The self-represented Applicant was appealing both the convictions and sentences under s. 445.1 (1)(a) of the Criminal Code and s. 4 of The Animal Protection Act, 1999 for willfully permitting to be caused unnecessary pain or suffering or injury to cattle. The cattle were suffering from hoof ailments, but the Applicant disregarded the prior warnings and advice provided by the animal protection officers and veterinarian in having the animals treated.
The Applicant was fined $2,000 on the Criminal Code offence and $5,000 for the Animal Protection Act, 1999 offence. He was also subject to an animal prohibition order of 10 years under s. 447.1 of the Criminal Code, as well as an order that for the duration of that time he must register his address and any subsequent changes within 15 days to Animal Protection Services and submit his property to regular inspections by Animal Protection or peace officers under s. 14 of the Animal Protection Act, 1999.
The issues argued in the appeal was:
1. Did the trial judge fail to render sufficient assistance to the self-represented accused to ensure a fair trial?
2. Did the trial judge err in convicting the Applicant under the Animal Protection Act, 1999, having already convicted him under the Criminal Code?
3. Did the trial judge err by basing her sentence on irrelevant considerations?
The appeal judge reviewed the trial’s 609 page transcript and evidence, and determined that the Applicant’s defences at trial seemed to be that only some of the cattle were in distress, which the trial judge had cautioned was not a defence, that dumb animals do not suffer, and that the animal protection authorities had treated him unfairly. None of these defences were in answer to the charges or established due diligence on his part. It was concluded that in the end had gone out of her way to assist the Applicant as a self-represented accused, and the result was a fair trial.
Regarding the convictions under both provincial and Criminal Code charges, the appeal judge applied the Kienapple principle (when one incident results in two or more convictions on offences that have sufficiently similar elements, the accused should be convicted only of the more serious offence) and concluded that both offences were substantially the same as each prohibited wilfully causing of pain, suffering or distress to an animal. Because the Crown indicated that if Kienapple were found to apply, the provincial charges would be stayed. The judge therefore allowed the appeal to the extent of quashing the conviction and entered a judicial stay on the provincial charge, which removed the $5,000 fine and that part of the order dealing with registration. The prohibition order remained since the trial judge relied on both statutes in imposing it.
As to the final issue, the judge determined that the trial judge had considered a number of factors in the decision: the number of animals involved; the warnings and advice provided by the animal protection officers and veterinarian, which the Applicant disregarded; and the suffering experienced by the affected cattle. Further, the Applicant had shown no remorse, and kept interrupting the trial judge to excuse his neglect and deny the animals’ pain and suffering, stating “I am tired of hearing this word pain and distress because we cannot communicate with cattle that way”. Although the sentence was harsh and ended the Applicant’s life in ranching, the judge determined that it was a fit sentence that was both proportionate to the gravity of the offence and to the principles of denunciation and deterrence.