse of process was established. The Justice confirmed that the Babos framework had been properly applied and emphasized that maintaining public confidence in the enforcement of animal welfare laws required that prosecutions proceed where valid orders had been breached.

R v Marineland of Canada Inc., 2025 ONCJ

R v Merasty, 2025 SKCA 109

Statute: Criminal Code,
Section: s 2: definition of bodily harm
Province or Territory: Saskatchewan,
Offence: Other,
Animal: n/a,
Type of Distress: Definition of bodily harm
Sentence: Appeal allowed: conviction for assault substituted with a conviction for assault causing bodily harm and remitted to trial judge for sentencing
Legal Issue: Procedure (Charges), Procedure (Error in principle), Sentencing,

Despite not being an animal abuse case, this appeal does contain a concise overview on what is required for proving an assault causing bodily harm charge and may be of use when prosecuting animal cruelty.

The offender had been brought before the trial judge on robbery charges, as well as common assault, assault causing bodily harm, and aggravated assault due to an altercation involving a bicycle once owned by the offender. He testified at trial that the bike was his and admitted to striking the victim but said he did not expect to knock them out and that he was only defending his property.

Police who attended the scene had found the victim unconscious, confused and dizzy, with a one-inch laceration on the top right side of his head, with photos taken at the hospital showing the victim’s face covered in dried blood and head wrapped in gauze. Defence counsel argued that the victim’s prior physical condition had not been established and it had not been proven that the injuries described by police witnesses were caused by the offender. The trial judge convicted the offender of common assault but not of the more serious offences of aggravated assault or assault causing bodily harm, stating that:

“I am mindful that the police found [the victim] to be unconscious when he was found on the ground. When he was observed at the hospital sometime later, he was conscious and pictures were taken of his condition. However, when it comes to whether this injury rises to the standard of bodily harm, I have no evidence as to how the injury suffered by [the victim] affected either his health or comfort beyond what is considered transient or trifling… without further evidence as to how his health or comfort was affected, I am unable to determine or infer whether the injury he suffered equated to bodily harm according to Section 2” (para. 8).

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the more serious offences, arguing that the trial judge erred in law by failing to find that the injuries sustained by the complainant met the legal definition of bodily harm. At issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in concluding that the offence of assault causing bodily harm had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court reviewed the definition of bodily harm under the Criminal Code and the evidence required to prove it, referring to case law which ranges from fainting to superficial bruising, lacerations and pulling of hair (para. 19). It concluded that the trial judge had accepted that the victim had been conscious prior to the assault and not after, and that the altercation produced a laceration with significant bleeding, which amounted to more than trifling injuries, and went on to explain:

[22]           Testimony from [the victim]’s treating physician was not required to establish that [the victim] had suffered bodily harm, because the evidence accepted by the Court proved that [the victim] was knocked out and left with a cut that caused significant bleeding. It does not take the testimony of a person with medical training to describe a bruise, a cut, or that someone was found unconscious. It does not take evidence from a medical expert, or even the complainant, to conclude that these injuries affected the health and comfort of [the victim] and were more than trifling in nature. Bodily harm can be inferred from the nature of the injuries sustained which, in this case, were proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence.

[23]           Simply put, expert evidence or medical evidence is not required before making a finding of bodily harm.

The Court found that the trial judge had erred in his application of the definition of bodily harm to the facts. The appeal was allowed, with the conviction for assault substituted for a conviction for assault causing bodily harm, and the matter was remitted to the trial judge for sentencing.

https://canlii.ca/t/kg9mz
R v Merasty 2025 SKCA 109

Josan v R, 2025 SKKB 108

Statute: Criminal Code,
Section: s 445.1(1)(a)
Province or Territory: Saskatchewan,
Offence: Abuse,
Animal: Dog,
Type of Distress: Beating a dog, caught on video; threatening statements made to person recording incident
Sentence: Appeal dismissed; suspended sentence of 12 months with probation conditions, 30 hours of community service, restitution of $1,994 to the Regina Humane Society, a $100 victim surcharge, and a two-year prohibition on possessing animals upheld
Legal Issue: Procedure (Error in principle),

In November 2024, the appellant/offender had pled guilty to wilfully causing unnecessary pain to a dog by hitting it contrary to s 445.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code in an incident that had been captured on video. He was issued a suspended sentence of 12 months with probation conditions, 30 hours of community service, restitution of $1,994 to the Regina Humane Society, a $100 victim surcharge, and a two-year prohibition on possessing animals.

The offender appealed in June 2025, arguing the sentence was excessive and that the sentencing judge had failed to comply with section 726 of the Criminal Code by not asking the offender if he had anything to say before sentencing (para.13-14). The respondent/Crown submitted that the sentence was reasonable and proportionate to the offence, given its seriousness and the need for deterrence and denunciation and acknowledged the procedural error under section 726 but argued it did not affect the sentence.

The judge undertakes a thorough review of the history of animal case law across Canada, referring to the Criminal Code amendments in 2008 and 2019, and quoting at length from cases such as Justice Fraser’s dissent in Reece v Edmonton, Alcorn, Chen and the recent Nichols case from Manitoba to demonstrate the seriousness of animal cruelty offences and the evolving consideration animals have in society. The judge also stated that

“Sentencing judges must consider both the harm done to the animal and to society’s revulsion against and condemnation of animal cruelty. The focus of the inquiry must begin with the gravity of the offence – the nature and extent of the pain, suffering, and injury caused to the animal as the victim of the offence. Courts have compared offences against domestic animals with offences against children, since both are vulnerable and rely upon people as their guardians for their care and protection” (para. 73)

They reiterated that “most convictions result in a prison sentence, suspended sentence with probation, or conditional sentence order. Incarceration is appropriate for serious cases of intentional harm, including for first time offenders” (para. 74) and that “aggravating factors include harming animals in the offender’s care, since this is a breach of trust, and harming pets of others to exert control or as retribution” (para. 75).

The appeal was dismissed after the judge concluded that the sentence was not excessive, but appropriate given the circumstances, and that the error made by the sentencing judge relating to s 726 was not a miscarriage in justice but a harmless oversight, as the offender’s counsel had effectively communicated the offender’s remorse and personal circumstances to the Court.

https://canlii.ca/t/kdlfj
Josan v R 2025 SKKB 108